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Summary  
About this study 
We agree with David Cameron’s observation on drugs policy that “it would be very disturbing if 
some radical options were not at least looked at”.1 Among the radical options that are often 
proposed is the creation of a system of licensed cannabis supply subject to taxation and 
regulation of supply and demand sides of the market. In this study, we consider a hypothetical 
reform of this kind and identify a long list of possible sources of net social cost and benefit that 
could result. We attempt to quantify them, using the concept of net external benefit as an 
evaluation criterion. Net external benefit is the total value in cash-equivalent terms of the costs 
and benefits that cannabis use imposes on society outside the user him/herself, and it therefore 
excludes the potential net benefits (‘enjoyment’) accruing to cannabis users in a reformed 
market. Our evaluation is consequently conservative in that it contains an inherent bias in 
favour of the prohibitionist status quo. In our view, it is impossible with available UK evidence to 
produce a credible estimate of net consumption benefits. Despite the bias this entails, it gives a 
far more reliable picture of the policy question than the many widely-cited estimates of the 
“social cost of drug use”, which include internal costs (potential harms to drug users) but ignore 
completely the internal benefits which are the reason that recreational drugs are used in the 
first place.  
The estimates underpinning our evaluation should not be seen as predictions of what would 
happen if such a policy were to be introduced in some future period, since they relate to the 
market situation as it existed in England and Wales in 2009/10, and they abstract from any 
transitional adjustments (and any accompanying transitional cost).  We have not attempted to 
extend the evaluation to cover Scotland or Northern Ireland, since most of the data resources 
available to us cover England and Wales only. 
In constructing the estimates, we consider a wide range of evidence and the difficulties involved 
in drawing conclusions from that evidence. We provide simple, largely subjective, quantitative 
indications of the degree of uncertainty involved in our estimates, some of which should be 
regarded as illustrative calculations rather than formal estimates. Our aim is not to produce a 
definitive cost-benefit analysis of a licensed and regulated cannabis market – which we believe 
to be impossible in the present state of knowledge – but to set out clearly the range of 
considerations that need to be considered in forming a view about this policy, and to indicate 
which aspects of the evaluation are likely to be critical to the outcome of a full cost-benefit 
analysis. 
                                                 
1 House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs 2001, Examination of witnesses, question 123 
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Main conclusions  
[1] The heated public debate on cannabis policy is much too limited in scope. We have 
identified seventeen distinct sources of social cost or benefit that might contribute to the 
outcome of a comprehensive market reform and attempted to quantify thirteen of them. The 
relative importance of these sources depends critically on the form of regulation and the nature 
of market responses to reform. Consequently, any considered view on the question of reform 
needs to take account of a large number of factors and be contingent on a specific view about 
the detailed nature of the reform. Few of the most vocal participants in the debate on drug 
policy reform take a sufficiently broad perspective. 
[2] At present, there is so much uncertainty about some of the important issues involved in 
the introduction of a licensed and regulated cannabis market that a clear conclusion is not 
possible. In particular we lack a good understanding of the demand behaviour which underlies 
the steady fall in cannabis prevalence over the last decade or so, and the degree to which the 
association between cannabis use and long-term adverse outcomes is truly causal. In our view, 
all unambiguous claims for or against radical policy options should be treated with caution. 
[3] Psychopharmacological research suggests that harm from cannabis use is related to the 
chemical composition of the drug, so product regulation similar to that in the tobacco market 
would have some advantages. Several alternative forms of regulation could be used in a licensed 
market and policy designers need to bear in mind the different consequences each might have 
for the harmfulness of consumption. Relatively laisser faire reforms which encourage large 
numbers of small producers make it difficult to control product characteristics and may lead to 
higher levels of overall potency and in turn more harmful long-term outcomes. 
[4] Cost benefit evaluations should not assume that there are zero personal benefits from 
consumption: such an assumption would be unthinkable in any other application of cost benefit 
analysis. Our use of a net external benefit criterion is based on the view that the consumer 
necessarily perceives at least as great a personal benefit from consumption as there is personal 
cost and risk from consumption. It is a conservative approach, producing results biased in 
favour of the status quo under the assumption of competent well-informed decision-makers. 
However, we need a much better understanding of the vulnerable groups who may be making 
poor consumption decisions because of inadequate information or imperfectly developed 
decision-making capacity. 
[5] Given the lack of a convincing empirical model of market demand for high- and low-
potency forms of cannabis and the uncertainty about the form that product regulation would 
take, there is a wide range of plausible market responses to reform. It is likely that consumption 
in overall volume terms will rise significantly as a consequence of the switch to legal status and 
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the lower price that results. But it is possible that, for some forms of product regulation, average 
potency would fall, with aggregate consumption of the psychoactive ingredient THC rising much 
less than consumption of the good itself, and possibly even declining. 
[6] Our results are set out in Table S1 below. The direct impacts of reform in terms of 
potential changes in aggregate policing, criminal justice and drug treatment costs appear to be 
modest and largely insensitive to the nature of regulation and the market response to it. We 
estimate an annual aggregate net benefit of roughly £200-300m from this source as a 
consequence of a move to a regulated market. 
[7] Another direct effect of reform will come through its impact on drug-related crime. One 
might expect crime related to cannabis consumption to increase if reform reduces price and 
increases demand, while crime related to cannabis supply would be reduced as illicit supply is 
driven out of the market. At the individual level, we have found no statistically significant 
evidence of a causal link between cannabis use and acquisitive or violent crime, but a modest 
significant link with supply activity – suggesting an overall net saving on crime costs from 
reform. However, the large size of the cannabis market, the potentially high personal costs for 
the victims of violent crime, and the substantial statistical uncertainty around the estimates 
imply that, at the aggregate level, projected net social benefit of reform is highly uncertain. We 
can be confident of a substantial additional net benefit from reform through a reduction in drug-
related crime if we assume that the demand response is low or moderate. However, if very large 
demand responses to market reform are envisaged, it is not possible to draw any definite 
conclusions about the cost-benefit balance for the impact on crime. 
[8] The indirect effects of policy reform include the social costs of long-term impacts on 
physical and mental health, the impact on labour market outcomes through the scarring effect of 
a criminal record, and the ‘gateway’ effect on the risk of involvement with harder drugs. For all 
of these, we estimate the external costs and benefits to the rest of society, excluding the internal 
costs and benefits borne by the cannabis user. These indirect impacts of reform are hard to 
estimate with any confidence because of the difficulty of isolating the effect of unobserved 
confounding factors that produce spurious correlation between cannabis use and observed 
outcomes. The public debate about cannabis policy has focused heavily on mental health costs, 
but we find these to be modest, because of the relatively small number of individuals involved 
and the modest effect size suggested by the research literature. In total, we expect net external 
costs of the impact on physical and mental health to range from zero for the low demand 
response scenario to around £85m in the case of a strong demand response to reform. Even in 
the worst case, these costs are modest in relation to projected savings on policing and criminal 
justice costs. 
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Table S1   Summary of aggregate external net benefits from cannabis licensing in England and 
Wales (2009 prices) 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response 
(15% quantity increase, 
10% fall in THC) 
Mid-response 
(20% quantity increase, 
5% increase in THC) 
High-response 
(40% quantity increase, 
25% increase in THC) 
Policing + £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
+ £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
+ £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
Court procedures + £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
+ £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
+ £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
Custodial sentences + £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
+ £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
+ £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
Community sentences + £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
+ £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
+ £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
Tax on earnings lost during  
incarceration 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
Assumed market regulation 
/ health promotion costs - £45m - £45m - £45m 
Cost of cannabis-related 
accidents 
+ £13m 
[£8m, £21m] 
- £6m 
[-£11m, -£4m] 
- £32m 
[-£53m, -£20m] 
Cannabis dependency 
treatment costs 
+ £5m 
[£2m, £7m] 
- £2m 
[-£3m, -£1m] 
- £11m 
[-£16m, -£6m] 
Cannabis-induced crime + £17m 
[£6m, £28m] 
- £15m 
[-£145m, £114m] 
- £569m 
[-£1.4bn, £256m] 
Mental illness treatment 
costs 
+ £16m 
[+£8m, +£43m] 
- £8m 
[-£21m, -£4m] 
-£41m 
[-£106m, -£20m] 
Physical illness treatment 
costs 
- £16m 
[-£31m, -£8m] 
- £21m 
[-£41m, -£11m] 
- £43m 
[-£82m, -£21m] 
Criminal record scarring 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
Gateway consequences 
+ £48 
[£0m, +£96m] 
+ £28 
[-£20m, +£80m] 
- £13m 
[-£220m, £0m] 
                                                              Unquantified effects 
Consumption of other 
substances ? ? ? 
Failures of decision-making  ? - -- 
Credibility of health 
information + + + 
Drug tourism - - - 
Total quantifiable direct 
and indirect effects 
+ £361m 
[+£277m, +£461m] 
+ £253m 
[+£98m, +£415m] 
-£430m 
[-£1.3bn, +£400m] 
Note: subjective ranges of uncertainty in brackets; figures may not sum to totals because of rounding. ? = direction of 
effect uncertain; - = probable net cost of modest size; -- = probable net cost, possibly large; + = probable net benefit of 
modest size. 
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 [9] We estimate modest external net benefits from reform through the avoidance of 
scarring effects of criminal records in the labour market of roughly the same magnitude as the 
external cost to society of the impact on mental health. 
[10] Another greatly exaggerated focus of the public debate on cannabis policy is the 
“gateway effect” – the possible increase in risk of involvement in hard drugs caused by exposure 
to cannabis. In our view, the evidence for a large gateway effect among cannabis consumers is 
weak, and there is an often-overlooked offsetting gateway on the supply side, drawing cannabis 
users into drug dealing. Licensing of supply might lead to a rise in demand and thus harm 
through the demand gateway, but it would also remove many people from illicit cannabis 
supply and thus reduce harm through the supply gateway. We estimate that reform could 
generate a net external benefit in the range £20-80m under the most plausible assumption of a 
moderate demand increase. Only a large demand response would be likely to generate a net 
social cost. 
[11] Overall, taking account of all thirteen reform effects that we were able to estimate 
quantitatively, the total effect of reform is a net external benefit of around £280-460m if we 
anticipate a low demand response; a net benefit of £100-415m for the most plausible moderate 
demand response; and a projected net external cost of £430 in the case of a large demand 
response. This last estimate is very uncertain, with an indicative range of uncertainty from -
£1.3bn to +£400m. 
[12] There are many other possible effects of reform which we believe are not possible to 
quantify with any degree of confidence. Four of these may be particularly important: indirect 
effects of relative price changes on the consumption of other harmful substances including 
tobacco, alcohol and other illicit drugs; failures of decision making by certain vulnerable groups 
whose evaluations of their personal costs and benefits may be unreliable as a basis for welfare 
evaluation; the possible improvement in the credibility of health information achievable by 
separating health messages from legal penalties; and the possibility of “drug tourism” as a 
response to a unilateral UK policy initiative. Although we cannot quantify these effects, it is 
likely that they will follow a similar pattern to the quantified effects: no substantial net social 
costs if demand response is low or moderate and a risk of large social costs only if the demand 
response is large. The degree of uncertainty, particularly in the last case, is again very high. 
[13] Tax revenues are a transfer of resources within society rather than a net benefit to 
society, but they are an important aspect of policy outcomes. The conjectured impact on the 
government budget is summarised in Table S2 below. We estimate that tax revenue from 
licensed cannabis supply in England and Wales would fall somewhere in the range £0.4-0.9bn, 
which is far less than some of the assumptions that have appeared in the policy debate. We 
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expect tax revenue to be lower in the case of strong demand response to reform, because of the 
large residual illicit market for high-potency cannabis that could exist in that case. Overall, the 
contribution of cannabis licensing in England and Wales to reduction of the government deficit 
is expected to lie in the range £0.5-1.25bn. 
Table S2        Summary of aggregate government budget implications of cannabis 
licensing in England and Wales 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response 
(15% quantity 
increase, 10% fall in 
THC) 
Mid-response  
(20% quantity 
increase, 5% increase 
in THC) 
High-response 
(40% quantity 
increase, 25% 
increase in THC) 
Commodity taxes  
  
 
     Taxes on licensed cannabis 
+ £768m 
[£564m, £871m] 
+ £594m 
[£436m, £674m] 
+ £541m 
[£397m, £614m] 
     Other indirect taxes ? ? ? 
Taxes on earnings 
  
 
     Tax lost during incarceration 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
     Tax lost due to scarring 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
Public expenditure 
  
 
     Enforcement costs 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
     Health information and 
dependency treatment 
- £41m 
[-£43m, -£39m] 
- £47m 
[-£48, -£46m] 
- £58m 
[-£61m, -£51m] 
     Mental illness treatment 
+ £16m 
[-£0m-£53m] 
- £21m 
[£0m-£53m] 
- £43m 
[£0m-£107m] 
     Physical illness treatment 
- £16m 
[-£31m, -£8m] 
- £21m 
[-£41m, -£11m] 
- £43m 
[-£82m, -£21m] 
Total 
+ £1,051m 
[£816m, £1,225m] 
+ £841m 
[£645m, £1,000m] 
+ £724m 
[£525m, £882m] 
  
[14]  Uncertainty about the magnitude of certain impacts and the response of demand to 
market reform make it impossible to give an unambiguous ex ante evaluation of the net social 
benefit of reform. However, it seems clear that the risk of large net social costs is only significant 
if there is a large demand response to reform. This suggests that a good way to proceed in 
practice might be to introduce the reform together with a monitoring system to give early 
warning of any large demand response, particularly among the very young or other vulnerable 
groups. One of the clear lessons to be learned from policy experience over the last decade or so 
is that it is possible to reverse policy quickly if monitoring were to suggest a large expansion of 
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demand. Policy monitoring should distinguish between consumption of low- and high-potency 
forms of cannabis, since the largest social costs are linked to the latter rather than the former. 
Recommendations for future research 
Where next? This study has revealed the existence of large gaps in our knowledge and in the 
data resources that would be required to supply the missing evidence. Some of these gaps could 
be filled by carrying out quite straightforward research – for example, to improve estimates of 
policing and criminal justice unit costs. Some gaps may never be filled adequately, because of 
the extreme difficulty of estimating the true long-term causal effects of variations in drug use on 
outcomes. Two important areas of uncertainty where progress may be possible are drug-related 
crime and drug demand behaviour, but it would require greater sustained investments in data 
and research effort.  
 (i) Data  
The Home Office relies heavily on the British Crime Survey (now known as the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales) as the primary source of data on drug use.  The BCS has significant 
shortcomings: it is a cross-sectional survey that does not allow analysis of the dynamics of drug 
use at the individual level; it gives data on drug use and crime victimisation but not 
respondents’ own criminal activity; and it under-represents prolific offenders and drug users. In 
this study, we have exploited research based on a combination of the Arrestee Survey (AS) and 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS), to avoid the under-recording of cannabis 
consumption by the BCS and to estimate the volume of cannabis-related crime. The 
abandonment of both the AS and OCJS in 2006 makes it now virtually impossible to construct 
these estimates using current, nationally representative data. If drugs policy is to be evidence-
based, this gap in our data resources is a serious problem and should be reconsidered. 
(ii) Demand analysis 
A second obvious gap in our data resources is the lack of regular, representative data on drug 
prices and potency, which makes it almost impossible to attempt an analysis of demand in the 
current cannabis market. The uncertainty inherent in our estimates is greatest in the scenario 
which envisages a large demand response to market reform. We see this outcome as relatively 
implausible, given the limited evidence of response to less radical policy liberalisation in many 
countries and the lack of any detectable increase in demand in response to the reclassifications 
of cannabis in 2004 and 2009, but the evidence on demand behaviour is weak. Published 
attempts to estimate demand responses come from US and Australian data and do not give a 
good basis for projecting the effect of reform in the UK. Standard statistical models of cannabis 
use also fail to offer any clear explanation for the steady decline in cannabis demand over the 
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last decade and they do not capture the important distinction between low- and high-potency 
forms of the drug or explain the structural shift in the cannabis market. There is a clear need for 
a better understanding of the demand for cannabis, which will only be achievable with better 
data on consumption, price and potency. 
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1 Introduction and objectives 
Policy on illicit drugs is the subject of perpetual heated debate, both at the international level, 
where there is pressure for revision of the UN conventions which seek to dictate elements of 
national policy, and at the national level, where successive UK governments have flirted with 
various ideas for reform. Proponents of ‘tough’ and ‘liberal’ drugs policy have often adopted 
strong positions, using highly selective interpretations of limited research evidence to support 
their arguments. Few participants in the public debate on drugs policy acknowledge the large 
uncertainties that exist in the research evidence and the debate is often conducted in emotive 
terms, using vague conceptions of ‘tough’ and ‘liberal’ policy, and sometimes making large 
deductive leaps that have little backing in logic. Perhaps the worst aspect of the public debate is 
that the very act of contemplating certain policy options can attract vehement criticism and even 
risk to the reputations of policy analysts who do so. 
People on different sides of the argument often choose to emphasise different elements of the 
cannabis policy issue. For example, May et al (2002) give quotations from interviews with two 
police officers who personally used very different operational policies. One was concerned with 
the potential damaging consequences of a criminal record for a minor cannabis offence: 
“If you stop someone and they are not aggressive or abusive and they don’t have 
a criminal record, I can’t see the point in giving them a criminal record for a bit 
of cannabis.” 
Another officer was concerned with a different set of possible long-term consequences: 
“I feel that cannabis leads onto heavier drugs. Most hard drug users start with 
cannabis and before you know it you have a heroin addict.” 
Others might be concerned about the costs of using criminal justice procedures against cannabis 
users, or the costs of treatment for cannabis dependency, or the mental health consequences of 
long-term use, or a host of other considerations. Few participants in the policy debate are 
prepared to consider the whole range of factors that are relevant to policy decisions. 
No serious researcher or commentator on drugs policy believes that cannabis is harmless. 
Although there are many uncertainties about the health consequences of cannabis use, the 
research literature demonstrates convincingly that potential harms do exist. However, the 
existence of a potential harm does not automatically provide justification for a prohibitionist 
policy. If it did, we would certainly be prohibiting alcohol and tobacco and, taken to the extreme, 
we would also be considering banning many everyday activities and pastimes – including David 
Nutt’s famous example of horse-riding (Nutt 2008). The absurdity of examples like this tells us 
that there is a very wide logical gap between the revelation of health risks by medical research 
and any specific policy prescription. The current stance of cannabis prohibition may be a good 
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policy option, but it cannot be assumed so automatically on grounds of demonstrable risk of 
harm to cannabis users.  
Prohibition is (probably) a deterrent to cannabis consumption and it raises supply costs and 
market price, which also restrains demand. It may also have an informational role as a signal to 
consumers of potential risk. However, it has drawbacks too. If the only market is a black market, 
the authorities sacrifice the power of taxation, which is a way of influencing price and generating 
tax revenue. They also sacrifice the ability to regulate the market in other ways, particularly in 
terms of product characteristics like potency. It is also likely that confounding the health 
education message with legal prohibition destroys the credibility of that message in the minds of 
some cannabis users. 
Our aim in this study is not to produce a definitive cost-benefit verdict on cannabis licensing and 
regulation, because a definitive analysis is simply not possible, given the limited evidence that is 
available. Instead, we set out a reasonably complete list of the issues that would have to be 
addressed by a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and attempt to provide an indication of 
their likely importance. We have three primary objectives: (i) to give the policy debate the broad 
perspective that it requires; (ii) to make advances in the quality of evidence available for some of 
these issues; and (iii) to identify – if possible – a key set of elements of the cost-benefit 
calculation which are likely to have the biggest influence on the conclusions and which 
consequently deserve particular attention in future research.  
The estimates presented here vary in their sophistication, with some being little more than 
back-of-the-envelope – albeit quite a large envelope. All are subject to considerable uncertainty, 
which we try to convey by means of subjective high-low ranges based mostly on judgement 
rather than science. Despite their variable quality, we hope that, by putting these specific 
estimates into the public domain, we will provide a starting point for a more coherent policy 
debate. 
All the estimates reported here relate to England and Wales rather than Great Britain or the UK. 
This is dictated by the coverage of some critical data sources produced by the Home Office, 
whose remit extends only to England and Wales. This incomplete geographical coverage is far 
from ideal, because it would not be feasible to introduce some forms of this policy on one side of 
the Anglo-Scottish land border only. Although there are significant differences between the illicit 
drugs markets in England and Scotland, we would not expect the exclusion of Scotland to make a 
large quantitative difference to our calculations, since the Scottish population comprises only 
8.6% of the population of Great Britain (mid-2010 figures). 
This is not the first attempt to apply the principles of cost-benefit analysis to regulation of the 
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cannabis market. Atha and Davis (2011) provide some estimates for the UK suggesting a modest 
net social benefit of reform (mainly due to large projected savings in criminal justice costs), and 
also very large net gains to the government budget. However, their analysis rests on strong 
assumptions, and we are sceptical about the very high projections of tax revenue. Some 
potentially important indirect long-term effects (particularly on health) are not costed.  
There have been only a few attempts at comprehensive cost-benefit studies outside Britain. In 
the USA, Kilmer et al (2010) and Caulkins et al (2013) have examined California’s Proposition 19 
which was defeated in a referendum in November 2010. With a specific excise tax of $50 per 
ounce, they project a large reduction in production costs and a consequent fall in the retail price 
causing a possibly large increase in total consumption. But there is a great deal of uncertainty, 
arising from our limited understanding of behavioural demand responses to price changes. They 
envisage significant but modest effects relating to the costs of law enforcement, regulation and 
treatment, but highly uncertain changes in the costs associated with longer-term indirect 
consequences. The type of policy reform they consider precludes strong product controls and 
could therefore cause a worrying rise in average potency; a more direct approach to regulation 
may be feasible in the European context. In Australia, Shanahan and Ritter (2011, 2013) have 
produced estimates for the state of New South Wales, presented unconventionally in the form of 
aggregate welfare measures for the status quo and reform settings, so the effect of reform is the 
difference between the two. Shanahan and Ritter envisage a system involving product controls 
and monopolistic distribution through state or non-profit cannabis-only retail outlets, with 
licensing of commercial producers alongside individual small-scale cultivation permitted for 
people over 21. Their findings suggest significant net benefits from criminal justice cost savings 
and consumption benefits from increased cannabis use, which are offset by projected social 
losses from the costs of market regulation and reduction of educational attainment.  Their 
projection of overall net social benefit of reform lies well within the margin of uncertainty for 
the analysis. 
We first give a brief overview of the drugs market in England and Wales over the relevant period 
and then set out our own approach to evaluation, before presenting the results of the analysis. 
We would like to emphasise that we have approached our objectives with a completely open 
mind. None of the authors of this report is committed to any ideological position in relation to 
illicit drugs, nor did any of us start with any specific view about the desirability of a licensed and 
regulated cannabis market. 
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2 The illicit drugs market in England and Wales since 2000 
2.1 The policy environment 
British policy on cannabis and, to a lesser extent, other illicit drugs has seen large swings of 
opinion by government since 2000. The main developments in drugs policy are outlined in Table 
2.1.1. Throughout the period, a prohibitionist legal stance has been maintained, with illicit drugs 
classified into three categories, A, B and C, which were defined initially by the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act. Classification combines two purposes, which are often seen to be in conflict: to 
indicate an official view of the potential harmfulness of each substance; and to define 
enforcement penalties for possession, trafficking and related offences. At the start of the 
millennium, cannabis had been included in class B  since 1971 and, as a consequence, carried 
maximum penalties for possession and supply of 5 and 14 years respectively. At the time, this 
compared with life imprisonment (supply) and 7 years (possession) for class A drugs, and 5 
years (supply) and 2 years (possession) for class C. 
The Blair government’s first drugs strategy appeared in 1998, overseen by a “Drugs Tsar”, Keith 
Hellawell. The strategy had four loosely-stated aims: prevention of drug use by young people; 
protection of communities from drug-related anti-social and criminal behaviour; encouraging 
existing drug users to give up; and reduction of the availability of illicit drugs. There was a 
commitment to (initially unspecified) policy targets and, in the early years, the Home Office 
engaged in a process of developing specific targets and corresponding quantitative performance 
indicators, including the development of a Drug Harm Index (MacDonald et al 2005), which has 
been quoted in both the 2008 and 2010 drugs strategy documents in relation to class A drugs. 
The policy instruments to be used in achieving the aims of the drugs strategy were not initially 
specified except in the most general terms, but there was a generalised commitment to drug 
treatment and co-ordination of policy across agencies. Development of new policy initiatives has 
been problematic throughout the last decade, with early disagreement between the Home 
Secretary (then David Blunkett) and the Drugs Tsar, who resigned in July 2002 over the 
proposed softer line on cannabis; and, later on, between the Home Secretary (then Alan 
Johnson) and the chairman of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (then David Nutt), 
over the latter’s criticism of the government’s maintenance of a hard line on ecstasy 
classification, contrary to ACMD advice.   
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Table 2.1.1 Major developments in drugs policy affecting England and Wales since 2000 
Date Event 
Jul 2001  Start of 13-month cannabis decriminalisation experiment in London Borough of 
Lambeth. 
Oct 2001 Home Secretary David Blunkett announced intention to reclassify cannabis from 
class B to class C. 
May 2002 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee’s report supported cannabis 
reclassification; also recommended reclassifying ecstasy from A to B; and 
advocated a large expansion of treatment provision. 
Jul 2002 Drug Tsar Keith Hellawell resigned in protest at plans to reclassify cannabis. 
Nov 2002 Updated Home Office Drugs Strategy confirmed cannabis reclassification and 
proposed increased maximum penalty for class C supply of 14 years imprisonment; 
expansion of CJS-triggered drug treatment. 
Jan 2004 Reclassification of cannabis implemented; policing guidelines indicated 
confiscation and warning as normal action on possession; maximum penalty for 
supply of class C drugs raised to 14 years. 
May 2005 Judgement of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), in R v Quayle, Wales and 
others, that a defence of medical necessity for relief of chronic pain is not 
admissible for cannabis offences. 
Jan 2006 2005 Drugs Act implemented: magic mushrooms put in class A; burden of proof 
shifted to defendant in cases involving possession of more than the (unspecified) 
amount required for personal use; compulsory drug testing for suspects in crimes 
believed to involve class A drug use or recipients of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. 
Jul 2006 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee’s report on drugs policy 
criticised the drug classification system and the organisation and operation of the 
ACMD, both generally and in relation to its recommendations on magic mushrooms 
and ecstasy. It found no evidence to support the gateway theory or deterrence 
effects from drug classification. 
Jan 2006 The ACMD advised retaining cannabis in class C, following Government request for 
reconsideration in light of concerns about psychotic illness and increased supply of 
high-potency sinsemilla (“skunk”).  
Feb 2008 Revised Home Office Drugs Strategy specified 8 quantitative policy targets to be 
monitored. 
May 2008 Home Secretary Jacqui Smith announced intention to reclassify cannabis from class 
C to class B. 
Jan 2009 Cannabis reclassified as class B. AMCD recommendation for downgrading of MDMA 
to class B rejected by the Home Secretary. 
Oct 2009 Firing of chairman (David Nutt) followed, over the following six months, by the 
resignation of seven other members of ACMD in protest at government’s treatment 
of ACMD. Formation in Jan 2010 of Independent Scientific Committee on Drugs. 
Dec 2010 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill introduced, with provisions to: remove 
restrictions on the area of expertise covered by the membership of the ACMD 
(relaxing the requirement for at least 6 scientist members); and allow the Home 
Secretary to place temporary restrictions on substances by statutory instrument. 
Dec 2010 Consultation on a revised Home Office Drugs Strategy emphasising: (i) individual 
responsibility to seek help and overcome dependency: (ii) a holistic approach to 
support drug-dependent people; (iii) demand reduction; (iv) a “crack down” on 
drug suppliers; (v) the role of local communities. A payment-by-results system 
proposed for the drug treatment system. 
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2.2 Consumption trends 
Drug consumption is difficult to measure given its illicit nature, nevertheless several large-scale 
surveys ask annually about drug consumption using questions that are consistent over time and 
thus allow us to construct time series of reported drug prevalence. Here we provide an overview 
of consumption trends over the last decade among the general population, using data from the 
British Crime Survey (BCS) and the surveys of Smoking, Drinking and Drugs Use among Young 
People in England (the “Schools Surveys”). These are the surveys used to derive the UK 
government’s reported levels of drug prevalence (see UK Focal Point, 2010). To put the UK 
situation into an international context, we also present data from the European School Survey 
Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD) , which in 2007 collected data on school students in 
35 countries. 
Figure 2.2.1 Trends in drug use among 16-59 year olds  in England and Wales 
 
Note: 'Any drug' comprises powder cocaine, crack cocaine, ecstasy, LSD, magic mushrooms, heroin, 
methadone, amphetamines, cannabis, tranquillisers, anabolic steroids, amyl nitrite, glues, any other 
pills/powders/drugs smoked plus ketamine since 2006/07 interviews and methamphetamine since 
2008/09 interviews. 
 
The BCS samples adults aged 16-59 years in private households in England and Wales. Figure 
2.2.1 shows the proportion of respondents who reported using drugs of different types in the 
previous year. Overall drug prevalence among 16-59 year olds was stable at about 12% for the 
first part of the decade before beginning an almost continuous decline in 2004 that reduced 
prevalence to just above 8% in 2009/10. The decline was driven by the falling use of cannabis, 
which fell from 10% in 2000 to about 6% in 2009/10, but the overall drop also masked a rise in 
the use of powder cocaine. Cocaine is much less common than cannabis but experienced a large 
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proportionate increase in prevalence, from 2% in 2000 to about 3% by the end of the decade. 
Use of crack and heroin was negligible among the general population (annual prevalence of 
0.3% or less) for the entire decade. 
Figure 2.2.2 looks at the same trends but focuses on 16-24 year olds only, who are known to 
consume the bulk of illicit drugs. Not surprisingly, the trends in prevalence are similar to those 
across the full age range, but it appears that the fall in cannabis use among the younger age 
group began slightly earlier, in 2001, than might be inferred from Figure 2.2.1. Annual cannabis 
prevalence fell from 30% in 2000 to 20% in 2009/10. There was also a small increase in the 
prevalence of powder cocaine, but almost no use of crack or heroin. 
Figure 2.2.2 Trends in drug use among 16-24 year olds  in England and Wales 
 
See note to Figure 2.2.1. 
The BCS gives us no information about another important group of drugs consumers, those 
under 16. To follow the trends in their drug use, we present data from the Schools Studies (for 
England only) in Figure 2.2.3. Again, we see evidence that overall drug use declined after about 
2003, falling from an annual prevalence of about 20% to 15% in 2009 (it is not clear what is 
behind the apparent sharp increase from 2000 to 2001). Cannabis prevalence follows a similar 
decline, from 13% to 9%, as does a residual category of other drugs (including ecstasy and 
solvents). As for adults, there was also an increase in the annual prevalence of powder cocaine, 
from 1% in 2000 to around 2% near the end of the decade, although the prevalence was only 
about a fifth of that in the 16-24 year age group. School pupils report higher prevalence of crack 
and heroin (0.5–1%) than adults, though they remain low and there is no apparent trend.  
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Figure 2.2.3 trends in drug use among 11-15 year olds in England 
 
Note: ‘Others’ includes ecstasy, amphetamines, poppers, LSD, magic mushrooms, ketamine, methadone, 
glue, gas, aerosols and other solvents, tranquilisers, anabolic steroids and other drugs, excluding cannabis. 
Source: annual school surveys of Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use. 
 
Although drug use seems to have fallen in recent years in England and Wales, it remains high 
compared to other European countries. ESPAD has collected four sweeps of data since 1995 on 
the substance use of 15-16 year old European school students. We use data from the fourth 
sweep in 2007. Figure 2.2.4 shows the percentage of students who had ever  taken cannabis: 
with a prevalence of 29%, the UK is among the highest consuming countries, behind only France, 
Switzerland , Slovakia and the Czech Republic. More than half the surveyed countries reported 
average prevalence of less than 20%. 
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Figure 2.2.4 Lifetime cannabis prevalence among 15–16 year olds in Europe 
 
 
It is important to bear in mind that these survey-based estimates of drug prevalence are likely to 
be substantial under-estimates of true drug prevalence. There are two main reasons for this. 
Under-reporting  Drug possession is illegal and survey respondents may be reluctant to admit 
their past drug use at interview. Methods such as Computer-Assisted Self Interview (CASI) are 
routinely used to ensure the confidentiality of responses and these methods have been shown to 
elicit higher rates of self-reported prevalence, but there remains some evidence of under-
reporting. A review by Pudney et al (2006) suggested that under-reporting might be 5-6% for 
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cannabis. 
Nonresponse  Survey participation is voluntary, and  there is a significant refusal rate in all the 
surveys which provide evidence on drug use. If drug-users are more likely to refuse co-
operation, then the achieved sample will over-represent non-drug users and under-estimate 
prevalence. A further problem for survey measurement is that some prolific drug users live in 
“chaotic” conditions and are hard to contact, either because they have no formal home or 
because their pattern of activity makes contact difficult. Pudney et al (2006) attempted to 
overcome this problem in their study of the drugs market in 2003/4 by combining general-
population surveys with a survey of arrestees which was believed to have better coverage of this 
hard-to-reach group. Their estimates, which are shown in Table 2.2.1, suggest that estimates of 
last-year prevalence based on household surveys like the British Crime Survey understate the 
number of cannabis users by at least 30%.2 This is a large bias, but less than the degree of under-
estimation found for more damaging drugs like heroin and crack. 
 
                   Table 2.2.1  Alternative estimates of England and Wales drug prevalence  
                                            (users within previous year) 
 
BCS 2003/4 estimate: 
ages 16-59a 
Pudney et al (2006) 
estimate: ages 17-59 
Pudney et al (2006) 
estimate: all ages 
Cannabis 3.363 4.824 5.521 
Amphetamines 0.483 0.877 0.985 
Ecstasy 0.614 1.210 1.289 
Cocaine 0.755 1.326 1.390 
Crack 0.055 0.241 0.302 
Heroin 0.043 0.206 0.244 
a Source: Chivite-Matthews et al (2005) 
 
It was not feasible in this study to repeat the Pudney et al (2006) analysis to adjust for under-
estimation of prevalence, because much of the data used in that study is not available for more 
recent years. Consequently, some of the prevalence-related estimates of policy costs and benefits 
presented in sections 5 and 6 and summarised in section 7 are likely to  be under-estimates, 
although we do not expect the overall cost-benefit balance to be  severely distorted. 
2.3 Drug prices and purity 
We review trends in the price (and purity) of illicit drugs in the UK using the available data since 
2000. The data come from three main sources: the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and 
forensic services; a survey of drug and alcohol services, police forces and service user groups 
conducted by the charity DrugScope; and a survey of drug users by the Independent Drug 
                                                 
2 These prevalence figures were excluded from the version of Pudney et al (2006) published by the Home Office, 
apparently to avoid conflict with BCS estimates. 
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Monitoring Unit (IDMU).  
The data provided by SOCA (and its predecessor before 2006, the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service, NCIS) are collected from police forces around the UK, who obtain information using a 
variety of means, including test purchases, prisoner interviews and informants (UK Focal Point 
on Drugs, 2010). SOCA does not publish the data itself but does provide them in standardised 
form to international bodies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Reports to the 
EMCDDA are passed via the UK Focal Point on Drugs, which publishes summary prices from the 
SOCA data in its annual reports on the UK drugs situation. The UK Focal Point also publishes 
data on drug purity, based on seizures analysed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) and, more 
recently, LGC Forensics. 
DrugScope is a charity which offers advice and support to organisations in the drug sector, and  
promotes evidence-based policy development. Every year since 2005, DrugScope has surveyed 
drug action teams (DATs), police forces and service user groups in 20 towns and cities across 
the UK. Average prices from the surveys are published in Druglink magazine, and we use the 
available data from 2006 onwards (also summarised in UK Focal Point on Drugs, 2010).  
The Independent Drug Monitoring Unit is a company that monitors the state of the drugs market 
in the UK and provides expert witnesses in court cases. They conduct an annual survey which 
collects information on drug consumption and prices paid by drug users who volunteer to take 
the survey (mainly online). We use data published on the IDMU website covering prices from 
2004 onwards. 
The three data sources are clearly very different from each other in their sampling methods, 
respondent populations, response modes and geographical coverage. Illicit drugs are far from 
being a standardised product, and so there will be differences in reported prices owing to 
variation of drug types and quality (for example, the IDMU survey collects separate prices for 
five types of cannabis , compared to only two or three in the other sources) and differences in 
purity. It is not feasible to make adjustments for all these differences, and given the lack of data 
harmonisation we would expect average prices to differ over sources. However, our main 
interest is not to compare alternative price estimates at a point in time, but to get a picture of 
trends over the last decade. As will be seen below, the trends from the three sources are broadly 
consistent with one another. 
Cannabis  
We distinguish three forms of cannabis: 
(i) Sinsemilla (“without seeds”) is a herbal form prepared from the flowering tops of 
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unpollinated female plants. Sinsemilla is believed to be mainly produced domestically rather 
than imported, using indoor production methods with artificial lighting. It is often referred to as 
“skunk”, especially varieties with a particularly strong aroma. Sinsemilla commands the highest 
market price. 
(ii) Herbal cannabis refers to all other unprocessed material from the cannabis plant. It is mostly 
imported. 
(iii) Resin or hashish is extracted from the cannabis plant and (mainly) imported from North 
Africa in the form of compressed dark brown or black blocks. 
Figure 2.3.1 shows the price of cannabis, distinguishing between these three types. The long run 
of SOCA data show that the prices of resin and standard quality herb both fell during the first 
half of the decade, from a high of nearly £4 per gram in 2000 to around £2–£3 in 2006. The 
trends are broadly corroborated by the IDMU data from 2004. All the data sources then show a 
resurgence of prices from around 2006 onwards. By 2010, standard herbal cannabis and resin 
were back up to around £4 per gram, with high-quality cannabis being sold for about £7 per 
gram after showing significant rises from 2008 onwards (the IDMU data are an exception here, 
indicating that sinsemilla prices were flat overall from 2004-9).  
We should note that the reference purchase weights used in the SOCA and DrugScope data were 
reduced in 2006 and 2008 respectively (see notes to Table 1), which would lead to a one-off 
increase in the price per gram equivalent in these years (given that larger drugs purchases are 
cheaper per unit weight). This change may overstate the apparent upward trend, however IDMU 
reports that there were large increases in all cannabis prices in 2010 (full data not yet 
published), providing further evidence for a reversal of the falls in the first half of the decade.3 It 
is tempting to attribute the increased price of cannabis since 2009 to the effect of reclassification 
to class B that occurred at the start of 2009, but this would be unsafe, since there is no 
corresponding evidence of a fall in price following the earlier reclassification to class C in 
January 2004. 
  
 
                                                 
3 Online press release: “IDMU Survey reports big hike in 2010 UK Drug Prices”,  
http://www.idmu.co.uk/big-hike-in-2010-uk-drug-prices.htm 
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Figure 2.3.1  Price of cannabis per gram equivalent since 2000 (indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
Note: Data sources are in parentheses: LEA is law enforcement agencies, DS is DrugScope, IDMU is 
Independent Drug Monitoring Unit. High quality herbal cannabis is skunk or sinsemilla. Prices are in £ per 
gram equivalents converted from street prices: LEA prices are based on the price for an ounce until 2006, 
and the price for 1/8 ounce from 2007; Drugscope prices are based on the price for an ounce until 2008,  
and the price for ¼ ounce from 2009; IDMU prices are based on the price for 1/8 oz. LEA data sources: UK 
Focal Point (2001), NCIS data for 2000; UK Focal Point (2005), NCIS data for 2001-2003; UK Focal Point 
(2010), NCIS/SOCA data for 2004-2009. DrugScope data source: UK Focal Point (2010). IDMU data source: 
pages from IDMU website http://www.idmu.co.uk/prices.htm 
 
The concept of purity is ambiguous in the case of cannabis, which has a complex chemical 
structure involving many different compounds (“cannabinoids”). The primary psychoactive 
constituent of cannabis is 9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), but perceptions of product quality are 
influenced by other product characteristics, and these quality variations are reflected in the 
large number of named product varieties (“Red Seal”, “Black Moroccan”, “Northern Lights”, etc). 
There is some evidence from police seizures of cannabis to suggest that there has been a sharp 
rise in the average potency (THC content) of purchased cannabis  since 2002, due almost 
entirely to a shift from low-potency imported herb and resin to higher-potency sinsemilla (see 
Table 2.3.1). There is no discernible trend in average THC content within each of the sinsemilla, 
herb and resin categories since 2000 (ACMD 2008, Table 5). The rising trend in market share of 
sinsemilla has been much exaggerated in parts of the news media but it is a striking change in 
the structure of the retail market. However, it should be borne in mind that police seizures are 
unlikely to be representative of all cannabis purchases, and may over-represent cannabis 
“connoisseurs” who would, in any case, constitute an increasing share of the market if the falling 
trend in cannabis prevalence is due to an exit from the market of marginal consumers who 
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would otherwise have used only low-potency cannabis. Since 2009/10, the British Crime Survey 
has included a question asking respondents to distinguish between skunk and other forms of 
cannabis and responses to that question suggest a lower market share, with around half of 
cannabis users reporting use of at least some skunk.4 
 
Table 2.3.1   Market share of cannabis types 
Year % sinsemilla % herbal % resin 
Market share (by weight) 
2002a 15 15 70 
2004/5b 55 45 (herb & resin combined) 
2008b 81 3 16 
Median potency (THC content) 
2004/5b 14.0 2.1 3.5 
2008c 15.0 9.0 5.0 
a King et al (2005); b Potter et al (2008); c Hardwick and King (2008) 
 
 
Powder cocaine and crack 
Figure 2.3.2 shows that the prices of powder cocaine and crack have been falling almost 
continuously since 2000 (the top line segment is the gram price provided by SOCA from 2007 
onwards; other crack prices are per rock). Cocaine fell from £80 per gram in 2000 to only £40 
per gram in 2009, while crack also roughly halved in price from £30 per gram in 2000. However, 
these trends can be misleading because it is also known that the purity of cocaine and crack have 
declined in recent years. The UK Focal Point also publish data from the FSS (and latterly, LGC 
Forensics) on the purity of drugs seizures, showing that the purity of both cocaine and crack fell 
fairly continuously over the decade (from 52% in 2000 to 20% in 2009 for cocaine, and from 
66% to 27% over the same period for crack). Using these annual data, we have made 
approximate adjustments to the price trends in Figure 2.3.2. The adjusted data in Figure 2.3.3 
suggest that the adjusted price of cocaine and crack was fairly stable over most of the decade, 
but began to rise quite sharply after 2007. This is also in line with IDMU  reports of low cocaine 
and crack purity.5  
 
                                                 
4 Note that the term skunk is often used only for certain particularly pungent types of sinsemilla, so this may 
understate the market prevalence of high-THC sinsemilla to some unknown extent. 
5 http://www.idmu.co.uk/big-hike-in-2010-uk-drug-prices.htm 
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  Figure 2.3.2   Price of powder cocaine (g) and crack cocaine (rock) since 2000                      
(indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
Note: See note to Figure 2.3.1. LEA crack prices are per gram from 2007 (per rock previously). 
 
 
Figure 2.3.3 Purity-adjusted price of powder cocaine (g) and crack cocaine (rock) since 2000 
(indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
Note: See notes to Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Purity data sources: UK Focal Point (2002), FSS data for 2000–
2002; UK Focal Point (2010), FSS data to 2007, FSS and LGC Forensics from 2008 onwards. 
 
Heroin 
Figure 2.3.4 shows a slightly different picture for heroin prices. The SOCA data show a long term 
downward trend, while the IDMU and DS prices for the second half of the decade show that 
prices were flat overall, although somewhat volatile.  
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Figure 2.3.4   Price of heroin(g) since 2000 (indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
Note: See notes to Figure 2.3.1.  
 
Adjusting the prices for purity (Figure 2.3.5) suggests that the downward trend in prices since 
2000 was interrupted by a large adjusted price hike in 2003 owing to a drop in purity. 
Nevertheless, recent prices still appear to be near historic lows. 
Figure 2.3.5  Purity-adjusted price of heroin(g) since 2000 (indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
Note: See notes to Figure 2.3.1and 2.3.3. 
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Amphetamines, ecstasy and LSD 
Finally, we turn to amphetamines, LSD and ecstasy. The data suggest that LSD and amphetamine 
prices have been broadly flat in recent years, with perhaps an uptick in 2008, while the price of 
an ecstasy tablet has fallen dramatically, from £11 in 2000 to just over £2 in 2009 (Figure 2.3.6).  
 
 
       Figure 2.3.6 Price of amphetamines (g), ecstasy (tab) and LSD (tab) since 2000 
(indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
However, as for cocaine and crack, there are have been large falls in the purity of ecstasy tablets 
(from 74mg of MDMA base per tab in 2000 to 44mg in 2009, according to FSS/LGS Forensics 
data; UK Focal Point, 2010). Making an adjustment for purity, Figure 2.3.7 indicates that the 
“real” price of an ecstasy tab in 2009 (in terms of purity in 2000) was closer to £4 than the 
nominal street price of £2. Amphetamines also declined slightly in purity; thus there was a 
moderate increase in the adjusted price over the decade. (We have no data on the purity of LSD 
tabs and so cannot make any adjustment.) 
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 Figure 2.3.7  Purity-adjusted price of amphetamines (g) and ecstasy (tab) since 2000 
(indexed to 2010 prices) 
 
The overall picture emerging from the data is that drug prices have either fallen or remained 
stable since 2000, although falling prices have been partly or largely offset by declines in purity 
(especially for cocaine and ecstasy). There is some evidence of a recent resurgence in cannabis 
prices and the effective price of cocaine and crack may also be being driven up by continuing 
falls in purity. 
 
2.4 Enforcement 
The Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) has been the primary legislation for controlling psychoactive 
substances in the UK since 1971. This Act is intended to prevent the non-medical use of certain 
drugs and created a classification system that used the harm caused by a drug to define the 
maximum penalty associated with its possession and misuse. Drugs subject to this Act are 
known as 'controlled' drugs. The Act defines a series of offences, including unlawful supply, 
intent to supply, import or export (collectively known as 'trafficking' offences), unlawful 
production, and unlawful possession. The police have the special powers to stop, detain and 
search people on 'reasonable suspicion' that they are in possession of a controlled drug. The 
table below presents the current classification of controlled drugs and the maximum penalty 
that applies in relation to its possession or supply.  
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Table 2.4.1 Classification of drugs and maximum penalty under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
Classification Drug 
Maximum penalty 
Possession Supply 
Class A Powder cocaine 
Crack cocaine 
Ecstasy 
LSD 
Magic mushrooms 
Heroin 
Methadone 
Methamphetamine 
Injectable Class B drugs 
(such as amphetamines) 
 
7 years + fine Life + fine 
Class B Amphetamines 
Barbiturates 
Cannabis (since January 2009) 
Codeine 
 
5 years + fine 14 years + fine 
Class C Anabolic steroids 
Ketamine (since April 2006) 
Minor tranquillizers (librium, valium, etc.) 
GHB/GBL 
BZP 
2 years + fine 14 years + fine 
Source: Drugscope (http://www.drugscope.org.uk/) 
 
Figure 2.4.1 shows that drugs offences are a major contributor to the prison population (almost 
13,000 prisoners, over 15% of the prison population), second only to the category of violence 
against the person. A majority of these cases involve drugs other than cannabis, but this does 
emphasise the far-reaching consequences of treating drugs as a criminal justice issue, since 
imprisonment is likely to have a long-term impact on the future legal employment opportunities 
open to those who fall foul of the law. A significant number of people are introduced to opiates 
for the first time while in prison, partly because the short detection window of heroin makes it 
relatively easy to evade mandatory drug testing (Dolan et al 2007). 
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Figure 2.4.1  Prison population by offence class, 2010 
 
 
As discussed in section 2.1, the classification of cannabis has been subject to several changes 
over time. In 2004, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett announced that cannabis was to be 
re-classified as a Class C drug. At the same time, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
issued guidance stating that those found in possession of cannabis should be given a warning 
and have the drug confiscated rather than being arrested. The intention was to reduce the 
potential unintended harm associated with the criminalisation of cannabis use and the workload 
of police officers. However, it is clear that the new system, perhaps together with the increasing 
importance of policing targets, created a perverse incentive to give and formally record offences 
that might otherwise have been dealt with informally. As Figure 2.4.2 shows, the recorded 
number of possession offences increased sharply after the introduction of ‘cannabis warnings’ in 
2004.6 This increase is entirely explained by cannabis possession offences and occurred at the 
same time as the number of trafficking and other drug offences was relatively flat, while the total 
recorded number of crimes (right axis) was actually falling.  
 
 
                                                 
6 A cannabis warning is a spoken warning given by a police officer, either on the street or at the police station. The 
police have the option of using a cannabis warning when someone is caught with a small amount of cannabis for 
personal use.  
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Figure 2.4.2 Total recorded crime and drug offences, 2000/01 – 2010/11 
 
 
Source: Crime in England and Wales 2010/11 and 2009/10 
 
Figure 2.4.3 shows the composition of the total number of police recorded cannabis possession 
offences by type of disposal. Out-of-court disposals, such as cannabis warnings and (as from 
January 2009) Penalty Notices for Disorder7 (PNDs), account for the entire increase in cannabis 
possession offences brought to justice in recent years. Indeed, since 2004 the number of offences 
resulting in a caution or conviction actually fell. In percentage terms, cannabis warnings 
represented about 53% of the total number of cannabis possession offences in 2004 (40,138), 
reached a peak of 74% in 2007 (104,207), and then fell back to about 57% (79,100) in 2010, 
with PNDs accounting for a further 10% in the same year (13,916).  
 
 
                                                 
7 PNDs are tickets that police officers can issue at the scene of an incident or in custody - they carry an on-
the-spot fine of £80. 
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Figure 2.4.3 Cannabis possession offences by type of disposal 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics, various years 
Another interesting trend that has emerged in the past decade is an increase in home-grown 
cannabis. Traditionally cannabis has been imported in the UK through drug dealers. However, in 
the past 10 or 15 years there has been a noticeable increase in the domestic production of 
cannabis. This is mainly due to technological innovations, such as the development of more 
resistant strains of cannabis which can grow also in temperate climates, and the increased 
availability of ultraviolet lights and hydroponic techniques. The success of intelligence-led 
interdiction of cross-border trade in cannabis may also have encouraged the increase in 
domestic production. As Figure 2.4.4 shows, this trend is reflected in the composition of 
cannabis cautions and warnings by type of offence. Although possession offences still constitute 
the vast majority of all cannabis offences dealt with in court, production offences (which include 
cultivation for personal use) resulting in cautions increased from 1.3% in 2000 to 16.4% in 
2010, while those resulting in a conviction went from 14.5% in 2000 to 18.3% in 2010.  
As shown in Figure 2.4.5, in 2010 the most common outcome received by adults sentenced for a 
cannabis offence was a fine, which was administered to over 41% of individuals found guilty of a 
cannabis offence and about 54% of those convicted of a possession offence. About 22% were 
sentenced to a community order, which was most frequent (39%) among those charged with 
production offences. Immediate custody was very infrequently applied to possession offences 
(only 1% of these), while it is most commonly used for supply offences (33%).  
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Figure 2.4.4 Cannabis cautions and convictions by type of offence 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics, various years 
 
Figure 2.4.5 Persons sentenced by type of disposal 2010 
 
Looking at trends, Figure 2.4.6 shows that the total number of people sentenced to immediate 
custody for supply, intent to supply, and possession offences has been decreasing over time until 
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2007, and increasing thereafter. By contrast, and in line with the trend shown in Figure 2.4.4, the 
number of individuals in custody for production offences has been increasing steadily since 
2003. It is unclear whether this reflects an increasing tendency to use supply or production, 
rather than possession, charges in marginal cases. 
 
Figure 2.4.6     Persons sentenced to immediate custody by type of cannabis offence 
 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics 
In 2009, the average duration of a custodial sentence was 1 year and 3 months for a supply or 
intent to supply offence, 1 year and 9 months for a production offence, and only 2 months for a 
possession offence. The distribution of sentences is however rather skewed, as shown in Figure 
2.4.7, with longer sentences being rather infrequent in particular when considering supply and 
possession. In terms of trends, Figure 2.4.8 shows that the average length of a custodial sentence 
for cannabis production remained stable at around 1 year until 2006, but then saw a steady 
increase in more recent years, presumably as a result of the increased incidence of large-scale 
home-grown cannabis cultivation.   
Finally, Figure 2.4.9 shows the average fine amount for cannabis possession offences from 1999 
to 2009. The average fine in 2009 was equal to £84, and this has changed little since 1999. As the 
values shown are in nominal amounts, the figures actually imply a modest reduction in the value 
of the average fine over time.  
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Figure 2.4.7 Distribution of length of sentence by type of cannabis offence - 2009 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics  
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Figure 2.4.8 Average sentence length for production offences 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics  
 
Figure 2.4.9 Average fine amounts for cannabis possession offences 
 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics  
 
 
2.5 Treatment 
With the launch of the first ten-year drug strategy Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain8 in 
                                                 
8 See http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm39/3945/3945.htm. 
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1998 a range of policies aimed at overcoming the negative effects of problem drug use were 
gradually introduced in the UK. During these years (1998- 2008) the main focus was on tackling 
the use of illegal drugs by increasing the range of treatment programmes, imposing tougher legal 
sanctions, and establishing widespread public information campaigns. The second ten-year plan, 
based on the 2008 strategy Drugs: protecting families and communities9, shifts the attention to 
the protection of children, young people and families affected by drug misuse. Both strategies 
emphasise the importance of treatment and seek to improve its quality and effectiveness 
(Department of Health, 1996; Gossop et al. 2001; Gossop 2006; NTA 2006).  
The range of treatment interventions offered in England and Wales at present is very 
heterogeneous, including advice and information, care planning, psycho-social help, community 
prescribing, inpatient drug treatment and residential rehabilitation. In addition, drug misusers 
are offered relapse prevention and aftercare programmes, hepatitis B vaccinations, testing and 
counselling for hepatitis B and C, HIV, and needle exchange. Oral opiate substitution 
maintenance treatment with methadone is the most common pharmacological treatment used in 
treating heroin addiction. Given the sheer diversity of treatments on offer, co-ordination and 
integration between different providers is key in helping problem drug users. The monitoring of 
such a complex system differs between England and the devolved administration of Wales, and 
has changed dramatically over the last decades.  
In England, the Regional Drug Misuse Database collected information about new presentations 
to drug services, or presentations after a break of six months or more, during the period 
between 1990 and 2001. This system was then superseded by the National Treatment 
Monitoring System (NDTMS), which collects data on all individuals in structured community-
based services or residential and inpatient services (Tier 3 or 4). Responsibility for managing 
the NDTMS was transferred from the Department of Health to the National Treatment Agency 
(NTA) in 2003. The NTA reorganized the NDTMS, changing the definition of drug treatment and 
data collection methods between 2001 and 2005, and later revised the way in which substances 
are reported. As a consequence, very little information on treated individuals is available before 
2004/05 and consistent data on main drug type goes back only to 2005/06.  
A separate monitoring system has developed in Wales, where the Welsh National Database for 
Substance Misuse has been in operation since 2001. The system did not cover the majority of 
treatment agencies until 2005/06, though. Moreover, the data in this case mainly consist of the 
number of referrals (individuals can be referred more than once during the same year), while 
the classification of the main drug problem differs substantially from that used by the NDTMS.  
                                                 
9 See http://www.gos.gov.uk/497468/docs/664685/Drug_strategy. PDF.  
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In what follows, therefore, we will report data for England and Wales separately. For each 
country we show the total number of individuals or referrals and the percentages by specific 
drug type for all the years available. Where possible, we distinguish between young people (aged 
less than 18 in England, and less than 20 in Wales) and adults (aged 18 or above in England, and 
18 or more in Wales), as the distribution by drug type is very different for these two groups.  
Figure 2.5.1 shows the number of individuals in contact with treatment services in England from 
1998/99 to 2009/10. As we can see, this number has grown steadily over these two decades 
going from 85,000 individuals in 1998/99 to more than 220,000 individuals in 2009/10. In the 
last three years of data, however, this growth has tapered off. Although a strict year-on-year 
comparison is not advisable, due to changes in the methods of collection and definitions of 
treatment over time, the trend shown coincides with an increasing amount of resources devoted 
to treatment programmes during this period.  
 
 
Figure 2.5.1 Number of individuals in contact with drug treatment services - England 
Source: Statistics from the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS), various years 
 
We know, for example, that government funding for drug treatment services in England has 
risen significantly since 2001. Table 2.5.1 reports the most recent figures available for the 
combined funding from the Home Office and the Department of Health, known as the Pooled 
Treatment Budget (PTB) for drug treatment services for adults. At 2008/09 prices, this has 
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spiralled from £225m in 2004/05 to £381m in 2009/10. NTA also estimates that the drug 
treatment workforce has also grown significantly, from 6,000 practitioners and managers in 
2002 to over 10,000 in March 2005 (NTA, 2006).  
 
Table 2.5.1 Drug treatment budgets in England, recent years 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Adult pooled 
treatment 
budget 
£225m £300m £380m £383m £373m £381m* 
Local funding 
 
£226m £226m £224m £207m £208m n.a. 
Total 
 
£481m £526m £604m £590m £581m n.a. 
Source: NTA, http://www.nta.nhs.uk/funding.aspx; * data for 2009/10 from Drugscope.  
 
Figure 2.5.1 also shows the number in treatment by age group from 2004/05 onwards. It is clear 
that the vast bulk of people in contact with drug treatment services are aged 18 or above and 
that their share of the total number in treatment has not changed dramatically over the period 
for which data are available. In line with the general increase in the number of individuals in 
treatment, the graph shows that the number of people below 18 has gone from 8,800 in 2004/05 
to around 15,000 in the period 2007/08-2009/10, but the latter figure still represents only 6.8% 
of the total.  
The next two figures show the percentage of individuals in contact with treatment services by 
main problem drug. The NDTMS collects up to three substances as problematic for the individual 
at the point of triage. Data up to 2004/05 (not shown) used the first recorded substance to 
indicate why the individual is in treatment. More recently, the NTA has adopted a different 
definition of ‘primary drug’: individuals who have any opiate recorded in any of the three 
NDTMS substances and not crack cocaine will be reported under the group opiates only, where 
an individual has crack cocaine recorded and not an opiate they will be reported under the  
crack only category, if an individual had both opiates and crack cocaine recorded they will be 
reported under the opiates and crack cocaine category, and if neither opiates nor crack cocaine 
are recorded, then the first substances in the three NDTMS items reported is considered the 
main problem drug. This change in methodology was deemed necessary in order to monitor the 
increasing number of individuals presenting problems with both opiates and crack cocaine.  
Figure 2.5.2 refers to the population of individuals aged 18 or above, i.e. the adult population 
that we know represents the overwhelming proportion of individuals in drug treatment. As we 
can see, over 50% of these individuals presents with an opiate problem (most frequently 
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heroin), while about 30% reports crack cocaine and opiates in combination as the main problem 
drugs. If we add to these individuals those with a crack only addiction, we account for about 
83/84% of the adult population in treatment. The remainder is divided into those with cocaine 
problems (about 4-6%), those presenting with cannabis (6%), and those taking other main 
drugs (4%). The only visible changes over time are represented by a shift from opiates only to 
opiates and crack cocaine categories, the incidence of all other reported drug problems has 
remained constant in the last few years.   
Figure 2.5.3 shows the distribution of the young population – individuals below 18 – by main 
problem drug. Here the picture is very different from what we have just seen. The proportion of 
young people reporting a problem with a Class A drug is very small. The main problem drug is 
represented by cannabis. In 2009/10 the number of people reporting a cannabis problem was 
over 13,000, i.e. about almost 87% of the total population of young people in contact with drug 
treatment services. And this percentage has been increasing over the past few years, as it was 
about 78% in 2005/06.  
 
 
Figure 2.5.2 Adults (18+) in treatment by primary drug group - England 
Source: Statistics from the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS), various years 
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Figure 2.5.3 Young people (<18) in treatment by primary drug group - England 
Source: Statistics from the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS), various years 
 
 
We now look at the situation in Wales, where data are collected by a different system and are 
expressed as referrals rather than individuals. Figure 2.5.4 reports the number of referrals in the 
years between 2005/06 and 2009/10. The figure shows an increase from about 6,700 referrals 
(corresponding to 5,700 individuals circa) in 2005/06 to more than 11,200 referrals 
(corresponding to almost 8,000 individuals) in 2009/10. This would correspond to a 67% 
increase in the number of referrals in 5 years (40% increase in the number of individuals), 
which seems unlikely. It is more plausible that the jump between 2005/06 and 2006/07 is due 
to problems with data collection in 2005/06 and that the number of referrals for drug treatment 
has been generally stable between 10,500 and 11,500 in the last period. Similarly to Figure 2.5.1, 
we see that the majority of referrals pertain to the ‘adult population’, here represented by 
individuals aged 20 or above. In this case the proportion oscillates between 12.5% and 14.5% in 
the last few years.  
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Figure 2.5.4 Number of referrals to treatment for drug misuse by age group - Wales 
Source: Welsh National Database for Substance Misuse, online reports, available at 
http://wales.gov.uk/topics/housingandcommunity/safety/substancemisuse/stats/?lang=en 
 
 
 
Figures 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 report the distribution of adults and young people referrals, respectively, 
by main drug. As we saw for England, the main problem drug is opiates (here specifically heroin) 
in the adult population and cannabis in the young population. Here, like in the case of England, 
the proportion of young people whose main problem drug is represented by cannabis has been 
increasing in the last few years. However, by contrast with the previous analysis, the proportion 
of people below 20 years who report other problem drugs is non-negligible, particularly when 
considering heroin.  
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Figure 2.5.5 Adults referrals (20+) by main drug - Wales 
Source: Welsh National Database for Substance Misuse, online reports, available at 
http://wales.gov.uk/topics/housingandcommunity/safety/substancemisuse/stats/?lang=en 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.5 Young people referrals (<20) by main drug - Wales 
Source: Welsh National Database for Substance Misuse, online reports, available at 
http://wales.gov.uk/topics/housingandcommunity/safety/substancemisuse/stats/?lang=en 
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3 Licensing and regulation: a possible reform  
At present, the UN conventions require the UK to maintain a formal prohibitionist stance on 
cannabis. We have argued elsewhere (Pudney 2010) that there is a strong case for removal of 
domestic production and sale of cannabis from these treaties to allow national governments 
greater freedom to develop alternative policies which might, in some cases, extend to licensing 
and regulation. We make a basic assumption that the ban on international trade in cannabis 
incorporated in the UN conventions would remain in place, so that importation and exportation 
of cannabis products stays prohibited. For purposes of measurement, our analysis relates to 
England and Wales, but we assume that an identical licensing and regulation framework is also 
implemented in Scotland, to avoid distortionary responses to cross-border tax differentials like 
those generated by the Northern Ireland/Irish Republic border. Apart from this, we can only 
speculate on the system that would be implemented.  
More research attention has been paid to various forms of decriminalisation or depenalisation 
than to licensing and regulation. Most such reforms maintain formal illegality of production 
possession and supply, whilst removing penalties for possession of moderate amounts of the 
drug, or substituting them with informal warnings or other ‘dissuasion’ activity. The Portuguese 
reform of 2001 was of this type, with local Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction 
given powers to summon offenders in possession small amounts of the drug (2.5g in the case of 
cannabis) for discussion and imposition of sanctions such as community service, fines and 
various forms of treatment and advisory action. Supply activity remains heavily penalised and 
possession of larger amounts may lead to criminal charges (Hughes and Stevens 2010).  The 
celebrated Dutch ‘experiment’ goes further than this, by decriminalising retail (but not 
wholesale) supply activity through approved outlets. All reforms of this sort fall short of the 
licensing and regulation option considered here. There are four main differences. First, under 
the envisaged system of licensing, the fact of illegality is removed, with possible consequent 
changes to the image of the product. Second, licensing allows the possibility of direct regulation 
of the physical attributes of the product. Third, it removes the heavy penalties for suppliers 
(licensed suppliers, at least), with the associated reduction in criminal justice system costs to 
society at large and to the suppliers themselves. Fourth, licensed supply allows the possibility of 
taxation of the product, generating tax revenue for government. Given these major differences, it 
is important to avoid lumping together decriminalisation and licensed supply under a generic 
heading of liberalisation – they are quite different. 
3.1 Three visions of a regulated market 
There are many possible visions of what a regulated cannabis market might look like. If 
introduced in practice, a host of detailed decisions would have to be taken about the nature of 
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regulation, and the market outcome may depend critically on what those decisions were. Rolles 
(2009) provides a comprehensive discussion of the options for design of market institutions. 
Any detailed specification would be highly speculative so, instead, we contrast three broad 
approaches to licensing and regulation in quite general terms. 
3.1.1 A medical market 
Cannabis has been claimed to have valuable therapeutic properties in a number of medical 
settings, particularly as pain relief for sufferers of chronic serious diseases like multiple sclerosis 
and cancer. Many of the large number of cannabinoids (chemical constituents specific to 
cannabis) are currently under investigation by pharmaceutical companies as possibilities for 
future prescription drugs. A few countries (notably the Netherlands since 2003) and a number 
of states of the USA already license the supply of cannabis on doctor’s prescription. It can be 
argued that the first steps towards such a system have already been taken in Britain, since a 
synthetic cannabinoid called nabilone (cesamet) is licensed for treatment of nausea during 
chemotherapy, and a cannabis extract called Sativex10, is licensed for relief of pain and other 
symptoms in multiple sclerosis. As the NICE clinical guideline (NICE 2003) states: “the 
development of Sativex was a response to a government proposal, which recognised the 
undesirable health and social consequences for people who were obtaining illegal cannabis for 
purposes of symptom relief”. However, it appears that few practitioners prescribe Sativex at 
present, and its planned NICE review is currently suspended. 
We think it highly likely that medicinal prescription of cannabis derivatives will become routine 
in the foreseeable future, putting an end to the occasional distressing incidents of terminally-ill 
patients subjected to police searches and arrests for illicit cannabis use that occur today. 
However, we see the development of a medical market as a quite limited innovation in British 
cannabis policy because relatively few of the very large number of cannabis users would be 
likely to qualify for prescription. Note that medicines are zero-rated for VAT in the UK, so the 
medical market does not lend itself to market control through taxation, nor to the use of tax 
revenue to fund treatment and health information programmes. 
We do not expect to see a medical market for cannabis-derived products to develop along the 
lines of the system that has operated in California following the 1996 referendum which 
introduced a liberal system in which a doctor’s written opinion of the existence of a medical 
need for cannabis (but not a formal prescription) is sufficient to protect the cannabis user from a 
charge of possession and his or her supplier from a trafficking charge. This loose system of 
regulation has allowed many people without substantial health problems to gain access to 
                                                 
10 Sativex is formulated as an oral spray containing 2.7 mg THC and 2.5 mg CBD. 
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cannabis, and has been criticised as “backdoor legalisation”. Lacking both the tight product 
control that we see in the market for prescription pharmaceuticals and the indirect taxation 
applied to products like alcohol and tobacco, this policy seems to lack the potential benefits that 
regulation might bring.  
3.1.2 Regulation with light product control 
There are several models that might be used as indications of what a regulated non-medical 
cannabis market would look like. One is the referendum proposal for an amendment to the Swiss 
federal constitution introducing “une politique raisonnable en matière de chanvre protégeant 
efficacement la jeunesse” (which was defeated by 63% to 37% in November 2008). Another is 
the more detailed Proposition 19 in California (defeated by 54% to 46% in a ballot in November 
2010). The latter proposal would have permitted possession of up to 1 oz. of cannabis for 
personal consumption, consumption in non-public or specially licensed public places, and 
cultivation of cannabis in a private residence for personal use. Local governments would have 
been allowed to authorise retail sales of up to 1 oz. to people aged over 21, with a responsibility 
for regulating location, trading hours and promotional material. Other provisions would have 
permitted larger-scale possession and commercial production subject to local government 
approval, and the collection of indirect taxes. These abortive reform initiatives would have 
produced a system with little regulatory control over the nature of the product. The outcome 
would almost certainly have been a market with a large number of heterogeneous suppliers 
offering a wide range of product varieties. Since Proposition 19, similar initiatives have been 
passed by referendum and are in process of implementation in Colorado and Washington State, 
but the constitutional issues raised by conflict with prohibitionist federal law are unclear.  
The closest parallel among legal UK markets is probably the market for alcohol, where 
regulation is also light. Although the product is heavily taxed, advertising is allowed on national 
TV, controls on alcoholic content are mainly confined to differential tax rates and, apart from the 
age 18 limit, there are only modest restrictions on consumption. Production of alcoholic drink is 
subject to requirements for registration or licensing, which historically originated from concern 
for public order and wartime production, and currently appear to be motivated as much by a 
concern to protect tax revenue as to promote public health. For example, there is a basic 
requirement for all registered/licensed producers to provide financial guarantees covering 
projected tax liabilities. A major difference from any form of cannabis regulation is that 
cultivation of the crops required for producing alcohol (barley, grapes, hops, etc.) is essentially 
unrestricted. Production of beer and cider is subject to registration for taxation purposes, but 
market entry is relatively easy and there are few controls on the production process itself, while 
wines and spirits are subject to more stringent licensing involving approval of plant and 
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processes. Unlicensed production of certain alcoholic drinks (mainly beer and wine) for 
personal domestic consumption is permitted. The proliferation of micro-breweries in recent 
years shows that the requirements imposed by the revenue protection principle are not 
necessarily a barrier to market entry by small producers. 
This type of market organisation has three significant disadvantages. First, the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of suppliers makes regulation more difficult. Second, it is not clear that such a 
market would do anything to reduce the prevalence of high-THC low-CBD sinsemilla or of 
damaging smoking material, so health concerns may remain. Third, it seems unlikely that this 
relatively permissive form of market organisation would achieve sufficient public support to 
become a politically feasible reform. 
3.1.3 Regulation with stringent product control 
There is an instructive contrast between the alcohol and tobacco markets. Regulation is much 
tighter for tobacco: all advertising is illegal, smoking is banned in most public places, the product 
itself is subject to direct controls, and there is a very active programme of health education 
aiming at demand reduction. The third vision of a legal regulated market for cannabis would 
have much in common with the market for tobacco and seems to us the most plausible type of 
reform in the British context.11 There is likely to be public demand for stringent controls (see 
Branson et al. 2012 for recent survey evidence on the public support for regulation of markets 
for potentially harmful consumption goods) and, to achieve public acceptance in Britain, we 
would expect regulations on a licensed cannabis market to be at least as strict as those on the 
tobacco market, despite the evidence of rather less social harm for cannabis than either alcohol 
or tobacco. 
Consider the existing tobacco market: unlike cannabis, there is no significant agricultural 
production of tobacco in the UK, but it is produced as a farm crop elsewhere in the EU, with no 
specific controls or licensing requirements relating to the location or form of cultivation.12 The 
manufacture of products from imported tobacco leaf in the UK is subject to registration, which 
involves an assessment of the control of the manufacturing process, adequacy of record-keeping 
and security of the premises.  
However, there are health-motivated controls on product constituents which go far beyond the 
regulation required by the revenue protection principle. Regulations for the UK tobacco market 
are specified in a 2002 statutory instrument (Department of Health 2002), which implements 
European Community Directive 2001/37/EC. There are four main provisions: (i) the prohibition 
                                                 
11 A still more radical form of supply control is for a state monopoly, as currently proposed by the Uruguay 
government. 
12 Tobacco output was long subsidised under the Common Agricultural Policy, with those subsidies only now being 
phased out. 
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of certain forms of tobacco;13 (ii) controls on the physical constituents of tobacco products;14 (iii) 
a system of government testing of tobacco products;15 and (iv) mandatory health warnings.16 A 
significant omission from the regulations is any control on tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide 
yields of loose hand-rolling tobacco. However, there remains a concern about the ability to 
update regulations in response to the continuous development of additives by producers and to 
develop forms of regulation sufficiently flexible to cover new forms of consumption that may 
become important in the future. 
Product controls like those applied to tobacco require a degree of process consistency and 
internal quality control that are difficult for small producers to achieve, and economies of scale 
in production and distribution also produce a tendency towards domination by large producers, 
each offering a relatively uniform product in mostly prepared form. We do not make any specific 
assumptions about the producers who would be involved in a licensed market for cannabis, but 
we would expect some existing tobacco companies to be major participants, unless specifically 
excluded. This makes product controls particularly important, since tobacco companies would 
have a strong incentive to produce a cannabis product with high nicotine content to create 
nicotine dependency among cannabis users and thus promote long-term demand for 
conventional tobacco products. There is anecdotal evidence of a causal effect of cannabis use on 
tobacco smoking, which is consistent with the complementarity in demand between cannabis 
and tobacco found by some researchers (Van Ours 2007a). Table 3.1.1 summarises the way we 
would expect to see production controls applied in a tightly-regulated cannabis market. 
 
                                                 
13 Certain oral tobacco preparations (“snus”) are banned in all EU countries except Sweden.  
14 There are maximum yields of tar (10mg), nicotine (1mg) and carbon monoxide (10mg) per cigarette; yields must be 
declared on packaging and there is a mandatory system of reporting and justification of chemical additives. 
15 Traceable production batch identifiers must be printed on the packaging. Government testing criteria are based on 
international standards ISO 4387, 8243, 8454 and 10315.  
16 Health warnings drawn from a specified list are required on the packaging, occupying at least 30% of the front and 
40% of the back of the pack.  
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Table 3.1.1  Possible regulatory provisions under a system of tight control 
Regulation Provisions 
Licensing Mandatory licensing would be required for all commercial production, 
with controls to restrict participation to “fit and proper” persons. 
Possible exclusion of suppliers involved in the tobacco trade, to prevent 
exploitation of cannabis as a route into tobacco addiction. 
Domestic production Individuals are likely to be permitted some small-scale domestic 
production for personal use, in a private residence, inaccessible to the 
public. The appropriate limit on the scale of this type of production is 
not clear. The typical scale of production among “social” growers 
interviewed by Hough et al (2003) in Britain was around 10-12 plants. 
In the US, Colorado has adopted a 3-plant allowance for private 
individuals, while the Washington State reform has maintained the 
illegality of domestic production. Proposition 19 in California would 
have allowed domestic cultivation on a plot of up to 25 ft2. South 
Australia’s Cannabis Expiation Notice scheme and Western Australia’s 
Cannabis Infringement Notice scheme imposed cultivation limits of 10 
and 2 plants respectively to avoid prosecution on a charge of cannabis 
production. We envisage a relatively tight allowance, certainly under 5 
plants in cultivation at any one time. Proposals for a license fee levied 
on domestic production pose significant problems of policing and we 
envisage no such licensing system. 
Security Minimum security standards on commercial production facilities, 
similar to those imposed on tobacco producers. These would include a 
ban on cultivation in open fields. 
Financial procedures As is the case for alcohol and tobacco at present, financial guarantees 
and adequate record-keeping procedures would be required by the tax 
authorities to ensure that projected indirect tax liabilities can be met by 
licensed suppliers. 
Product controls Limits  on THC content, THC:CBD ratio, and yields of carbon monoxide, 
tar and nicotine 
 
In our view, product control is a potential advantage of a regulated market. The primary 
psychoactive constituent of cannabis is 9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) but there are many other 
chemical components, whose physical and psychological impacts are not well understood. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that a particular component, cannabidiol (CBD), has 
significant psychological effects such as reducing anxiety, and may attenuate the psychosis-like 
and memory-impairing effects of THC (Morgan et al 2010a, Morgan and Curran 2008). Some 
studies have suggested that the negative mental health consequences of cannabis use may only 
occur if there is a sufficiently high THC-CBD ratio in the product used. Cannabidiol may also 
suppress the self-reinforcing tendency of THC to build appetite for cannabis (Morgan et al 
2010b). Further evidence from fMRI brain scans also suggests that CBD pre-treatment tends to 
counteract the effects of THC on brain functions in regions that may mediate psychotic illness 
(Bhattacharyya et al 2010). 
- 40 - 
 
There is worrying evidence of a recent change in the typical THC/CBD content of illicit cannabis 
in the UK and elsewhere. The chemical composition of police seizures of ‘street’ cannabis has 
been tested using gas chromatography analysis, with results reported by the ACMD (2008), 
Hardwick and King (2008) and Potter et al (2008). Although these seized samples are unlikely to 
be fully representative of the whole cannabis market, they do suggest a recent large increase in 
the market share of sinsemilla with high levels of THC and virtually no CBD content. Estimation 
of trends is problematic because of comparability problems over time, but Hardwick and King 
(2008) suggest a rise in the market share of sinsemilla from around 15% (by weight) in 2002 to 
over 80% in 2008, while the low CBD content of sinsemilla appears to be common to samples 
seized at different times. Results from an extensive analysis of 1,756 samples collected in 2008 
are summarised in Table 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.1. The contrast between the characteristics of 
sinsemilla and imported herb or resin is very striking indeed and shows clearly the strong 
tendency for high potency to be accompanied by low CBD content in the current illicit market. 
 
Table 3.1.2  Market shares and median THC/CBD content of seized cannabis 
Substance 
Market share 
(%) 
THC content    
(%) 
CBD content    
(%) 
Imported resin 
(min, max) 
14.6 5.9 3.5 
 [1.3 – 27.8] [0.1 – 7.3] 
Imported herbal 
(min, max) 
2.1 8.3 < 0.1 
 [0.3 – 22]  
Sinsemilla 
(min, max) 
80.8 16.1 < 0.1 
 [4.1 – 46]  
Source: Hardwick and King (2008) and ACMD (2008) 
 
Recent research findings on the action of THC and CBD on brain function, together with evidence 
on the increasing prevalence of high-THC low-CBD sinsemilla, make a powerful case that 
regulation of cannabis products should focus on optimising the THC:CBD ratio, alongside 
controls on tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yields. One of the potential advantages of a 
system of licensed supply is that it would give the authorities the opportunity to exert much 
greater control over the properties of cannabis available to users and, consequently, reduce the 
risk to users of exposure to unexpectedly potent samples. Seen in this way, the setting of 
permissible ranges for THC and CBD content would be as important a policy parameter for the 
authorities as is the excise tax rate to be applied to retail sales. There is some precedent for 
controls on THC, since the Dutch authorities are in the process of imposing a 15% THC limit on 
cannabis sales through coffee shops. 
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Figure 3.1.1   THC and CBD content in seized cannabis samples 
(adapted from data reported in Hardwick and King 2008: with thanks to David Potter) 
 
It is not possible to predict the effects on demand or on production costs of alternative choices 
for the limits on THC and CBD content, so there is no need for us to make a specific assumption 
about the limits that would be set in practice. However, we anticipate that the choice of tax rate 
and product controls would be set in attempt to drive out of the market imported herb and resin 
and to make large inroads into the market for illicit sinsemilla. For this to be achieved, we 
envisage that the THC limit would need to be significantly above the median level observed in 
imported herb and resin. For example, using the data on sinsemilla THC content underlying the 
Hardwick and King (2008) study, the bottom quartile point for THC content is around 10%, 
which might be a good candidate for the permissible limit on potency, being below the median 
level of 15% in seized samples but significantly above the median value for imported herb and 
resin which are around 5-9%. An upper limit of, say, 2.0 for the THC:CBD ratio might be realistic, 
although in the absence of detailed research on dose-response characteristics of THC and CBD 
effects, this is quite speculative. 
In addition to controls on THC and CBD content, it is highly likely that the controls on nicotine, 
tar and carbon monoxide yields of tobacco products for smoking would be applied also to 
cannabis products for smoking, but we anticipate that they would be extended to loose material 
as well as prepared ‘reefers’. In order to reduce nicotine dependence, it is important to 
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encourage smoke-free cannabis products or the smoking of cannabis without the addition of 
tobacco. Provisions for declaration of additives, government responsibility for testing and 
monitoring, and health warnings on retail packaging would be likely to apply to cannabis 
products in much the same way as they do to tobacco at present. 
3.2 Curbs on consumption 
There are two main reasons for direct controls on consumption: the protection of vulnerable 
young people who might be damaged by early initiation into cannabis use and curtailment of 
cannabis use among the adult population. These restrictions would relate to the age at which an 
individual could legally be supplied with cannabis and the locations and circumstances in which 
it could legally be used. The design of consumption controls is not straightforward: set too 
loosely, they would be ineffective in protecting young people; too restrictive and they would be 
evaded by resort to the illicit market, frustrating the objectives of reform. There is very little 
research to indicate what might be the optimal point on this trade-off. 
Had it been adopted, Proposition 19 in California would have restricted sales of cannabis to 
over-21s, as is the case for alcohol throughout the USA. Instead, in the UK, tobacco and alcohol 
can both be bought legally at age 18. In our view, there are no completely reliable estimates of 
the impact of age of initiation on the health impairment caused by regular cannabis use, largely 
because of the difficulty of adequately accounting for confounding factors. However, there is a 
consensus that the risk declines appreciably for onset towards the end of the teenage years. If 
the age limit were set at 21, it would impose prohibition on people aged 18-20 who, in other 
respects, are treated as full adults by the law. Survey data indicate that the proportion of this 
group who report having used cannabis is currently around 35%,17 so a ban on this large group 
could endanger the attempt to displace the illicit market, especially if imposed without 
compelling evidence of substantially greater harm for this age group than for over-21s. For that 
reason, we see 18 as the most plausible minimum age threshold under a system of licensing and 
regulation. 
3.3 Retailing and advertising 
Controls on retailing and advertising are likely to be similar to, or stricter than, those on either 
tobacco or alcohol at present. We do not envisage any licensing of sale for consumption on the 
premises, so there would be no parallel with the alcohol licensing laws that currently apply to 
bars and restaurants. It also seems unlikely that retailing of cannabis would be permitted as 
widely as are tobacco and (off-premises) alcohol at present. In our view, supermarkets, general 
stores, newsagents, etc. would be judged unsuitable as retail outlets because of the risk of access 
                                                 
17 Authors’ analysis of 2009/10 British Crime Survey data. 
- 43 - 
 
by under-18s. Instead, licensed retail outlets are likely to be confined to specialist shops and off-
licences (liquor stores). There have been suggestions that cannabis might be supplied to 
consumers through pharmacies; we think this unlikely, since the supply of potentially harmful 
drugs to people without diagnosed medical need is in conflict with the ethical code that 
pharmacists and other health professionals are trained to comply with. 
There is an interesting issue concerning limits on purchase amounts. For example, proposition 
19 in California would have allowed purchases of up to 1 oz. In contrast, UK tobacco regulation 
currently imposes a minimum size on purchases of cigarettes by banning sales singly or in packs 
of less than ten. The upper limit reflects an assumption that large purchases will lead to binge 
consumption or secondary unlicensed supply, while the lower limit presumably reflects the 
assumption that children will be less likely to be able to afford larger transactions. There is some 
evidence from the Civil Infringement Notice experiment in Western Australia that the setting of 
a relatively high 30gm limit on allowable purchases changed behaviour in favour of larger 
purchases and thus (as a consequence of quantity discounts in the retail market) lower average 
prices. In view of this, an upper limit on the size of a single purchase seems a sensible 
precaution. An interesting possibility which could help reduce THC intake would be to specify 
this limit on purchase quantities in terms of THC content rather than weight of cannabis plant 
material. 
Commercialisation and the promotional activity that accompanies it have been identified as a 
possible key factor in the growth of cannabis under the liberal Dutch policy regime (MacCoun 
and Reuter 2001) and there is evidence from the alcohol and tobacco markets in various 
countries that bans on advertising can have a significant impact on consumption (Saffer and 
Chaloupka 2000, Saffer and Dave 2002). Consequently, we expect policy on advertising within a 
regulated cannabis market to be the same complete ban on product display and public 
promotional activity that now applies to tobacco.  
3.4 Monitoring and enforcement 
The enforcement of regulatory controls is an important aspect of policy. It has been argued by 
Glaeser and Schleifer (2001) that prohibitionist policy has an advantage over taxation policy in 
terms of economic efficiency, since violations of prohibition are more easily detectable than 
violations of tax codes by legal suppliers. We doubt the plausibility of this assumption in the case 
of cannabis, but it does underline the importance of the effectiveness of taxation and other forms 
of regulation. 
In Britain, monitoring and enforcement of the controls on retailing of alcohol and tobacco is the 
responsibility of local authorities and is carried out by local Trading Standards officers, with 
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support from the police. We expect that these responsibilities would be extended to cover 
retailing of cannabis products under a system of licensing and regulation, and that the penalties 
for breaches of the regulations on cannabis would be similar to those applying to alcohol at 
present. The maximum penalty for selling alcohol to under-18s is a fine of £5,000 (£2,500 for 
tobacco) and offenders may have their retail licence suspended or withdrawn. We would expect 
existing penalties for breach of tobacco advertising regulations to apply also to cannabis 
products: for example, there is at present a maximum fine of £1,000 for failure to display the 
required sign declaring the illegality of sales to under-18s. 
Anti-smuggling and tax revenue protection policy is implemented at the UK level by HM Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC). All retailed tobacco products are currently required to bear a fiscal mark 
identifying it as legally produced and taxed, with a maximum fine of £5,000 and suspension of 
licence as a penalty for selling unmarked tobacco. We would expect this to apply to retail 
cannabis also. Although the incentive for illegal imports would be much reduced under a system 
of licensed domestic supply, we would expect smuggling to carry the same high maximum 
penalties that currently apply to tobacco: forfeit of the smuggled goods, up to seven years 
imprisonment and an unlimited fine. We envisage no penalties for possession of illicit cannabis, 
which would in any case be difficult to detect if home production for personal use were 
permitted. 
Illegal export of legally-produced cannabis could become a significant problem, in terms of 
international relations with trading partners which maintain a prohibitionist policy on cannabis. 
We do not consider that issue explicitly, except to note that legal requirements for detailed 
recording of production and movement of goods would be an important element of policy, as it 
is with supply chain legislation for tobacco. 
3.5 Information and health education 
We share the widely-held view that the drug classification system introduced by the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act inappropriately conflates two quite distinct functions. It disseminates 
information on the relative levels of potential harm from different substances and it 
simultaneously sets limits on the penalties to be applied by the criminal justice system. There is 
a common perception, particularly among the population groups most likely to become involved 
in drug use, that the criminal justice aspect of the classification system – reflecting the political 
judgements of legislators – has distorted the health messages sent out by the classification 
system. This, together with its omission of legal substances like alcohol and tobacco, tends to 
undermine the credibility of the classification system as a source of health information. It also 
makes it difficult for the authorities to issue specific guidelines on safer use similar to those that 
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have had some success in alcohol and diet.18 In our view, it is quite plausible to argue that the 
creation of a licensed cannabis market would free health education on cannabis from political 
taint and thus improve the credibility of health information. 
It is difficult to predict the extent of cannabis-related health education in a regulated system, and 
there are serious doubts about the effectiveness of mass-media health education programmes. 
We anticipate that existing publicly-funded drug-prevention work in schools and elsewhere 
would continue as at present, but we would expect an additional programme of mass media 
health campaigns similar to those that exist for alcohol and tobacco. The budgets for those 
programmes in 2009/10 were £17.6m and £14.8m respectively.19 
 
4 The approach to evaluation 
The evaluation presented here is a comparison of the potential outcomes under a new policy of 
licensed and regulated cannabis supply with the existing policy based on prohibition. It is 
important to realise that our analysis does not aim to give a prediction of the actual effects of 
policy reform in real time. Instead, we ask what the effects of policy reform would be if all 
external conditions except cannabis policy were held fixed at their 2010 configuration for a 
sufficiently long period of time to allow full adjustment to the new policy regime. Thus we are 
abstracting from a host of possible short-term effects and adjustment delays which would be 
extremely difficult to predict. Thus, for example, we are assuming that the cohort aged (say) 30 
in 2010 would be identical to the 30-year-olds in our hypothetical future except for the changes 
induced by cannabis policy. We are therefore abstracting from background trends arising from 
technology, demography and past changes in policy on education, social security, etc., which 
have their long-term effects as each cohort ages through time.  
Our analysis should be seen in the context of a wider policy review process. Ideally, policy 
reform involves four stages:  
(i) Background science, in the form of continuous research activity, generates basic knowledge of 
relevant processes such as: the biological effects of drug use on the human body; the psycho-
socio-economic processes which create and influence the demand for these drugs; and the 
effects of legal deterrents. 
(ii) Ex ante policy analysis then attempts to project the range of likely outcomes of alternative 
feasible reforms, exploiting the background scientific knowledge that exists. The aim here is to 
                                                 
18 See Fischer et al (2011) for a proposed set of “Lower Risk Cannabis Use Guidelines”, covering frequency of use, age 
of use, driving, consumption practices, potency, and risks for special groups  such as pregnant women and people  
with cardiovascular disease. 
19 Sources: House of Commons (2009, section 6) and ASH (2011). 
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identify whether reform is sufficiently promising to consider further and, if so, which variants 
appear preferable. This is the type of analysis presented in this study. 
(iii) Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of favoured policy options can then identify the impact 
of alternative reforms avoiding contamination from other extraneous influences on the 
outcomes on which policy is focused.  
(iv) Full-scale implementation of the selected reform. 
The difficulty we face in practice is that the RCTs of phase (iii) are completely infeasible for 
many of the most important policy decisions governments are called upon to make. That is 
certainly so for policies like the introduction of licensed and regulated cannabis supply. 
Although RCTs have been used for some of the relevant background science, the impossibility of 
controlling administration of cannabis in a realistic social setting and the long-term nature of 
many of the potential consequences of reform, make experimentally controlled trials of realistic 
policies completely infeasible. This means that we are forced to consider a leap from ex ante 
policy analysis to actual implementation. Inevitable, the consequence of this is that actual 
outcomes are highly uncertain.  
4.1 Uncertainty and the precautionary principle 
The largest volume of work on the problems of illicit drug use is in the medical literature and 
perhaps influenced by a basic precept of medical ethics, primum non nocere (first, do no harm) 
that creates a presumption in favour of cautious intervention, which often translates 
(questionably, in our view) into a bias towards the policy status quo. Among policy-makers, the 
precautionary principle is often used;20 this states that, if a policy has a significant risk of causing 
substantial harm then, in the absence of scientific consensus on the level of harm, the burden of 
proof that it is not harmful should fall on those proposing the action. Again, this creates a 
presumption in favour of the status quo.  
However, the precautionary principle should not be adopted without question. If policy effects 
are potentially damaging and irreversible then the principle clearly applies but, if the policy 
reform is unlikely to have large adverse effects and if it is also easily reversible, the 
precautionary principle places unnecessary constraints on policy-making. Evidence from Britain, 
the USA, Australia and several European countries suggests that moving away from punitive 
policy has remarkably little impact on cannabis use. The recent history of British policy on 
cannabis may not be a glorious one, but it does demonstrate conclusively that rapid reversals of 
policy are feasible. Consequently, in our view, the precautionary principle carries very little 
                                                 
20 The precautionary principle is incorporated into Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (see European Commission 2000). 
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force in this context, and we see no compelling argument against moving directly to 
implementation of new policies which appear promising, even if there is considerable 
uncertainty about the projected policy impacts. Nevertheless, in carrying out our analysis, we 
have adopted a cautious approach which builds in a degree of inherent bias in favour of the 
status quo. 
The ex ante policy analysis presented here is valuable for informing the policy debate, but it is 
subject to considerable uncertainty. In addition to a host of lesser uncertainties, we see four 
major sources of uncertainty which stand in the way of strong policy conclusions. First, there is 
no single obvious model for a licensed and regulated cannabis market. Second, in England and 
Wales since around 2002, there have been fundamental changes in the illicit cannabis market, 
with a large shift in favour of UK-produced high-potency forms of cannabis and a steady 
downward trend in cannabis use. The reasons for the trend in demand are not well understood. 
It is highly unlikely that falling demand is the result of policy changes or of price and income 
movements. Other explanations that have been put forward include: (i) the market domination 
of high-potency cannabis which some users find unpleasant; (ii) inconsistency of the effects of 
cannabis with the fast-paced life increasingly aspired to by many of the young; (iii) increasing 
health concerns which have been put in the public domain by the heated policy debate since the 
early 2000s. Without a good understanding of the determinants of demand, it is difficult to 
construct a convincing post reform scenario. Third, there is no consensus on the definition and 
consequent size of the group of people who should be regarded as vulnerable, in the sense that 
they are not judged to be mature, well-informed decision-makers able to balance personal risks 
against personal consumption benefits in deciding whether to use cannabis. Fourth, given the 
infeasibility of realistic randomised controlled trials, research on the long-term consequences of 
cannabis use has relied on observational data, analysed by statistical methods which are 
unavoidably vulnerable to bias from unobserved confounding factors. We believe that even the 
most sophisticated of these methods have a tendency to overestimate the causal impact of 
cannabis but, since the assumptions embedded in these methods are largely untestable, it is 
impossible to be certain.  
It is difficult to give clear indications of the degree of uncertainty arising from these and other 
sources. Some components of the projections are purely statistical and we are able to construct 
conventional confidence intervals which indicate the likely range of error arising from purely 
random sources. However, conceptual uncertainty is likely to be much more important. Our 
approach is to provide a high-low range which gives a mainly subjective assessment of the 
degree of uncertainty from all sources. There is no ‘scientific’ way of producing these indicators 
of uncertainty, so they should be treated as no more than the authors’ personal views about 
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where the major sources of uncertainty lie. 
4.2 Elements of the evaluation 
Opponents in the policy debate often seem to be fighting on different ground. Drugs policy 
‘doves’ will point to the recurrent costs of policing and the criminal justice system (CJS) as a 
reason for decriminalisation, while ‘hawks’ often suggest the existence of large adverse long-
term behavioural effects of drug use, using the “slippery slope” or “gateway” argument to oppose 
relaxation of policy. It seems unlikely that there will ever be a satisfactory outcome from a 
debate in which the two sides selectively highlight different issues. Drugs policy is difficult 
territory and any policy decision will have many distinct effects, all of which must be evaluated if 
we are to reach a fully considered view. Our aim here is to put all of the main issues together in 
one review and attempt to reach some conclusions about the likely importance of each element. 
It is useful to classify costs and benefits into two groups: direct and indirect – although the 
distinction is inevitably blurred to some degree. Direct costs/benefits are those which are 
primarily related to the current operation of the cannabis market and its regulation and policing. 
They include things like policing and CJS costs, the costs of administering the system of 
regulation, etc. Indirect costs/benefits are only indirectly related to the way the cannabis market 
works and instead depend on long-term consequences produced by other behaviours triggered 
by the changed policy on cannabis. These indirect costs and benefits may be incurred long after 
the actions that caused them, and some stem from what is often known as the “gateway” effect.  
The most widely discussed gateway hypothesis is that cannabis consumption in itself causes a 
rise in the risk of becoming a user of more damaging drugs such as cocaine, heroin and crack. If 
the causal gateway exists, a policy reform which induces a change in cannabis consumption 
patterns may, in turn, induce increased future costs of problematic hard drug use via a gateway 
effect. The gateway hypothesis as usually stated refers to demand behaviour, but causal 
gateways may exist on the supply side too, where they could generate benefits from reform 
instead of costs. For instance, if cannabis licensing and regulation has the effect of removing 
people from the illegal supply of cannabis, this may have the long-term effect of eliminating an 
entry point into hard drug supply, thus saving some people from a life blighted by 
imprisonment, damaged employment prospects and crime. Our aim is to bring direct and 
indirect effects into consideration and, as far as possible, to produce credible estimates of their 
magnitudes. Figure 4.1 gives a simple schematic overview of the primary issues involved. 
There is a further important distinction to be made between the internal and external 
consequences of drug use. Internal consequences are experienced by users themselves; they 
include both enjoyment of cannabis consumption and the possible adverse impacts on health 
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and wellbeing. External consequences, such as the costs of medical treatment and criminal 
justice procedures are borne by society as a whole. This distinction has an important bearing on 
measurement and is discussed in the next section, together with the distinction between 
transfers (such as tax payments) and true social costs. 
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Demand side 
Policy 
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Figure 4.2.1  Schematic outline of an evaluation of cannabis licensing and regulation 
- 51 - 
 
4.3 What costs and benefits? 
4.3.1 Internal and external costs and benefits 
The effects of a move to a regulated market can be separated into internal costs and benefits 
experienced by drug users themselves and all other external costs and benefits. The reason for 
making this distinction comes from the standard microeconomic view of ‘rational’ consumption 
behaviour: a drug user who is fully-informed and has fully-developed decision-making faculties 
will balance the enjoyment from drug use against the costs, which include the purchase price 
and risk of personal harm. However, a self-interested consumer will not take into account costs 
imposed on others by his or her drug use. These external costs might include medical treatment 
costs, drug-induced crime, drug-induced accidental harm to others and distress to other family 
members. Consider a reform which relaxes external consumption constraints, leading to an 
expansion in cannabis consumption. This increases the risk to the consumer of cannabis-related 
harms (such as psychotic illness or respiratory disease) but, if the consumer has a full 
understanding of those risks and the capacity to use that information to make rational 
decisions, then the increase in potential harm must be at least offset by the enjoyment derived 
from increased consumption – since otherwise he or she would not have made the decision to 
consume more.  Most discussions of drugs policy studiously avoid admitting any positive social 
value of consumers’ enjoyment, which contrasts starkly with the important role of consumer 
benefit in almost every other application of cost-benefit analysis. One might not approve of 
users’ enjoyment of cannabis in some moral sense, but it clearly exists. 
In our view, it is impossible to give any credible estimate of the net consumption benefits 
accruing to cannabis users, in the absence of evidence on the nature of demand responses in the 
UK. Instead, our approach is to include only projected changes in external costs and benefits in 
our primary evaluation. By excluding the change in consumer surplus from consideration, our 
analysis will therefore tend to underestimate the social benefits flowing from the removal of 
distortionary constraints on consumption and this inherent bias in favour of prohibition should 
be borne in mind when interpreting our findings. Since we focus on the net external social costs 
and benefits (which are essentially the difference between two large figures for wellbeing in 
two policy regimes), our estimates are strikingly small in relation to the size of the market for 
cannabis and – particularly – legal drugs like alcohol. Appendix 4.2 outlines the theoretical 
argument underlying our approach in the context of consumers facing uncertain health and 
criminal justice costs of cannabis use.  
There are three caveats to bear in mind when interpreting our results. 
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(i)  Imperfect information   
The revealed preference argument rests on one of two alternative assumptions: either 
consumers have full information about all the risks involved in consumption; or the 
consequences of consumption are reversible and realised quickly, so that consumers can learn 
from experience and modify their behaviour accordingly. The latter assumption is clearly not 
applicable to cannabis consumption: if there is a long-term risk of psychotic, respiratory or 
cardio-vascular illness, it is unlikely to occur quickly and extremely unlikely to be reversible. 
Consequently, the supply of accurate health information to young people is critically important. 
(ii)  Failures of ‘rationality’ 
Behavioural economics challenges the view of rationality that underlies the revealed preference 
principle. Choices about risky consumption involve two issues: time (since the consequences 
may not be felt until far into the future) and risk (since adverse consequences are not perfectly 
predictable). The traditional economic model assumes consistent intertemporal discounting to 
handle situations where consumption consequences are distributed over time, and expected 
utility maximisation to handle unpredictability of outcomes. Experimental evidence has 
challenged both of these ideas. Consistent time-discounting has been rejected in favour of 
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997), under which consumers may make choices today that 
their future self would prefer not to make. This pattern of behaviour has been observed in drug-
dependent people but whether as a cause or consequence is uncertain (Madden et al 1997).  
Risk is equally problematic. Cannabis use involves a small risk of a few severe consequences, 
such as long-term illness and criminal penalties and there is experimental evidence of a 
tendency to over-react to small risks, leading to a proliferation of alternative theories of risky 
decision-making, notably prospect theory and its later developments (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Problems of temporally-inconsistent decision-making and over-reaction to small risks 
work in opposite directions: the former leading people to use drugs, despite regretting it from a 
lifetime perspective; and the latter acting as a barrier to consumption. 
 (iii)  Undeveloped or impaired decision-making 
Decision-making abilities vary greatly between people and they also vary over time with 
personal development through childhood and adolescence. These abilities depend on cognitive 
skills and the process of learning from one’s own experience and observation of the experience 
of others. Consequently, there are particular concerns about two population groups: those with 
impaired mental functioning, and the young. The rate of co-morbidity of drug dependence and 
other mental disorders is high (McManus et al 2009) and cannabis use is observed to be 
especially high among people in treatment for psychotic disorders, where it is associated with 
- 53 - 
 
particular poor prognosis. A particularly important concern is cannabis use by young people. 
The most recent school drug survey (NatCen 2011) found that as many as 21% of 15-year-olds 
had used cannabis during the previous year21 and that, of those, about a third had used the drug 
once a month or more. The proportion of all current adult cannabis users who reported 
initiation into cannabis use at age 16 or below is 43% in the 2003 OCJS.22 If this figure is 
combined with the Pudney et al (2006) estimates of the numbers of juvenile and adult cannabis 
users (Table 2.2.1 above), it suggests that in 2003 there were 2.77m (or 57%) cannabis users in 
England and Wales who had started at age 16 or earlier. This might be interpreted as a case for 
treating up to 57% of the internal harms experienced by cannabis users as elements of social 
cost. However, this would require very strong assumptions: that all damaging behaviour 
commencing by age 16 is purely the result of under-developed decision-making abilities and 
would not have occurred anyway if a later start were made; that every under-17 who chooses to 
use cannabis is a flawed decision-maker, while every under-17 who chooses otherwise is not; 
and that a course of behaviour commencing before age 17 is essentially irreversible by later, 
better-informed decisions.  
Added to this conceptual uncertainty is the considerable practical problem of measuring 
internal harms, and there is a further difficulty in predicting how the introduction of a 
regulatory system would affect the rate of under-age cannabis use. Although one might expect 
cannabis to be more available to young people under a regulated system, this is far from certain. 
If licensing succeeds in eliminating much of the illicit supply from the market by removing profit 
opportunities and if policing of the retail system is effective, then it is just possible that 
availability to under-age consumers would be reduced. Note that it is important here to 
distinguish between consumption of cannabis material and consumption of its most 
problematic constituent, THC. With successful product regulation, it is quite possible that there 
could be a rise in under-age consumption of the former but a fall in consumption of the latter. 
We have very little evidence on this issue, and there is only weak evidence from the first 
analyses of the introduction of legal medical marijuana markets in a number of states in the 
USA, which have found no compelling evidence of leakage into the illicit under-age market 
(Anderson and Rees 2011). 
4.3.2 Social costs and transfers 
It is easy to confuse transfers of resources between members of society with a change in the 
total resources generated by society. A particular issue in the case of market regulation is 
                                                 
21 This is just over half of the 39% who reported having been offered cannabis at some point. 
22 This relates to all respondents aged 10-60 reporting any cannabis use within the last year; the distribution of onset 
age is unlikely to have changed much since the survey year 2003. If the age range is restricted to cannabis-using 
respondents aged 17-30 at interview, the estimated proportion with onset at 16 or younger increases to 54%. 
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indirect tax revenue. Taxation of licensed cannabis supply generates revenue for government, 
but this is not a net social benefit, rather a transfer of resources from cannabis users to 
government, and should therefore not be included in measures of social cost or benefit. 
Evaluations of social cost do not always respect this principle. A good example is drug-related 
acquisitive crime. A ‘pure’ theft is simply a transfer from the legal owner of the property to a 
new illegal owner. We may deplore the transfer from a moral point of view but, strictly 
speaking, it is not a loss to society. In practice, thefts are never pure – the victim always incurs 
additional costs such as property damage, psychological distress, etc., but the common practice 
of treating stolen property as a total loss to society is not defensible unless we are prepared to 
admit moral weights to social welfare measurement.  
An exception to this exclusion of transfers is the treatment of taxes and social security benefits 
related to earnings. If a drug policy reform changes an individual’s earnings (for example 
through a spell of imprisonment), he or she experiences the loss of the post-tax part of those 
earnings. This is an internal cost, which should be excluded from our estimate of social cost. 
There is also an external cost which should be included in social cost: the rest of society loses its 
share of the output the individual would have produced, and delivered in the form of tax 
revenue. 
As far as possible, we exclude the internal component of transfers from our analysis of social 
costs and benefits but, in section 7.3, we also present a parallel analysis of the impact of reform 
on transfers to and from government. 
4.4 Production costs in a licensed market 
We would expect the dominant form of commercial cannabis production in the UK to be under 
glass. As we have noted, cultivation in open fields would almost certainly be banned and would 
in any case probably be low yielding in the temperate UK climate. In order to estimate the likely 
costs of cannabis production in greenhouses, we adapt US work (Caulkins 2010) that was 
carried out against the background of the referendum in California in 2010 to introduce the 
Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act (Proposition 19). Had it been passed, the Act would 
have allowed local governments some powers to authorise commercial cannabis production.  
Compared to the small-scale home production methods, there is every reason to expect the 
(gross) cost of cannabis production to fall under a legal regime: there should be economies of 
scale from larger production units, innovation resulting from more open exchange of 
information, and more competition in the market for growing equipment. There should also be 
increases in labour productivity because workers could specialise full-time in cannabis 
production and those with particular skills in this area could sort more efficiently into the 
industry. Finally, labour costs should fall (to the extent that small-scale producers currently pay 
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themselves wages) because there would no longer be a need to pay a risk premium.  
Nevertheless, as stressed by Caulkins (2010), estimating cannabis production costs is a 
speculative exercise because the commercial growing of cannabis for general use is illegal 
everywhere. Much of his information about production techniques and costs had to be taken 
from the grey literature or growing manuals aimed at enthusiasts (which may understate the 
difficulties). To allow for this uncertainty, we give high-low ranges for the costs that we use. We 
base our estimates on a hypothetical growing operation situated on a hectare of land that is 
50% covered with greenhouses (the proportion of land covered is not critical, as rent turns out 
to be a tiny fraction of the final cost). Caulkins (2010) gives costs for a similar operation for 
California. We make various adjustments, mainly to allow for the UK cost of electricity, rent, 
labour inputs and wages. We also consider the amount of lighting likely to be needed at UK 
latitudes and look at the possible net benefits of adding two harvests in winter. The details of 
our projections of production cost are explained in Appendix A4.4. 
Table 4.4.1 summarises the estimated costs, which are dominated by materials costs, labour, 
structure and lighting. Our final mid-range estimates are around £260 per kg under both 
scenarios because compared to summer harvests only, the additional lighting (and heating) 
costs during winter are offset by lower fixed costs (greenhouse structure and equipment) per 
unit of cannabis produced. Our high-low range of £180 to £360 per kg is wide, reflecting the 
accumulation of low and high range limits, but even our high estimate is only just over 10% of 
the wholesale price of a kilogram of skunk, £3,096, given by IDMU in 2009.23  
 
Table 4.4.1  Estimated cost per kg of greenhouse-produced cannabis  
 
2 harvests per year 4 harvests per year 
 
Mid 
range 
Low 
cost 
High 
cost 
Mid 
range 
Low 
cost 
High 
cost 
Materials  £142.43 £71.22 £213.65 £142.43 £71.22 £213.65 
Lighting cost £27.11 £27.11 £27.11 £42.18 £42.18 £42.18 
Heating £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £4.06 £1.89 £5.67 
Rent £0.03 £0.02 £0.04 £0.02 £0.01 £0.02 
Structure £43.34 £34.67 £52.00 £21.67 £17.33 £26.00 
Labour £54.30 £47.00 £70.56 £54.30 £47.00 £70.56 
Total £267.21 £180.02 £363.37 £260.59 £177.74 £352.41 
  
Production costs are only one component of the pre-tax price. Other elements include 
compliance costs, distribution costs, producer’s profit margin and the retail mark-up. 
                                                 
23 Cannabis prices in 2009 from http://www.idmu.co.uk/cannabis-prices-2009.htm 
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Compliance costs may be important. We would expect there to be some direct controls on the 
nature of the product, possibly covering tar, nicotine, CO, THC and CBD content and these 
controls introduce the need to undertake monitoring and exercise a high degree of control over 
product quality. We have no clear basis for estimating compliance costs, and they are largely 
dependent on the rigour of the monitoring system adopted by the authorities. Caulkins (2010) 
quotes experience of medical cannabis production in the Netherlands, where regulatory 
oversight is so rigorous that the legal product sells above the coffee shop price, and compares 
this with the low cost ($100) of testing an individual sample, which would add a negligible 
amount to costs if a light-touch random testing regime were adopted. For our mid-estimate, we 
assume that compliance costs are approximately equal to production costs, so that they are 
significant but not critical to the competitiveness of the licensed product. Distribution costs are 
assumed to be 50% of production costs and pre-tax producer profit is assumed to be 11%, 
which is the 5-year average for British American Tobacco.24 Gross retail margins vary widely 
but a gross margin of 50% (implying a mark-up of 100%) might be a reasonable assumption. 
Table 4.4.2 illustrates a possible price configuration, leading to a pre-tax price of around £1.45 
per gm. This would imply a ratio of the current illicit price to the projected price of licensed 
product of 4-5. This pre-tax ratio compares reasonably well with Miron’s (2003) estimate of 
200-400% for the ratio of illicit to (post-tax) legalised cocaine price. We now consider taxation. 
 
Table 4.4.2  Illustrative pre-tax pricing of licensed cannabis  
 
Mid estimate Low estimate High estimate 
Production cost  £0.26 £0.18 £0.35 
Compliance cost £0.26 £0.18 £0.53 
Distribution cost £0.13 £0.09 £0.18 
Producer margin £0.07 £0.05 £0.12 
Total producer cost £0.72 £0.50 £1.17 
Retailer margin £0.72 £0.50 £1.17 
Total £1.45 £1.00 £2.34 
 
 
4.5 Tax policy and demand responses 
As in the legal markets for alcohol and tobacco, we would expect the costs of production, 
distribution, compliance and profit margins to be modest components of the final market price 
of licensed cannabis.  
                                                 
24 For 2006-2010, the 5-year average rate of pre-tax profit for Gallaher, BAT and Philip Morris were respectively 
5.4%, 11.3% and 25.7% respectively; we use this to generate the high-low range. 
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Alcohol is subject to excise duty and VAT (at 20%). Excise duty is levied on alcohol content for 
beer and spirits and on product volume for wine and cider (with constant rates of duty within 
specified ranges of alcohol by volume (ABV)). Table 4.5.1 shows some examples. Note that the 
implied duty per litre of pure alcohol varies markedly across products, and total tax as a 
percentage of retail price varies between 31% (cider) and 72% (strong beer). Stronger products 
tend to be taxed at higher rates, although this is not uniform. Separate rates for high- and low-
strength beers were introduced in the 2011 budget.  
 
Table 4.5.1  Alcohol taxation in 2011 
Product  
(ABV) 
Duty 
per litre 
alcohol 
Standard 
serving 
(litres) 
Duty per 
Serving 
Typical 
price per 
serving 
VAT 
(20%) 
% total 
tax 
Beer (4.2%)  £18.57 0.568 £0.44 £1.40 £0.23 48% 
Strong beer 
(7.5%) 
£23.21 0.568 £0.99 £1.80 £0.30 72% 
Low strength beer 
(2.8%) 
£9.29 0.568 £0.15 £1.00 £0.17 31% 
Wine (12.5%)  £19.30 0.175 £0.42 £1 £0.17 59% 
Cider (4.5%)  £7.97 0.568 £0.20 £1.40 £0.23 31% 
Spirits (37.5%)  £25.52 0.025 £0.24 £0.50 £0.08 65% 
 
Tobacco attracts an ad valorem tax in addition to the specific excise duty and VAT, and the ad 
valorem tax and VAT interact in a complex way. The 2011 budget raised the specific duty on 
cigarettes and lowered the ad valorem tax so that economy cigarettes were taxed more heavily. 
As a percentage of retail price, tobacco is taxed more heavily than alcohol (Table 4.5.2). 
 
Table 4.5.2  Tobacco taxation in 2011 
Product Pack size 
Specific 
duty / 
pack 
Ad 
valorem 
duty 
Ad 
valorem 
duty / 
pack 
Typical 
pack 
price 
VAT 
(20%) 
% 
total 
tax 
Cigarettes 20 cigarettes £3.10 16.5% £1.02 £6.20 £1.03 83% 
Loose tobacco 50g £7.60 0 £0.00 £14 £2.33 71% 
 
 
There are two striking features of these tax systems: taxes are high in comparison with 
suppliers’ costs, and their structure is related to product characteristics in a complex way. The 
latter point suggests that a cannabis tax might in practice have multiple rates related to factors 
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like THC yield, perhaps with concessions for product forms that are tobacco-free or do not 
involve inhalation of smoke. With the very coarse evidence currently available on cannabis 
demand, it is not feasible for us to take account of such details. Instead, we assume – purely for 
clarity’s sake – that there is a single licensed product with a fixed level of THC essentially 
dictated by the licensing authority. 
What tax regime would be likely in a licensed cannabis market? In many respects, the 
government would be in the same position as an entrepreneur contemplating entry into an 
existing market: decisions have to be made about the design of the product and pricing. 
However, unlike the entrepreneur, government would only be able to influence product design 
and price through regulation and taxation, rather than setting them directly. In our view, the 
only practical approach to the analysis is to make assumptions about the government’s strategic 
market objectives, then predict the price and product characteristics that would be required to 
achieve those objectives, and then finally to predict the indirect tax rate that would be required 
to generate that market price. 
It is important to realise that, with product controls as part of the regulatory armoury, there is a 
tradeoff between price and potency that the government can choose from, if it seeks to make 
substantial inroads into the illicit market. The important insight here is that the demand for 
cannabis is a derived demand: although consumers purchase cannabis, they do so in order to 
gain access to the constituents of the good. From this viewpoint, cannabis is thought of as a 
bundle of components rather than a commodity in itself. Appendix A4.5 sets out a formal 
analysis from this viewpoint, using the Gorman-Lancaster characteristics model of demand 
(Gorman 1980, Lancaster 1966, Pudney 1981).  
We consider two cases: version 1 assumes that cannabis users only care about a single 
characteristic, the primary psychoactive ingredient THC. With a single desirable characteristic 
available in the market, the characteristics model predicts that all competitively supplied 
varieties will offer the same price per unit of THC. Empirical evidence tends to contradict this: 
current market prices for standard herb/resin and sinsemilla are around £4 and £7 per gram 
(see Figure 2.3.1) and mean THC yields are around 6% and 15% (Table 2.3.1), so the price per 
gram of THC is £66.67 (herb/resin) and £46.67 (sinsemilla). The model predicts that, at these 
prices, sinsemilla will take the whole market – and the recent steep rise in its market share is 
possibly consistent with that view. The figure of £46.67 as the current implicit market price of 
THC suggests that, if the THC limit on the licensed product were set at (say) 10%, the 
corresponding maximum competitive price level for licensed cannabis would be £4.67, 
compared with £7 for illicit sinsemilla. 
An alternative variant of the model assumes that consumers care about the volume of cannabis 
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they use (e.g. the number of joints smoked) as well as the total THC yield. Cannabis smoking is 
often a social activity and it is quite plausible that users derive some enjoyment from the act of 
consumption independently of the potency of the drug. Given the THC-price configurations 
observed in the market for sinsemilla and standard herb or resin, we can infer the implicit 
market valuation (or shadow price) of the two characteristics, product weight and THC (see 
Appendix A4.5 for details). For any projected level of THC potency in a new licensed product, 
these market valuations can be used to estimate the maximum competitive price that could be 
charged. Our assumption is that government would aim to choose the level of taxation so as to 
generate a price below this maximum competitive level and thus drive much of the illicit supply 
out of the market. Current market prices for standard herb/resin and sinsemilla of £4 and £7 
per gram and THC yields of 6% and 15% imply that the current implicit valuation of THC is 
£33.33 per gram and of cannabis quantity is £2 per gram. So, from the consumer’s point of view, 
the purchase of (say) 5gm of sinsemilla at £7 per gm is essentially a joint purchase of £10-worth 
of cannabis bulk and £25-worth of THC. This implies that, if government wishes the licensed 
product to make inroads into the illicit market, and sets a THC limit of (say) 10%, it would need 
to set the excise tax rate at a level which will generate a market price significantly below £5.33 
per gram according to this 2-component model. The large difference between the maximum 
competitive prices (£4.67 and £5.33) predicted by these two perfectly reasonable views of 
demand means that there is a great deal of conceptual uncertainty around the setting of tax 
rates. 
It is difficult to forecast demand, even for standardised commodities in legal markets, with 
access to high-quality data. To do so following a market intervention involving a new regulatory 
apparatus and the entry of a major new supplier is still more so. The conventional approach to 
demand forecasting is to use information on expected future price and income movements 
together with estimates of the response of demand to price, derived from statistical models 
fitted to recent survey or time-series data. There is only a limited literature on the 
responsiveness of cannabis consumption (and consumption of other related goods) to changes 
in price and legal status, mainly owing to a scarcity of high-quality data. The most suitable data 
come from the US or Australia, since those are the countries with best developed measurement 
of illicit drug prices. As we are not aware of any relevant UK studies, we base our assessment of 
likely demand responses on this international evidence. 
Demand elasticities 
The important concept here is that of a demand elasticity, which tells us the percent impact on 
the demand for a good of a 1% increase in the price of that (or some other) good. So, if the 
elasticity of cannabis demand is -0.8, then a 10% fall in the price of cannabis will increase 
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cannabis consumption by approximately 8%. There is an important distinction between the 
participation elasticity, which describes how responsive the number of new cannabis users is to 
price variations, and the intensity elasticity, which measures the responsiveness of the level of 
consumption by existing users. The total elasticity is the sum of the participation and intensity 
elasticities. Appendix A4.5 goes into technical detail and also summarises estimates of 
elasticities in the published research literature (Table A4.5.1). There is no clear consensus on 
the magnitude  of demand elasticities for cannabis, but a reasonable assumption representative 
of the research literature is that the participation elasticity is around -0.4 an the intensity 
elasticity -0.3, giving an overall elasticity of  -0.7.  
A drawback of existing research on demand responses to price variation is that it largely ignores 
the issue of product quality. As outlined in the previous section and Appendix A4.5, if consumers 
value a range of product characteristics, variations in price will change the relative valuations of 
the underlying characteristics and produce both changes in the market shares of different 
product varieties and in the aggregate demands for cannabis quantity and components like THC. 
Non-price influences on demand 
As well as affecting the retail price of cannabis, the creation of a regulated market changes its  
legal status and may consequently cause a structural shift in demand. There is a possibility that 
the status of illegality has a direct effect in restraining demand, either through fear of legal 
penalties or through an indicative process by which the law emphasises social norms (Cooter 
1998). 25 Because there are no examples of fully legal cannabis markets anywhere in the world it 
is very difficult to assess the impact of a move to legality and the best one can do is to try to 
draw inferences from the limited reforms which have been enacted at different times across the 
world. MacCoun (2010) reviews the evidence from reforms that have variously depenalised 
possession of small amounts of cannabis,  decriminalised home cultivation, legalised 
consumption in coffee shops, and (for alcohol) raised the drinking age. Depenalisation of 
possession (in several US states, the Netherlands, Portugal and parts of Australia) seems to have 
had almost no effect on cannabis use. There is also no evidence that the decriminalisation of 
limited home cultivation in Alaska and South Australia substantially changed consumption 
trends.  
MacCoun (2010) argues that the Dutch coffee shop experience represents the most realistic 
scenario for assessing the likely non-price effects of licensing cannabis supply, and concludes 
that legalisation could result in a 35% increase in past-month use. However, it appears that 
consumption may be quite sensitive to the increased restrictions introduced from the 1990s, 
                                                 
25 See Pudney (2010) for a discussion of the role of law in relation to cannabis. 
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such as raising the minimum age of entry from 16 to 18 and limiting advertising. To the extent 
that the UK market would be strictly regulated from the start, we may expect the non-price 
effects to be substantially lower. 
Given the considerable uncertainty about demand responses, the obvious way to proceed is to 
consider a range of possible market outcomes, corresponding to different views of demand 
responses. Appendix A4.5 contains a detailed technical discussion of the possible demand 
responses to a policy-induced price change in a setting where consumers are interested in 
cannabis both as a consumption good in itself and as source of THC; Table A4.5.3 gives a range 
of alternative predictions as illustrations of the possible outcomes of a reform. For simplicity, 
we assume here that the licensed product is subject to a 10% limit on THC content, with the 
indirect tax rate set at a level that generates a market price of £4.80 for the licensed product 
(which is 10% below the maximum competitive price). We consider three alternative scenarios, 
set out in Table 4.5.3, which have four appealing features: (i) they span a reasonable range of 
possibilities in view of the changes in implicit market valuations of THC and quantity that would 
be generated by a moderate undercutting of the illicit market by licensed supply; (ii) they allow 
for the possibility that the amount of THC and the volume of cannabis may change in different 
ways as users substitute between licensed and unlicensed varieties; (iii) they respect the 
identities connecting post-reform market shares and the proportional demand changes induced 
by the reform; and (iv) they imply a wide range of possibilities in terms of market shares of 
unlicensed product. Appendix A4.5 gives the technical details.  
The low-response scenario is consistent with low elasticities of demand for THC and cannabis 
quantity and substitutability between them, with reform leading to a modest increase in 
demand for cannabis quantity and decrease in intake of THC. The mid-response scenario 
involves a substantial increase in cannabis quantity but little increase in THC intake. The high-
response scenario, which we regard as less plausible, involves a large rise in THC consumption 
and still larger rise in cannabis quantity, and could be consistent with a significant role for 
illegality per se as a restraining factor on pre-reform demand. 
 
Table 4.5.3  Three market response scenarios 
 Low 
response 
Mid 
response 
High 
response 
Change in THC demand  -10% +5% +25% 
Change in cannabis quantity +15% +20% +40% 
Unlicensed share (quantity)   20%   30%   35% 
Unlicensed share  (THC) 25% 39% 45% 
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We use these scenarios to produce alternative estimates of those elements of social cost 
which are related either to the level of consumption of THC (for example, the costs of 
psychotic illness) or the quantity of cannabis (for example, the costs of respiratory 
disease). 
 
 
 
5 Direct costs and benefits 
The available evidence on policing and criminal justice system costs is surprisingly sparse, and 
the few unit cost figures that appear in the research literature are remarkably divergent. 
Enforcement costs can be separated into the costs arising from three phases of the enforcement 
process: (i) policing; (ii) criminal justice procedures; and (iii) implementation of sentences 
imposed by the justice system. We consider these in turn. For each, we first review the available 
evidence about costs and make judgements about the plausible range of unit costs for relevant 
types of action. We then summarise the available data on caseloads and consider the change in 
aggregate social costs that would be brought about by projected caseload changes as a result of 
the policy reform. 
5.1 Enforcement costs 
5.1.1 Policing 
Unit costs for a given police action (such as a cannabis warning or a supply arrest) are generally 
calculated in one of two ways. The first, used by Godfrey et al (2004) and May et al (2002), is 
based on an estimate by Brand and Price (2000) of the aggregate costs of policing drug offences 
in financial year 1999/2000. Brand and Price (2000) did not describe their estimation 
procedure in detail, but it involved the adaptation of an activity sampling exercise carried out by 
Humberside police to estimate the proportion of police activity that is devoted to dealing with 
crime.26 The resulting aggregate figure (£516m) for policing costs arising from drug offences is 
then divided by the number of drug offences recorded to produce an average cost per offence. 
Surprisingly, although both Godfrey et al (2004) and May et al (2002) appear to have used the 
same method and the same aggregate cost figure, the former arrived at a figure of £3,551 per 
drug offence, while the latter quoted a figure of £4,605 per offence. The Brand and Price (2000) 
aggregate cost estimate is acknowledged to be quite crude and it is not an ideal basis for policy 
costing. Their study was updated by DuBourg et al (2005) for a subset of offence groups 
(excluding drug offences, unfortunately) and their more extensive analysis of police activity 
                                                 
26 The details of the Humberside study and the way in which it was adapted are not documented. 
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data suggested that the Brand-Price method tended to understate the costs of non-violent crime 
and overstate the costs of most violent crime. In a study of the costs of class A drug use, Godfrey 
et al (2002) used a reduced figure of £1,346 per arrest for possession, which appears to be 
based on an alternative to the Brand and Price calculation, although the method of calculation is 
not made clear. 
A second approach to costing any particular type of police action is to make an estimate of the 
average number of hours of police time required for that action to be completed and multiply it 
by the average cost of an hour of police time. This approach has been used by May et al (2002) 
and May et al (2007) in two conflicting ways. The earlier study calculated the hourly cost of an 
officer’s time as the ratio of total police expenditure to the number of police constables, 
converted to an hourly rate by dividing by an assumed 1,500 working hours per officer per year. 
This concept of an hourly rate therefore includes all support and overhead costs, apportioned 
pro rata. In this way, May et al (2002) arrive at a figure of £50 per hour. An arrest for cannabis 
possession was assumed to take 10 hours of a constable’s time – a figure based on analysis of a 
sample of custody records and on police evidence given to the Home Affairs Select Committee 
on Drugs Policy. Thus an average cannabis arrest was estimated to have a unit cost of £500. In 
the later study, May et al (2007) use a completely different approach, with no explanation for 
the change of methodology. They assume an arbitrary £13 per hour as the cost of a constable’s 
time, based on the observation that the starting salary was £9.22 but the average constable 
would have some years of experience. Note that this concept of an hourly rate excludes any 
support and overhead costs and is likely to give a gross underestimate of true policing costs. At 
10 hours of police time per arrest and 80 minutes per warning, this latter approach implies 
£130 as the average cost of an arrest for possession and £17.33 as the average cost of a police 
warning. 
As far as we are aware, these are the only recent attempts to estimate the costs of police action 
on drug offences and they are not very encouraging. Estimates spanning a range from £130 to 
£4,605 per arrest do not provide a good basis for cost-benefit analysis. However, both extremes 
of this range are subject to methodological objection, so it is possible to narrow the range of 
plausible estimates considerably.  
We have no new basis for estimating the time required to deal with particular types of case, and 
the available estimates in the research literature are almost anecdotal in nature, so there is a 
great deal of uncertainty involved here. The literature also has little to say about the magnitude 
of the seniority effect – that more serious crimes tend to involve more senior officers, thus 
raising the unit cost. Again, comparison of figures used in different studies generates a very 
wide range. Using a (non-representative) sample of custody records, May et al (2002) found 
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that the time from arrest to return to the beat was 3.5 hours. This excludes additional activities 
that might be required, so a figure of 5 hours was used, in line with earlier police evidence given 
to the Home Affairs Select Committee on Drugs Policy. On grounds that patrol officers typically 
work in pairs, a total of ten hours was assumed for an average arrest for drugs possession. At 
the other extreme, the Godfrey et al (2002) figure of £1,346 would imply, at our rate of £68.46 
per hour of police time, 19.7 constable-hours per arrest. Even allowing for the fact that Godfrey 
et al (2002) were considering arrests for class A possession rather than cannabis, this is a very 
large difference. 
Given the uncertain basis of the latter estimate and its questionable outcome, we follow the May 
et al (2002) approach, but modify it slightly. Our concern is with the assumption that all aspects 
of the arrest involve two constables, so that the 5 hours of elapsed time is equivalent to 10 
hours of police resource. Some of the work involved in an arrest (report-writing, etc) does not 
require two people and some will also be spread across offences where multiple charges are 
involved.27  For this reason, we assume that the 3.5 hours reported by May et al (2002) as the 
interruption to patrol time required to process a cannabis arrest involves both officers, while 
the additional time required is 2 hours of a custody sergeant and a further hour of one of the 
constables, so that our assumption for the total time for a cannabis arrest is 8 constable-hours 
plus 2 sergeant hours. May et al (2002) do not distinguish between arrest leading to a caution 
and arrest leading to a court appearance. In the latter case, we assume arbitrarily that the 
additional preparatory work increases the average time to 12 constable-hours plus 4 sergeant-
hours. 
For the formal cannabis warnings which have been in operation since 2004, May et al (2007) 
assume an average time of 80 minutes to carry out eight steps, including the stop-and-search, 
police checks, completing a stop-and-search form, inputting details to various information 
systems and transferring the seizure to the property store. It appears that the 80 minutes time 
was not increased to allow for involvement of two officers in the action. To allow for this, we 
have increased the assumed time to 140 minutes. We assume the same time for the use of a 
Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND), which involves on-the-spot imposition of a fine. 
For the time required to deal with an arrest for supply offences, we are in the realms of 
guesswork, since we have found no relevant evidence in the research literature. We assume that 
all arrests for supply and production offences involve preparation for a possible court case and 
that, on average, the process involves costs equivalent to 24 hours of constables’ time, 12 
sergeant-hours and 10 inspector hours. These figures should be seen as an arbitrary illustration 
                                                 
27 Analysis of custody records by May et al (2002) found that 15% of cannabis possession arrests involved other 
non-drug offences. 
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only: they have been chosen to give a unit cost figure close to the Brand and Price (2000) 
estimate of over £3000 per case. 
Table 5.1.2 gives the resulting unit cost estimates, which range from £150 for a warning or PND, 
to £3,420 for an arrest for a supply offence. Since these figures are so uncertain, we also provide 
a judgemental high-low range for each unit cost, which we are confident will contain the true 
figure. 
 
Table 5.1.2  Assumed times and unit costs for police actions 
Activity 
Illustrative calculation 
of police time 
Unit cost                
(mid estimate) 
High-low          
range 
Cannabis possession: 
formal warning or PND 
140 constable minutes 
 
£150 £100-200 
Cannabis possession: 
arrest and caution 
8 constable hours 
+ 2 sergeant hours 
£660 £400-£1000 
Cannabis possession: 
arrest and preparation 
for court 
12 constable hours 
+ 4 sergeant hour 
£1060 £700-£1,500 
Cannabis supply or 
production: arrest and 
preparation for court 
20 constable hours + 8 
sergeant hours + 8 
inspector hours  
£3,420 £2,000-£4,800 
Note: calculations rounded to the nearest £10. 
 
Official statistics on the volumes of drugs offences dealt with in various ways lack some of the 
detail we would like for analysis of drugs policy. In particular, the specific substance (or 
substances) involved in a particular detected drug offence is not recorded in a proportion of 
cases, and published data are often aggregated within the three official drug classes, so that 
individual drugs cannot be separated. 
Table 5.1.3 gives our best estimate of the police caseloads for cannabis offences in the two years 
post-reclassification for which data are available. The residual possession category is the 
difference between the number of recorded cannabis possession offences and the total number 
of warnings, PNDs and court convictions. This residual thus covers cases not proceeded with, 
not guilty verdicts and an error arising from the mismatch between financial years used for 
criminal statistics and calendar years used for sentencing statistics. 
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Table 5.1.3  Police caseloads for cannabis offences post-reclassification 
Activity 2009 2010 
Cannabis possession: formal warning or PNDa 99,833 93,023 
Cannabis possession: arrest and cautiona 20,609 18,870 
Cannabis possession: arrest and preparation for court   
          leading to convictionb 21,457 25,188 
          leading to other outcomec 2,045 2,400 
Other cannabis possession arrest outcomesd 18,666 - 
Cannabis supply or production: arrest and preparation for court   
          leading to convictionb 8,701 12,319 
          leading to other outcomec 829 1,174 
Note: aTables 1.4 and  2.1 of Criminal Justice Statistics, Quarterly Update to December 2010;   b Table A4.10 of 
“annual tables” appendix to Criminal Justice Statistics, Quarterly Update to December 2010;  c Estimated from 
number of convictions, assuming an average 2005-10 conviction rate of 91.3% for drugs offences;  d Difference 
between number of recorded possession offences (Recorded Crime Statistics 2009/10) and sum of warnings, PNDs, 
cautions and court convictions; recorded offences not available for 2009/10. 
 
We use the unit cost estimates from Table 5.1.2 and caseload figures from Table 5.1.3 to 
construct estimates of the financial cost of cannabis policing for 2009 and 2010. In doing so, we 
make two further assumptions. First, the average proceeds from PNDs are assumed to be £43.20 
per PND. Although cannabis possession is an upper-tier offence carrying an £80 penalty, only 
54% were paid in full in the two years 2009-10.28 We assume that, for the remainder, any 
eventual proceeds of consequent fines are offset exactly by recovery costs. Second, we assume 
that the 2010 residual “other possession outcomes” volume is identical to the 2009 figure, and 
use the warning/PND unit cost figure to compute the corresponding cost element.  
The resulting aggregate cost figures are presented in Table 5.1.4. Our central estimate is that the 
total financial cost of cannabis policing in England and Wales is currently around £100 million. 
However, the range of uncertainty associated with this estimate is very large. If, instead, we 
adopt the low or high estimate for all of the unit costs, we would instead have a range of 
possibilities from around £65m to £105m. 
 
   Table 5.1.4  Estimated total current cost of cannabis policing 
                            (£million per annum) 
 
2009 2010 
Mid estimate £88.9m £104.6m 
(low, high range) (£55.6 – 125.3m) (£65.0 – 147.4m) 
 
 
There are three further points to bear in mind here. First, the supply/production component of 
                                                 
28 Table A2.1, Criminal Justice Statistics, England and Wales 2010. 
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these sums would be the saving in terms of police resources only if the licensing of cannabis 
supply were to remove the need for policing supply and production activity completely. In 
practice that is not the case – there will always exist a black market, just as there does for 
tobacco. As with tobacco, the black market will generate some policing activity, so that total 
savings will be less than the figures in Table 5.1.4 suggest; we consider these regulation costs in 
section 5.6 below. 
Second, our estimates exclude all policing costs associated with importation and exportation of 
cannabis. Under the hypothesised system of licensing and regulation, international trade in 
cannabis would continue to be illegal. We assume that these policing (and associated criminal 
justice system) costs would remain unaffected, in spite of the likely fall in the volume of 
imported cannabis that would ensue. We make this assumption principally because we have no 
data on the caseload classified by drug type; in practice, this means we will underestimate the 
enforcement cost saving to some degree. 
Third, note that our estimates are considerably larger than the £3.5m saving estimated by May et 
al (2007) for the 2004 switch to policing of cannabis as a class C drug. There are three main 
reasons for this difference: May et al used a very low figure of £13 per hour for police time, 
which ignored all support costs; their calculation relates to 2004 and does not allow for cost 
increases since then; and supply offences were excluded from consideration. 
5.1.2 Criminal justice procedures 
The statistical evidence on the costs of criminal justice procedures relating to drug offences is 
still more limited than the evidence on policing costs. The widely-cited study by Brand and Price 
(2000) uses cost data for 1997/8 reported by Harries (1999), which was produced from a Home 
Office simulation model of aggregate costs and flows through the criminal justice system. These 
figures were subsequently revised by Dubourg et al (2005) to allow for sentence costs spanning 
multiple years but the court proceedings component of unit costs was left essentially 
unchanged. As far as we are aware, the Harries (1999) unit cost estimates, reproduced in Table 
5.1.5, remain the most up-to-date available estimates of the average costs of court proceedings 
for drug offences, despite the fact that they relate to a period fourteen years in the past. A 
further difficulty is that there is no official index of court costs for public prosecutions that can 
be used to uprate Harries’ estimated unit costs. In Table 5.1.5, we show the effect of uprating the 
1997/8 unit costs by RPI or median earnings growth. Alternative assumptions about cost 
inflation make a large difference to the result; in our view, the option of uprating in relation to 
earnings growth is preferable, since court processes are highly labour-intensive and legal costs 
are known to have grown strongly over the last decade or so. 
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Table 5.1.5  Estimated unit cost of court proceedings for drug offences by court type 
 
Crown court Magistrates court 
1997/8 estimate (Harries 1999) £7,700 £700 
Uprated to 2009/10 by RPIa £10,448 £950 
Uprated to 2009/10 by median earnings indexb £14,002 £1,273 
a Uprated using all-items RPI growth between 1997 and 2009; b Uprated using growth in median weekly 
earnings (ASHE) for full-time workers between April 1997 and April 2009  
 
Table 5.1.6 summarises the most recent available data on the breakdown of cannabis 
convictions for possession and supply/production across the two types of court. There is a 
strong tendency for magistrates courts to deal with cases of possession rather than supply.  
 
          Table 5.1.6  Distribution of cannabis possession and supply convictions by court                                      
type in 2010 (%) 
Cannabis offence Crown court Magistrates court Total 
Possession 2.32 71.62 73.94 
Production/supply 10.93 15.13 26.06 
Total 13.25 86.75 100 
Source: Criminal Justice Statistics England and Wales 2010, analysis of supplementary computer file Court 
level sentencing (downloaded from www.justice.gov.uk/publications/statistics-and-data/criminal-
justice/criminal-justice-statistics.htm on 15 August 2011) 
 
Under the assumption that all variations in average cost of court proceedings are captured fully 
by the type of court, we can use Tables 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 to construct unit costs for each of the four 
types of drug offence. The results are given in Table 5.1.7, for the two alternative uprating 
methods. We adopt the earnings-uprated costs as our mid-estimate, and adopt a wide range of 
uncertainty around each. 
 
Table 5.1.7  Estimated unit cost of court proceedings for cannabis offences 
Offence 
RPI 
uprating 
Median earnings 
uprating          
(mid-estimate) 
High-low        
range 
Possession, cannabis £1,240 £1,680 £1,000-2,400 
Production/supply, cannabis £4,940 £6,620 £4,000-10,000 
Note: weighted averages calculated from Tables 5.1.5 and 5.1.6, rounded to nearest £20   
 
Cannabis-related convictions totalled 26,716 for England and Wales in 2009 and 33,430 for 
2010; their distribution across offence and court types is given by Table 5.1.6. The aggregate 
costs implied by these caseloads and our estimated unit values are summarised in Table 5.1.8. 
 
   Table 5.1.8  Estimated total current cost of cannabis court proceedings 
                            (£million per annum) 
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2009 2010 
Mid estimate £ 70.9m £ 96.9m 
Low-high range £ 42.5-104.1m £ 58.2-142.9m 
 
On these estimates, the annual cost of court proceedings is approximately £100m, which is 
roughly comparable to policing costs. However, they are likely to be underestimates, since they 
exclude any of the costs involved in court proceedings which end with a not guilty verdict or 
which are initiated but not pursued to verdict; such cases involve costs which we are unable to 
estimate. 
 
5.1.3 Custodial sentences 
Unfortunately data are not available on custodial sentence length by specific drug type. In 2009, 
the first year after cannabis was restored to class B, there were 1,526 custodial sentences in 
England and Wales for offences recorded as involving class B drugs. Just under a quarter of 
these were for possession, the remainder for production or trafficking offences. Mean sentence 
lengths for class B possession and supply/production offences are 2.2 and 19.3 months 
respectively. Their distributions are shown in Figure 5.1.1: almost 90% of all possession 
sentences were 3 months or less while, for supply offences, the median was between 12 and 18 
months, with just under 90% of sentences being 36 months or less. We might expect cannabis 
offences to be seen by the courts as less serious than those involving other class B substances, 
so these distributions may overstate the severity of cannabis penalties to some degree. 
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   Figure 5.1.1 Distributions of sentence lengths for possession and 
supply/production offences involving class B drugs                                          
(Source: Sentencing Statistics 2009, supplementary table S5.8) 
 
Formal sentences are not a good guide to the true resource cost of custodial penalties. Overall, 
for all sentences discharged in 2009, the total time served was only 59% of total sentence 
length.29 These proportions relate to all offences but no separate figures are available for drug 
offences, so we assume a uniform implementation rate of 59% for possession and supply 
offences. 
The most recent official estimate of the average cost of a prison place is £45,000 for financial 
year 2008/9, equivalent to £3,750 per month. The average cost of a prison place for a specific 
type of drug offender will depend on the system for allocating such offenders to specific types of 
institution. Unfortunately there is no available information on the variation of prison costs 
across offence categories. The overall average cost will over-estimate the cost of places in low-
security facilities where some drug offenders are held but, against this, some will occupy places 
in Young Offenders Institutions, where costs are higher – approximately £4,920 per month on 
                                                 
29 Source MoJ (2010c, Table 9.1a); the proportion is lower (50%) for 6-12 month sentences and higher (62%) for 
sentences of 48 months and over. 
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average.30 In the absence of better information, we assume a flat average cost of £3,750 per 
month for all prison places. 
Table 5.1.9 sets out the cost calculation, which leads to a mid-estimate of £84m in 2010 as the 
public cost of custodial sentences for cannabis possession, production and supply offences. This 
figure is almost certainly an underestimate, since it excludes the costs of monitoring by the 
probation service post-release. It also does not include follow-on costs, such as the potential 
output lost during the period of imprisonment and as a consequence of unemployment induced 
by the scarring effect of a spell of imprisonment; we consider these in sections 5.2 and 6.1. Note 
that the cost of imprisonment for people convicted of international trade in cannabis is excluded 
from the calculation in Table 5.1.9. 
 
Table 5.1.9  Estimated unit cost of custodial sentences for cannabis offences, 2010 
Offence 
Mean 
sentence 
(all class B 
offences, 
months) 
Cost 
per sentence 
served 
Number of 
custodial 
cannabis 
sentences 
Aggregate 
cost 
Possession 2.2 £4,868 346 £ 1.7m 
Production/supply 19.3 £42,701 1,927 £ 82.3m 
Aggregate cost of sentences for cannabis 
possession/production/supply offences 
Mid-estimate: 
£84.0m 
Low: 
£50m 
High: 
£125m 
Note:  Calculations assume: mean sentence lengths uniform across class B drugs; time served is 59% of nominal 
sentence; no post-release costs such as parole monitoring. Estimates do not include costs of  exportation/ 
importation offences. 
 
5.1.4 Costs of community sentences and fines 
The vast majority of cannabis convictions lead to fines or community sentences of various kinds. 
Community sentences are extremely diverse in character and may involve a combination of 
requirements imposed on the offender. There are twelve specific requirements, defined by the 
2003 Criminal Justice Act, that can be imposed on offenders, including31: supervision by the 
probation service; unpaid work for the community; compulsory training or behavioural change 
programmes; reparation activities; bans on specified activities; curfew; exclusion from specified 
locations; treatment for mental health problems or drug/alcohol dependency; attendance at an 
Attendance Centre; restrictions on residence. The majority of Community Orders (COs) impose 
only a single requirement and the most common are for stand-alone supervision and for unpaid 
community work, each accounting for around a third of the total community sentence caseload. 
                                                 
30 See Official Report written answers: 3rd March 2010, c1251W and 18 January 2011, c865-867W. The latter source 
suggests that costs have been stable since 2008, so we do not uprate these averages to a current cost basis. 
31 See National Audit Office (2008, Appendix 7). 
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There is no information available on the distribution of CO requirements or durations across 
offence types, but we assume that most cannabis-related cases are relatively short and 
uncomplicated. 
There is little available information on the costs of implementing community sentences or the 
value of the output that is produced by those that impose a requirement for unpaid community 
work. However, the National Audit Office (2008) commissioned a costing study that gives some 
basis for estimating the public cost of community sentences. They estimated average costs 
incurred by the probation service of £650 and £780 respectively for orders made in 2006, 
involving supervision and unpaid work respectively. However, the underlying costing exercise 
also produced indicative costs for the specific example of a first offender sentenced to 60 hours 
of unpaid community work, where the cost was estimated to be £323. This is quite a typical 
sentence for cannabis possession. In the absence of better evidence, we uprate these figures to a 
2010 basis in line with median earnings growth and assume that COs for cannabis supply 
offences entail an average unit cost of £1,000 per case, while possession offences cost half that 
figure. We also assume that 50% of these COs require unpaid community work (150 hours for 
supply offences and 60 hours for possession), which generates output valued at £3.69 per hour, 
calculated as 75% of the National Minimum Wage for 18-21 year-olds from October 2010. Thus 
the average community sentences for cannabis supply and possession offences are assumed to 
generate £277 and £111 in social benefit from unpaid work, which can be offset against the 
costs of implementing the sentences.32 The results of this calculation are summarised in Table 
5.1.10. The estimated aggregate cost (assuming 2009 caseloads but 2010 cost levels) is the 
relatively small figure of £3.2m. 
 
Table 5.1.10  Costs  of community sentences 
Offence 
No. 
community 
sentences 
2010 
Unit    
cost 
Aggregate 
cost 
Unit 
social 
value of 
output 
produced 
Aggregate 
social 
value of 
output 
produced 
Cannabis possession 4,532 £500 £2.3m £111 £0.5m 
Cannabis supply/production 2,942 £1,000 £2.9m £277 £0.8m 
All cannabis cases 7,474 £697 £5.2m £176 £1.3m 
Source: http://sentencing.justice.gov.uk/?id=2&id2=19 
 
The introduction of Community Orders by the 2003 Criminal Justice Act was partly intended to 
encourage the courts to substitute community sentences for short custodial sentences. Instead, 
                                                 
32 We ignore costs to the offender of providing the effort required as unpaid work, since we are concerned here only 
with external net public costs. 
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there was a large switch from the use of fines to community sentences, so the proportion of 
sentences for drug offences which involve a fine declined from 47% in 1999 to 37% ten years 
later (MoJ 2010a, Table 4(iii)). Among indictable offences, cannabis possession generates the 
second largest volume of fines (over 13,500 in 2010), the average level being £101. We assume 
that this figure results from an average fine of £90 for cannabis possession and £250 for 
cannabis production or supply.33 There is little reliable evidence on the collection of fines and 
apparently no usable data on the associated recovery costs34 but the National audit Office 
(2006) found a payment rate within 6 months of only 52% in its analysis of a sample of fines 
imposed in 2005. We assume that there has been some improvement in payment rates to 60% 
since 2005, but we also assume that the value of all fines not paid within 6 months but 
eventually recovered is exactly offset by aggregate fine recovery costs. As Table 5.1.11 shows, 
the aggregate revenue from fines is estimated to be negligible in comparison with aggregate 
enforcement costs, and unlikely to exceed £1m. 
 
Table 5.1.11  Estimated net revenue from fines for cannabis offences, 2010 
Offence 
No. of fines 
in 2009 
Average 
fine 
Assumed 
proportion 
paid within 
12 months 
Net unit 
revenue 
from fines 
Aggregate 
net 
revenue 
Possession 13,554 £90 60% £54 £0.7m 
Production/supply 1,131 £250 60% £150 £0.2m 
Aggregate net cost of fines for cannabis 
possession/production/supply offences 
Mid: 
 £0.9m 
Low: 
£0.5m 
High: 
£1.4m 
Note:  Source: MoJ (2010a) and analysis of supplementary files. Calculations assume recovery of fines paid after 6 
months are exactly offset by collection costs 
 
5.2 Output lost through incarceration 
In addition to the direct cost of maintaining a prisoner in jail, the incarceration of a person who 
would otherwise be employed has a further cost in terms of the loss of earnings (and thus 
output) that would otherwise have been produced by that person. To the extent that this is a 
fully understood risk and that the offender was capable of taking that risk into account when 
making his or her decision to consume or supply cannabis, the greater part of this is an internal 
cost and (as discussed in Appendix A4.2), only the lost tax revenue should be included in a 
conservative evaluation restricted to external social costs and benefits. However, there is at 
least anecdotal evidence to suggest that many low-level cannabis suppliers become involved in 
drug dealing essentially as part of their social activity and may not think of this as drug dealing 
                                                 
33 This assumption is roughly consistent with the fact that the modal fine is £100 and the median is £75. 
34 See MoJ (2010b, pages 210-211) for an explanation of the process of redeveloping information on fines recovery.  
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subject to severe criminal justice penalties.  
One can value the loss of output as the (gross) earnings that would have been earned, had 
employment continued. A simple valuation method would be to multiply the time spent in 
prison by the average level of earnings, but this would overlook the fact that people arrested for 
drugs offences have a relatively low probability of being in employment at the time of arrest, 
and below-average earnings levels if they are employed. Table 5.2.1 illustrates this with data 
from the 2003-6 Arrestee Survey, comparing people arrested for suspected drugs offences with 
other arrestees. Note that (uprated) average pay for employed drug arrestees is only around 
70% of the average earnings level (of £488) for all employees in 2010. The higher average pay 
of people arrested for supply, rather than possession, offences reflects their greater average age. 
It is likely that people imprisoned for drug offences have weaker labour market attachment than 
the average for people arrested on suspicion of drug offences. The Arrestee Survey does not 
observe the outcome of the arrest, but it gives some indicators of a high risk of imprisonment. 
Table 5.2.1 shows that arrestees with a previous history of arrest have (significantly) lower than 
average employment rates (around 36-37% rather than 40-42%), and that with a previous spell 
in prison have a still lower employment rate of around one quarter. In contrast, a previous 
arrest or prison history has no statistically significant influence on the average level of pay for 
arrestees who are in employment.  
 
Table 5.2.1  Arrestee Survey 2003-6: economic activity and earnings by reason for arrest 
 
Possession 
Supply or 
production 
Non-drug 
offence 
% economically active a 
(all arrestees) 
42.1 
(2.3) 
40.4 
(3.3) 
47.2 
(1.0) 
% economically active a  
(arrestees with at least 1 previous arrest) 
36.7 
(2.5) 
35.6 
(3.7) 
41.1 
(1.0) 
% economically active a  
(arrestees with prison record) 
24.6 
(3.1) 
25.9 
(4.5) 
28.5 
(1.0) 
Average weekly net earnings at time of 
arrest b 
£317 
(14.2) 
£343 
(34.9) 
£469 
(42.3) 
Average weekly gross earnings at time of 
arrest c 
£405 
(371 ,  439) 
£443          
(359 ,  528) 
£629          
(526 ,  731) 
Means weighted to allow for survey design, non-response and arrest frequency; standard errors in parentheses 
adjusted for complex survey design.   a  Employed, self-employed, in training or education;  b Most recent pay 
(uprated to 2010 levels by growth in  median weekly earnings) for all arrestees in employment at time of arrest;  c 
Net-to-gross conversion using the personal tax and NI allowances and basic tax and NI rates for 2010)  
 
On the basis of this evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that between 24% and 36% of 
people imprisoned for cannabis possession and supply offences would be in productive 
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employment if they were not incarcerated35 and that their productive contribution to society 
would have been approximately £405 and £443 per week respectively. Taking the mean 
sentence length and aggregate number of sentences from Table 5.1.9 above (and assuming that 
59% of the sentence is spent in prison), the estimated value of lost production is in the range 
£4.6m-£10.2m. Compared to the cost of maintaining these people in prison (£35m-£80m), the 
value of lost output caused by their removal from the labour market while in prison is modest. 
Of course, the longer-term costs of damaged future employment prospects may also be 
substantial. We deal with that issue in section 6.1. 
 
Table 5.2.2  Assumed average levels of production lost through imprisonment, 2010 
 
Possession Supply 
Assumed % economically active  
30%              
[24% ,  36%] 
30%              [24% ,  
36%] 
Average gross earnings per month 
£1,755         
(1606 ,  1904) 
£1,921         (1555 ,  
2287) 
Average no. months served in prison 1.3 11.4 
Number of sentences 346 1,927 
Total value of lost production 
£12.9m                                                   
[£10.3m ,  £15.5m] 
90% confidence intervals in parentheses; Subjective high-low range in square brackets 
 
5.3 Cannabis dependency costs 
Cannabis dependency may involve a range of external costs both intangible (such as public 
treatment costs) and intangible (such as the distress caused to members of the drug user’s 
family). If cannabis users’ perceptions of the risk of dependency are too low, there will also be 
part of the internal cost to the user that should in principle be included in the calculation of net 
social cost. Given the extreme difficulty of assigning a value to all but tangible treatment costs, 
we exclude from the analysis intangible costs and all costs internal to the user, but assign a high 
upper limit to the range of uncertainty to our estimates to reflect this omission. 
Like policing, the level of drug treatment costs is, to a large extent, a choice made by society. In 
the last decade or so there has been a deliberate policy decision to expand the provision of drug 
treatment services and to embed them in criminal justice procedures. Thus, the cost of drug 
treatment programmes has increased, in part because policy-makers have chosen to increase 
them. Any attempt to estimate the change in treatment costs induced by a reform of cannabis 
                                                 
35 In a stationary multi-state transition process, the proportion of time spent in a given state equals the probability of 
observing that state at any point in time. Consequently, the proportion of a sentence that would have been spent in 
employment is the same as the probability of observing employment immediately before the sentence begins. 
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policy must therefore entail some assumption about policy on the provision of treatment 
services. We make the assumption here that the treatment system continues to run on current 
principles, except where the switch to licensing and regulation of the cannabis market 
necessitates some change. The difficulty here is the link between the criminal justice system and 
drug treatment. Although self-referrals are currently the most common form of entry to drug 
treatment programmes (40% in 2010), almost a third (29%) of entries into treatment are 
initiated by the criminal justice system (NDTMS 2011). This may happen through a variety of 
routes, including the probation or prison services, drug rehabilitation requirements in 
Community Orders and the Drug Interventions Programme. 
We have no way of knowing how many of the referrals triggered by the criminal justice system 
are the result of cannabis offences alone – probably rather few, but we cannot be sure. If legal, 
licensed cannabis supply were to become available, at least some of the possession and supply 
offences which could trigger referrals would be eliminated, so we would expect referrals to fall, 
together with the associated treatment costs. On the other hand, it is likely that any policy 
intervention which runs the risk of increasing cannabis consumption would be accompanied by 
some expansion in the provision of treatment services for cannabis dependency. We sidestep 
the dual problems of (i) estimating the impact on treatment caseloads of removing a class of 
offences from the criminal justice system and (ii) anticipating revisions to treatment policy, by 
assuming that these two effects offset each other. We thus maintain the assumption that the 
caseload of cannabis dependency treatment programmes varies only in proportion to some 
measure of the size of the cannabis market. 
There is no available data on the unit costs of providing treatment places linked to specific 
drugs, nor is there any breakdown of drug treatment budgets by substance of abuse. We also 
have no information on the duration of spells in treatment by substance of abuse, so there is 
little alternative but to use a single expenditure per case figure, calculated for the treatment 
system as a whole, as our estimate of the unit cost of a treatment episode for cannabis 
dependency. Table 5.3.1 shows the total treatment budgets and caseloads for adults and young 
people for England in the most recent year for which data are available, 2008/9. There are 
substantial differences between the types of intervention covered. The treatment budget for 
young people includes treatment for alcohol dependency, whereas the adult budget covers drug 
treatment alone; there are relatively few cases of heroin and cocaine dependency in the youth 
caseload, whereas adult treatment is strongly focused on those drugs; and there is almost no 
pharmacological treatment (such as methadone maintenance) within the youth treatment 
system. Despite these differences, the estimated unit cost is between £2,700 and £2,800 for both 
adults and young people. 
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    Table 5.3.1    Estimated unit costs of drug treatment (England, 2008/9) 
 
Adults a Young people b 
Caseload (all substances) 210,815 22,382 
Total treatment budget  £ 581m £ 62.2m 
Unit cost £ 2,756 £ 2,779 
a  Age 18 and over; excludes alcohol dependency; b  Age under 18; includes alcohol 
dependency 
 
Although the treatment budget is not broken down by substance of abuse, caseloads are 
available classified by primary substance of abuse. There are potential difficulties in cases 
where multiple drug types are involved, but we have no way of dealing with those complications 
using available data. Our cost calculations are based on a unit cost of £2,750 per case, arrived at 
by using the (rounded) adult cost per case figure in Table 5.32.1. We regard this figure as a 
probable over-estimate, given that the treatment of cases of heroin and cocaine dependency is 
typically more difficult (and consequently more expensive) than treatment for cannabis 
dependency. Our indicative range of uncertainty for the unit cost takes account of this (Table 
5.3.2). Caseloads by drug type are available separately for England and Wales and we combine 
these in Table 5.3.2 to give a total number of 16,255 cannabis treatment cases in 2009/10, or 
approximately 7% of the total drug treatment caseload. This volume implies a mid-estimate of 
£44.7m for the total cost of cannabis treatment in England and Wales. Under the proportionality 
assumption, these estimates suggest that even an increase in the cannabis market as large as 
50% would only increase treatment costs by somewhere between £12m and £24m, which is 
small in comparison to policing and criminal justice costs. 
 
   Table 5.3.2    Estimated total cost of treatment for cannabis 
dependency  in England and Wales 2009/10 
England: cannabis treatment 14,306 
Wales: cannabis treatment 1,949 
Estimated unit cost £ 2,750 
[High-low range] [£1,500-£4,000] 
Total cost in England and Wales £ 44.7m 
[High-low range] [£24.4m-£65.0m] 
 
Table 5.3.2 tells us the approximate cost of the existing volume of treatment for cannabis 
dependency, but it does not immediately tell us the implications of a switch to a system of 
licensed regulated cannabis supply. Under our simple assumptions, a 10% increase in the 
number of regular cannabis users would increase treatment costs by around £2.2m and a 50% 
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expansion might increase costs by roughly £22m. Even a doubling of the size of the at-risk group 
of cannabis users could be expected to increase treatment costs by under £50m, which is less 
than half the costs of policing cannabis, or of the CJS procedures associated with cannabis 
possession and supply. 
5.4 Drug-related crime 
Drug-related crime undoubtedly accounts for a large part of the external costs of illicit drug use. 
For example, Godfrey et al (2002) estimated that around 88% of the economic and social costs 
of class A drug use in England and Wales in 2000 was attributable to crime and policing costs, 
while the UK Drug Harm Index (MacDonald et al. 2005, 2006), which attempts to measure the 
trend over time in drug-related social harms, assigns over two-thirds of its weight to property 
crime. Consumption of illicit drugs might influence crime in a number of ways. It might create a 
need for additional income to fund drug purchases – Goldstein’s (1985) “economic-compulsive” 
mechanism. There may be direct “psychopharmacological” causes of drug-related crime: for 
instance, through weakening of self-control or decision-making capacity, or provoking violent 
responses to external provocation. Violence is also sometimes a feature of the working of illicit 
markets, where legal enforcement of contracts is impossible (Goldstein’s concept of “systemic” 
drug-related crime). However, research on drug-related crime is limited by the difficulty of 
establishing the level of crime that would have been committed by drug users or suppliers had 
they been free of drugs (the “counterfactual”), and there have been few attempts to use 
controlled experiments or estimate causal behavioural models as a basis for simulating crime in 
a counterfactual world characterised by a different configuration of drug markets. This lack of 
evidence is particularly striking in relation to cannabis, despite the widespread belief among the 
general public that cannabis use contributes to criminal activity (Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs 2008, Table 8). 
In a companion paper (Bryan et al 2011), we have used statistical matching methods and data 
on self-assessed motivation to produce separate estimates of the amount of violent and 
acquisitive crime which is causally related to cannabis use. That study uses a combination of 
data from the Arrestee Survey and Offending Crime and Justice Survey to give adequate 
coverage of prolific offenders and drug-users. The central conclusion is that, in contrast to 
public perceptions, there is essentially no statistically significant evidence of criminal activity 
induced by cannabis use and only weak evidence of a small amount of crime linked to cannabis 
supply activity (Bryan et al 2011, Table 7). The study also estimated the aggregate social costs, 
both tangible and intangible, associated with drug-related crime. Table 5.4.1 reproduces their 
results for two population groups: cannabis consumers (defined as those who have used 
cannabis but no hard drug within the last month); and cannabis suppliers (defined as those who 
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have sold cannabis but no hard drug in the last month). 
There are several important points to note about these estimates. First, there is some overlap 
between the sets of cannabis consumers and suppliers (since many suppliers also consume) and 
also between acquisitive and violent crime (since robbery involves both acquisition and actual 
or threatened violence). Second, social costs include the value of stolen goods, implying that 
theft constitutes a total loss to society. This is standard practice in the research literature, but it 
over-estimates the loss to society as a whole by ignoring the benefit generated by stolen 
property which remains in existence after the theft. Part of the loss to victims of acquisitive 
crime is in fact a transfer from the legal owner to the thief, rather than a total loss to society. It 
may be distasteful to include the benefit to wrong-doers in a measure of social welfare, but it is 
logically appropriate to do so, at least under conventional welfare measures. Third, the 
aggregate estimates for violent crime are large and the associated range of uncertainty very 
wide. This happens, despite the fact that estimated individual rates of cannabis-related crime 
are small, because the number of cannabis users is large and because the estimated levels of 
intangible unit social costs of psychological distress are potentially high and conceptually very 
uncertain (see Bryan et al 2011, section 8). Fourth, the estimates in Table 5.4.1 exclude crime 
committed by people aged 16 or under. It is perhaps more likely for juveniles than adults to 
commit petty crime to fund cannabis purchases, so there may be some under-estimation of the 
costs of cannabis-induced acquisitive crime, but the relatively small size of the cannabis-using 
under-17 population means that this bias will be modest in size. 
  
Table 5.4.1    Estimated aggregate external social cost of drug-related crime in 2003 
(2003 prices) 
 
Crime measure 
Indicator of drug use 
Cannabis-only user Cannabis-only supplier 
Group size (millions) 2.47 
(2.34 ,  2.59) 
0.21 
(0.18 ,  0.25) 
Aggregate social cost: acquisitive 
crime (£bn) 
0.747 
[-0.024 ,  1.518] 
0.829 
[0.318 ,  1.341] 
Aggregate social cost: violent crime 
(£bn) 
6.346 
[-0.345 ,  13.037] 
2.710 
[1.273 ,  4.148] 
Source: Bryan et al (2011), Table 15;  90% confidence intervals in parentheses; ranges of uncertainty in 
square brackets are partly subjective and should not be interpreted as conventional confidence intervals. 
 
Licensing of cannabis is likely to have two primary effects: an expansion in the number of 
cannabis users and a reduction in the number of illicit cannabis suppliers. To the extent that 
cannabis-induced crime does exist, we would therefore expect there to be an increase in crime 
generated by cannabis use, but a reduction in crime causally related to cannabis supply; these 
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may be offsetting to a large degree. To illustrate this, suppose that the number of cannabis users 
expands by 25% while the number of illicit cannabis suppliers falls by 75%. Under a simple 
assumption of proportionality, the net result would be falls in the aggregate social cost of 
acquisitive and violent crime of £435m and £446m respectively.36  
In practice, the situation is more complex than these simple calculations suggest, since a fall in 
the price of cannabis and an increase in its availability would have implications for other related 
markets. For example, there might be substitution of cannabis for other forms of consumption 
such as alcohol, with a consequent fall in the volume of alcohol-related crime and disease. These 
indirect benefits of reform could be very large (see Caulkins et al 2012, pp. 133-135) but, in our 
view, evidence on demand interactions with other problematic goods is far too weak to allow 
credible estimates to be made for Britain (or, probably, anywhere else).  
On the supply side, there may be some substitution of other illicit supply activity (such as 
cocaine dealing) for cannabis, with a corresponding rise in the volume of crime related to this 
new supply activity. These indirect effects could attenuate the direct effects on drug-related 
crime, although the degree to which this happens is impossible to estimate convincingly with 
currently available evidence. To illustrate the magnitudes involved, we make the following 
simple assumptions: (i) 12% of current illicit suppliers of cannabis would continue illicit 
cannabis supply activity post-reform (the same proportion as the estimated market share of 
smuggled cigarettes in the tobacco market); (ii) among those who move out of cannabis supply 
there would be an average 25% reduction in their criminal activity – a low figure that allows for 
considerable substitution of other harmful activity for cannabis supply. 
The Bryan et al (2011) figures are based on 2003 prices and relate to the subsets of cannabis-
only consumers and suppliers. We use the CPI to convert to 2009/10 prices and make 
assumptions about the numbers of cannabis suppliers and consumers pre-reform based 
respectively on the combined-sample proportion of OCJS and AS respondents who self-report 
any current or past cannabis supply activity and on the estimate of market size by Pudney et al 
(2006). Both supplier and consumer numbers are scaled down by 39%, to reflect the reduction 
in measured cannabis prevalence recorded in the BCS since 2003/4. This gives estimated 
numbers of suppliers and users as 0.139m and 3.374m respectively in 2009/10: a supplier-
consumer ratio of 4.1%. For the change in cannabis prevalence induced by reform, we use the 
three scenarios set out in Table 4.5.3. Since a neuroscience-based demand gateway would 
depend primarily on THC consumption, while a social influence-based demand gateway would 
depend primarily on the number of purchase transactions, we use an average of the THC and 
                                                 
36 The indicative ranges of uncertainty associated with these illustrative figures would be -£245 to -£626m 
(acquisitive) and -£1,041m to +£148m (violent). 
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volume changes characterising each scenario, so the low, mid and high-response scenarios 
imply demand increases of 2.5%, 12.5% and 32.5% respectively. Table 5.4.2 gives the results of 
these calculations. The projected net benefit is small and positive if the demand response to 
reform is low, but this declines to a net social cost and the associated range of uncertainty 
increases sharply as we admit the possibility of a larger demand response to reform. In the high-
response scenario, there is a large projected net social cost of over £0.5bn, but with such a large 
range of uncertainty that no useful conclusion can be drawn. 
 
Table 5.4.2   Projected net external benefit from reform-induced change in 
drug-related crime 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Cannabis-induced crime + £17m 
[£6m, £28m] 
- £15m 
[-£145m, £114m] 
- £569m 
[-£1.4bn, £256m] 
Note: subjective ranges of uncertainty in brackets; figures may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
  
5.5 Drug-related accidents 
Our knowledge of the contribution of illicit drug use to accidents is very limited. There is a small 
body of quantitative research on drug-related road accidents but very little on the role of drugs 
in accidents at work or in the home, and we therefore restrict attention to road accidents. The 
recent North report (North 2010, chapter 6) reviewed the state of evidence on drug-induced 
road accidents and found alarming shortcomings. It is well-established that cannabis and other 
drugs (both illicit and prescribed) cause some impairment of drivers’ performance. However, 
the system for identifying drug use as a contributory factor in accidents is limited and there are 
concerns about the low priority attached by police investigators to drugs other than alcohol as 
possible factors in accident investigations. There is also enormous difficulty in determining 
whether drugs found to be present in the system of a person involved in an accident played any 
part in causing the accident – particularly when both drugs and alcohol are present. 
When the police investigate a road accident, they use a formal procedure (STAT19) for 
recording contributory factors, which is part of the national road accident reporting system. 
This procedure is essentially subjective and it is partial, since some accidents do not involve 
police assessment in person. Drugs are likely to be under-recorded as a contributory factor, 
since there is no systematic testing for evidence of drug use by those involved. On the other 
hand, while the system records the existence of possible contributory factors (2.4 factors per 
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accident on average) it does not assign any estimate of their “share” of causation, so there is a 
countervailing tendency towards over-estimation through multiple counting. Table 5.5.1 
summarises the latest available data, relating to the whole of Great Britain in 2009. It is 
interesting that, of the 2,094 road deaths in which the police reported one or more contributory 
factors, 3.1% involved drugs – a figure which is very close to the causal impact of 2.5% 
estimated by Laumon et al (2010) for France, which has similar drug prevalence to Britain. 
 
Table 5.5.1  Proportions of road accident victims involved in accidents  where drugs 
were judged to be a contributory factor 
 Deaths 
Serious 
injury 
Slight 
injury 
All 
casualties 
Drug-related 64 314 924 1,302 
All accidents 2,094 22,146 155,407 179,647 
Drug-related share  3.1% 1.4% 0.6% 0.7% 
Cannabis-related share 
[Low-high range] 
2.0% 
[1.5, 2.4] 
0.9% 
[0.7, 1.1] 
0.4% 
[0.3, 0.5] 
0.5% 
[0.4, 0.6] 
Note: includes only casualties in accidents where a police officer attended the scene and a contributory 
factor was reported. Computed from Table 4h of DfT (2010). 
 
We adopt the drug-related shares of road casualties from Table 5.5.1 as our central estimate of 
the causal impact of drug use on road casualties. It is not possible to break this down by drug 
type, so we convert these shares to cannabis-specific form by multiplying by a factor defined as 
the number of cannabis users as a proportion of  those reporting any illicit drug. Estimates for 
this proportion range from 57%, using the prevalence estimates underlying the Pudney et al 
(2006) analysis of market size, to 79% from the last-month prevalence figures from the 
2010/11 British Crime Survey. In view of this uncertainty, we use a figure of 65% for our 
central estimate and [50%, 80%] as the low-high range. We then apply these rates to the 
numbers of recorded road casualties in England and Wales, after making allowance for under-
reporting of injuries (using also the confidence intervals provided by DfT 2010, Table 5c). The 
resulting numbers of drug-induced road casualties is presented in Table 5.5.2, together with 
estimated numbers of the corresponding accidents, classified by seriousness.  
To estimate the aggregate social cost of these casualties, we multiply the numbers of casualties 
and accidents by the estimated average unit social cost for each category of casualty and 
accident. These unit costs are taken from the Department for Transport’s annual analysis (DfT 
2011, section 3.4), which provides a standard basis for the evaluation of transport projects. The 
casualty-specific unit costs include human costs (such as grief and suffering), estimated using a 
willingness-to-pay methodology; the value of lost output; and medical costs. Accident-specific 
costs include police and insurance costs and damage to property. The unit costs over-estimate 
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external social costs to some extent, since some of their components are foreseeable internal 
costs to the drug user. Total cannabis-related road accident costs calculated in this way turn out 
to be substantial, ranging in total from £117m to £316m, with £192m as a central estimate. 
 
Table 5.5.2  Estimated cannabis-induced road casualties: England & Wales 2010 
 Deaths 
Serious 
injury 
Slight 
injury 
All 
casualties 
Number of reported casualties 1,642 20,700 155,407 179,647 
Casualties adjusted for under-reporting 1,642 63,692 523,165 588,499 
Estimated cannabis-related casualties:     
      Mid estimate 33 587 2,022 2,641 
      Low 25 282 1,555 1,863 
      High 40 1,084 3,331 4,455 
Estimated number of accidents by seriousness: 
      Mid estimate 30 506 1,616 1,945 
      Low 23 243 1,243 1,371 
      High 37 935 2,663 3,280 
Casualty-related unit cost (£) 1,585,510 178,160 13,740  
Accident-related unit cost (£) 12,813 5,333 3,070  
Estimated aggregate social cost of cannabis-related accidents: 
      Mid estimate £52.1m £107.3m £32.7m £192.1m 
      Low £40.1m £51.6m £25.2m £116.8m 
      High £64.1m £198.1m £53.9m £316.1m 
Note: includes only casualties in accidents where a police officer attended the scene and a contributory factor was 
reported. Computed from Table 4h of DfT (2010). 
 
5.6 Market regulation costs 
The licensing of cannabis supply would introduce a need for regulation activity similar to that 
already in place for tobacco and alcohol. It is difficult to estimate the costs of regulation activity 
because, in practice, regulation takes many forms, involves a large number of local and national 
agencies and is difficult to distinguish clearly from the other functions of those agencies. We 
interpret regulation to cover four areas: 
(i) Retail: including monitoring and control of advertising, mandatory health warnings, sale 
to under-age people, purchase quantities; 
(ii) Production: including monitoring of production locations and methods and control of 
product characteristics; 
(iii) Illicit supply: enforcement of bans on unlicensed production, and importation and 
exportation of cannabis. 
(iv) Information and education: provision of information about the law and health 
consequences of cannabis consumption. 
As with treatment for drug dependency, the cost of regulation depends on a set of decisions 
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made by the authorities about the appropriate level of regulation activity. This in turn has 
important implications for the outcome of the policy as a whole. For example, the large 
investment in anti-smuggling activity made in the last ten years is believed to have led to a large 
fall in the market share of illicit tobacco and, consequently, a significant increase in revenue 
from the indirect taxes on tobacco (APPGSH 2010, Annexe 2).  
In addition to the uncertainty about the regulation activity that would be undertaken, we have 
no reliable information on the unit costs of that activity. As far as we are aware, there are no 
published data on aggregate expenditure on regulation activity directed at the alcohol and 
tobacco markets. Most of this work is local, involves multiple agencies and is not easily 
separated from the other work of those agencies, so it is not feasible for us to attempt a detailed 
costing exercise for alternative assumptions about the intensity of regulation. Instead, we make 
two convenient assumptions: that the setting up of a system of licensed supply would reduce 
the incentive for illegal importation of cannabis, thus freeing some of the resources currently 
devoted to intercepting imported cannabis for other uses; and that those resources would be 
redeployed to local authorities for monitoring and enforcement of the new cannabis market. In 
addition, we assume that new funding would be provided to local authorities, which we 
estimate by analogy with the additional funding provided to support the introduction of the 
Welsh and English smoking bans in April and July 2007. In total, this funding package amounted 
to £29.5m for 2007/8 as a one-off payment to local authorities.37 We assume that the same sum 
is paid on an annual basis, in addition to any funding redeployed from the customs service. This 
is a relatively generous scale of funding, intended to reflect the health concerns which have been 
consistently expressed by UK governments. 
There is better information available on the costs of public health education and information 
initiatives. For alcohol and tobacco in 2009/10, these programmes cost £17.6m and £14.8m 
respectively, and we assume that there would be a new initiative (in addition to existing school-
based and other drug-prevention programmes) of similar scale: say £16m per year. Thus, in 
total, we envisage an increase in spending on market regulation and health education of £45m 
annually. 
 
6 Long-term and indirect costs and benefits 
The indirect consequences of policy reform are particularly difficult to evaluate. They include 
long-term effects on a range of outcomes including mental and physical health, education and 
employment trajectories, and the risk of transition to more serious drug abuse and crime, with 
                                                 
37 Local Authority Circular LAC(2006)17, Department of Health, 21 December 2006. 
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their adverse social consequences. There are two large problems here. The first concerns the 
distinction between internal and external costs and the extent to which the potential long-term 
costs are understood by cannabis users. External costs such as health service costs and the 
distress caused to family members are borne by others who have no say in the decision to use 
cannabis. Internal costs are borne only by the user himself or herself. Under simple 
assumptions, if the user makes a fully informed decision, the expected internal costs are offset 
by the pleasure derived from cannabis consumption and should thus be excluded from the cost-
benefit calculation. But, if trained researchers with access to large data resources and scientific 
research methods are uncertain about the magnitude of potential future internal costs, how can 
we assume that the ordinary drug user has a good understanding of them? 
The second major difficulty lies in the process of establishing causality linking cannabis use to 
the various long-term outcomes that are hypothesised to follow from it. A particular problem 
here stems from confounding, which is one form of what is often referred to as endogeneity. 
Consider the much-discussed link between cannabis consumption and schizophrenia. There is a 
clear statistical association between cannabis use and schizophrenia in the sense that average 
prevalence and intensity of cannabis use is significantly higher among people who suffer from 
the disease than among non-sufferers. Moreover, cannabis use is generally observed to precede 
the (detected) onset of schizophrenia. This pattern of association may arise because cannabis 
use causes schizophrenia in some people, or it may occur because there are deeper underlying 
factors which predispose people to become cannabis users and also to suffer the disease. If 
these underlying confounding factors are responsible for all of the association between 
cannabis use and schizophrenia, then there is no true causal connection, so policy-induced 
changes in the pattern of cannabis use will have no impact on the incidence of schizophrenia 
(unless the confounding factors also change for some reason). Researchers face a dual problem: 
the behavioural/biological processes are not sufficiently well-understood to identify clearly 
what the relevant confounding factors are, so they cannot be fully observed; and it is not 
feasible or ethical to conduct randomised controlled trials in which human subjects receive 
long-term cannabis exposure. There are several empirical approaches that have been developed 
to overcome these difficulties, none of which can be relied upon alone to give absolutely reliable 
results. These approaches are reviewed in Appendix A6.1. 
6.1 Long-term direct health costs 
6.1.1 Mental illness 
Anyone who has ever witnessed a friend or family member with serious prolonged psychiatric 
illness will understand the enormous – mostly intangible – social cost of mental illness and the 
difficulty of the diagnostic process. Diagnosis is particularly hard in the case of drug users, for 
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whom the symptoms of intoxication and drug dependency can be difficult to separate from 
those of mental illness itself. This is one of the most important areas of concern for policy on 
cannabis, but also one of the most difficult areas for research. 
The evidence for a link between cannabis use and mental illness or impairment comes from 
three sources. First, a short-term connection with impairment of brain function has been 
demonstrated using randomised experimental methods to examine the effects of oral THC on  
cognitive test outcomes (Curran et al 2002) and fMRI images of brain activity (Bhattacharyya et 
al 2009). It is unclear whether these short-term impacts on the brain are directly connected 
with long-term mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. Second, trend analysis of the connection 
between cannabis prevalence and onset and the incidence of schizophrenia has produced little 
evidence of a causal link. The UK does not have a full register of diagnoses of mental illness, so 
research of this kind is difficult, but analysis of the Australian register (Degenhardt et al 2003) 
suggests no causal link. So far, there is little national evidence of the significant rise in 
schizophrenia incidence projected by Hickman et al (2007) under the hypothesis of a causal 
effect, although Boydell et al (2003) do report a two-fold increase in incidence between 1965 
and 1997 in Camberwell. Practising clinical psychiatrists have expressed growing alarm about 
cannabis-related psychotic illness (Murray 2007). 
The third source of evidence is a large body of observational studies examining the statistical 
association between cannabis use and subsequent symptoms of mental illness. Moore et al 
(2007) provide a systematic review of this literature, with some assessment of study quality in 
respect of vulnerability to bias caused by reverse causation and transient intoxication effects. 
However, the majority of the studies reviewed relied on the use of proxy covariates to adjust for 
effects of unobserved confounders – a procedure which we have shown to be potentially 
unreliable (Appendix 6.1). The Moore et al (2007) pooled analysis of published findings 
suggests a 40% increase in the risk of psychosis for people with occasional use of cannabis, with 
a larger (50-200%) increase in risk for heavy users. Because of the confounding problem and 
the lack so far of any clear trend in schizophrenia incidence, we view estimates of this 
magnitude as an upper bound on the true causal effect, with zero as the lower bound. Moore et 
al (2007) also review the smaller literature on other mental disorders, including depression and 
anxiety. The findings of these studies are not very coherent and give little evidence of any effect. 
For this reason, we focus entirely on psychotic illness. 
The total annual cost of psychotic illness is based on the following identity: 
                                          (6.1.1) 
where: n is the size of the population; p is the prevalence of illness among non-cannabis users; 
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      and    are the pre-reform prevalence rates of non-use, low- and high-intensity cannabis 
use in the population (where           );    and    are the proportionate increases in 
prevalence of psychosis caused by the two levels of cannabis use; and c is the annual unit cost of 
a case of psychotic illness. Let                            be the pre-reform 
prevalence of psychosis in the population, and assume that reform increases the prevalence of 
light and heavy drug use by a uniform proportion g. Then the increase in aggregate cost is: 
   
                 
           
                                                           
We estimate    and    from OCJS survey data for 2003-6 as 11.25% and 5.72% respectively, 
where heavy use is defined as consumption at least once a week and light use is any lower rate 
of cannabis use (including current abstinence with any history of past use). McCrone et al 
(2008) estimate the prevalence of psychotic illness in England in 2007 as 0.5% and we take this 
figure to be applicable to England and Wales. The most recent estimates of prevalence and unit 
social costs are also provided by McCrone et al (2008), who quote a unit service cost of £10,687 
in 2007 prices, with a further £8,391 as the cost of lost employment. Uprating these to 2010 
prices in line with median weekly earnings, gives a total unit cost of c = £20,804. This figure 
includes elements for inpatient and other NHS care, medication, supported accommodation, 
criminal justice services, day care and other social services, informal care and lost output, but it 
does not include the “human” costs of distress to the victim and his or her family.38  
Calculations using expression (6.1.2) are presented in Table 6.1.1, where we show both service 
costs and loss of earnings under three alternative assumptions about causality. The first 
assumption is that there is no effect at all. The second is that there is no impact of occasional 
cannabis use on the prevalence of psychosis, but a doubling of prevalence among long-term 
regular users. The alternative stronger assumption is that prevalence is raised by 40% for 
occasional users and tripled for regular users. Given the likely over-estimation of causal effects, 
we regard the last of these as implausible and use it as an upper bound. 
The cost of services for patients with psychotic illness is clearly an external social cost which 
should be included in a cost-benefit analysis. Loss of earnings or output is an internal cost and 
arguably should be excluded from the cost-benefit picture if we are also excluding the user’s 
perceived enjoyment of cannabis. Following this line, we adopt an estimate of £26m (range: 
£0m-£52m) for our central demand-response assumption and £53m (£0m-£134m) for the high-
response case. 
 
                                                 
38 Estimates produced by SCMH (2003) for mental illness as a whole suggest that human costs may be as large as 
service and lost output costs. 
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Table 6.1.1  Projected  aggregate costs of additional policy-induced psychotic 
illness 
 
Low-
response 
Mid-
response 
High-
response 
Moderate causal impact a 
No. cannabis-induced cases (‘000) - 1.1 0.5 2.7 
Service costs - £13.7m £6.8m £34.1m 
Lost output: 
         Internal share c - £8.0m £4.0m £20.1m 
      External share c - £2.7m £1.3m £6.7m 
Total external cost - £16m £8m £41m 
Strong causal impact b 
No. cannabis-induced cases (‘000) -3.0 1.5 7.6 
Service costs - £35.5m £17.8m £88.8m 
Lost output: 
         Internal share c - £20.9m £10.5m £52.3m 
      External share c - £7.0m £3.5m £17.4m 
Total external cost - £43m £21m £106m 
a           ;   b            ;  c assuming an average tax/NI rate of 25%. 
 
6.1.2 Physical disease 
Cannabis is generally smoked, often in combination with tobacco because of its tendency to 
burn unreliably. Commercially-produced cannabis products would be likely to have better 
combustion properties and we assume that smoking will continue to be the primary means of 
consumption. We assume that, despite product controls, smoked cannabis remains at least as 
damaging to the respiratory and cardiovascular systems as tobacco, so that reform of cannabis 
policy has potential implications for physical as well as mental health. 
The relationship between tobacco and cannabis consumption plays a key role in determining 
the costs of physical disease. If someone is a tobacco smoker and also a regular user of cannabis, 
then it becomes very difficult to identify the damage to health caused by each substance. We 
‘solve’ this problem by assuming that each substance is equally damaging. The relationship 
between the demands for cannabis and tobacco is also important. A majority of the research on 
the issue has concluded that the two substances are complements, so that a reform leading to 
expansion of cannabis use would be expected to increase tobacco use also. However, most of 
this evidence does not separate prevalence and incidence. It is quite possible that initiation of 
someone into cannabis use might induce a demand for tobacco while, for someone who is 
already a smoker, an increase in cannabis use might be a substitute for cigarette smoking. A 
further complication is that product development within a licensed system might change the 
relationship between cannabis and tobacco demand.  
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There is a vast research literature on the health consequences of tobacco smoking, but there 
remains a great deal of uncertainty about the associated treatment costs. For the NHS in 
England, these were estimated as £1.4-1.7bn in 1996 (Department of Health 1998), and there 
are divergent estimates of £2.7bn (Callum et al 2011) and £5.2bn (Allender et al 2009) for 2006. 
Costs for Wales were estimated as £386m in 2007/8 by Phillips and Bloodworth 2009. The 
methods used to construct these estimates make use of survey data on the prevalence of current 
(and ex-) smoking, without adjustment for the overlap of this group with the group of cannabis 
smokers. Consequently, the estimates contain a (presumably small) upward bias to the extent 
that some cannabis-induced illness is misattributed to tobacco.  
The interrelationship between cannabis and tobacco is not known in sufficient detail to allow 
any but the crudest estimate of the possible health effects. This crude estimate is derived as 
follows. Define       and     to be the numbers of people who are respectively smokers of 
tobacco only, smokers of cannabis only and smokers of both. The co-consumption rate among 
smokers,               , and among cannabis users,               , can be estimated 
from OCJS survey data as 10.4% and 82.1% respectively, where we define cannabis users as 
those who report use at least once a week.  
The Callum et al (2011) and Phillips and Bloodworth (2009) estimates can be uprated to 2010 
terms to give a figure of £3.46bn as our central estimate of the aggregate cost of treatment for 
diseases attributed to smoking in England and Wales. The estimation procedure used in those 
studies attributes all the disease suffered by co-smokers of cannabis and tobacco to tobacco. 
The result can therefore be considered as an estimate of                 , where c is the 
mean cost of smoking-related disease for a cigarette smoker and   is the increase in risk for an 
average co-smoker relative to a cigarette-only smoker. We assume also that the average 
cannabis-only smoker has a level of risk equal to  . It is likely that    , since the typical 
frequency and duration of cannabis smoking is less than that of cigarette smoking, and we 
assume a central value of 0.5 (high-low range: 0.25-0.75). Under these rough assumptions, the 
cost of disease caused by cannabis is                        , which gives  £208m as the 
implied central estimate, with a high-low range [£107m, £587m].39 Under our three alternative 
assumptions about the expansion of demand in response to reform, this gives the net social 
costs induced by reform which are presented in Table 6.1.2. Remarkably, these costs are 
potentially larger than those of cannabis-induced psychotic illness, which have received far 
more attention in the cannabis policy debate. 
 
                                                 
39 The high estimate uses the higher Allender et al (2009) estimate of aggregate cost and       . 
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Table 6.1.2  Projected increase in aggregate treatment costs of cannabis-
induced physical illness 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Mid-estimate £16m £21m £43m 
High-low range [£8m, £31m] [£11m, £41m] [£21m, £82m] 
  
6.2 Scarring effect of a criminal record 
A ‘criminal record’ is not a completely unambiguous term, although it is usually interpreted as 
referring only to unspent court convictions. Under the 1974 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
(ROA), most convictions become spent after a specified rehabilitation period elapses. A 
conviction never becomes spent if it carries a custodial sentence of more than 30 months, it is 
spent after 10 years for a sentence of 7-30 months, and after 7 years for a sentence of 6 months 
or less. Fines and community sentences become spent after 5 years.40 Conditional and absolute 
discharges are spent after 1 year and 6 months, respectively, while cautions, warnings and 
reprimands are spent as soon as they are issued. 
Job applicants do not have a legal obligation to reveal unspent convictions but they might be 
asked to do so by their employer at the time of the job application or interview, or when signing 
the employment contract. Failure to disclose unspent convictions could result in dismissal. It is 
illegal for an employer to ask about spent convictions unless the job is listed as an exception 
under the 1974 ROA. Most of these exceptions are professions, offices and occupations in the 
finance, health and public sectors.41 
There are two types of Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks in England and Wales, known as 
Standard and Enhanced checks.42 Both Standard and Enhanced CRB checks will reveal details of 
spent and unspent convictions, cautions, reprimands, and warnings held on Police National 
Computer (PNC) records. In addition, if the job involves working with vulnerable adults and 
children, the checks will reveal information held by the Independent Safeguarding Authority.43 
Enhanced CRB checks are usually asked for people applying for jobs that involve very frequent 
contact with vulnerable children and adults (such as a teacher or a Scout guide). They contain 
the same information as Standard checks but with the addition of local police force information 
considered relevant by Chief Police Officer(s).  
                                                 
40 These rehabilitation periods are halved for under-18s. 
41 For more details see: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/CRB/about-the-
crb/eligible-positions-guide?view=Binary 
42 A third type of check, called Basic Disclosure is available in Scotland from Disclosure Scotland and can only reveal 
unspent convictions. This is accessible to applicants from England and Wales. Just under a million applications were 
handled by Disclosure Scotland in 2010. 
43 Notice that the Coalition Government has announced that the Independent Safeguarding Authority will be soon 
merged with the Criminal Records Bureau.  
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The CRB was established under Part V of the Police Act 1997 and was launched in March 2002 
(CRB 2010). As Table 6.2.1 shows, since 2002 the number of CRB checks has increased steadily. 
In 2010 there were more than 4.3 million checks in England and Wales, more than a three-fold 
increase since 2002. About 95% of the total were enhanced checks, involving the highest level of 
disclosure and 7-8% of these checks revealed one or more offences. Research has suggested 
that, at least in the early days of the CRB, as many as 11% of CRB checks may have been illegal 
under the 1974 ROA (Suff 2005). It appears that criminal justice penalties are increasingly 
visible to employers and may be a significant influence on their hiring decisions and, 
consequently, in the job search behaviour of people with criminal records. 
 
Table 6.2.1 Number of CRB checks by type and year since 2002 
 Period Standard Enhanced Enhanced as % 
of total 
Total 
2002 (Apr-Dec) 117,917 805,752 87.23% 923,669 
2003 267,819 1,881,653 87.54% 2,149,472 
2004 284,232 2,184,291 88.49% 2,468,523 
2005 294,381 2,361,547 88.92% 2,655,928 
2006 342,171 2,800,938 89.11% 3,143,109 
2007 302,892 3,050,148 90.97% 3,353,040 
2008 358,456 3,345,015 90.32% 3,703,471 
2009 349,438 3,848,836 91.68% 4,198,277 
2010 189,158 4,119,250 95.61% 4,308,408 
Source: Freedom of information requests 17194 and 17270. 44 
 
The number of people whose jobs are potentially vulnerable to a criminal record is large. In the 
2003 OCJS sample, 9% of respondents employed in the education, health, legal and financial 
sectors (where a criminal record may be visible to employers and potentially sensitive) 
reported having used cannabis within the last year and 3% reported a current rate of 
consumption of at least once a month.45 From the viewpoint of people acquiring a drug-related 
criminal record, employment rates among 2003/6 Arrestee Survey respondents on a charge of 
drug possession or supply were 42% and 40% respectively. 
There is no direct evidence on the long-term effect of a drug-related criminal record, but there is 
reason to believe that it might be an important factor in employers’ decision-making. The most 
thorough study of this issue in the UK by Metcalf et al (2001) was based on a survey of 
                                                 
44 Accessed at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/CRB/Freedom-of-information/all-foi-
responses/17194-number-of-checks?view=Standard&pubID=881971 and 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/agencies-public-bodies/CRB/Freedom-of-information/all-foi-
responses/17270-checks-issued/?view=Standard&pubID=856072 
 
45 Comparable figures for other sectors are 16% and 8%. 
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employers and founds that 26% automatically reject, or view less favourably, applicants with 
any form of criminal record.46 Drugs offences would “count a lot against” the applicant in 56% of 
cases. 47 
This finding is supported by an experimental audit study conducted in Milwaukee (Pager 2003), 
using closely matched pairs of people applying in person for entry-level jobs. For each vacancy 
audited, one applicant was randomly assigned to declare a criminal record, allowing the causal 
impact of the criminal record to be estimated. The callback rate among white applicants 
declaring a criminal record (17%) was half that for applicants with no record (34%). Among 
black applicants, the proportionate difference was still greater: a 5% callback rate compared to 
14% for the non-criminal group. 
We use a simple theoretical model of job search as a guide for our speculation on the costs 
generated by a criminal record. We assume there are two employment sectors. In sector 1, 
comprising mainly education, health, legal and financial services, employers have a high 
probability of checking criminal records and acting on the results. In sector 2, past criminality is 
a less sensitive issue and the risk from a criminal record check is negligible. In line with the 
evidence from Metcalf et al (2001) and Pager (2003), we assume that the probability of a job 
offer is halved in sector 1 but left unchanged in sector 2 for applicants with a criminal record.  
In appendix A6.2, we set out a very simple economic model of two-sector job search which 
allows us to explore the possible effects of criminal record scarring. The model is calibrated 
using data from the British Household Panel Survey and Labour Force Survey, matched to 
Arrestee Survey data. It should be emphasised that this model has only the very modest 
objective of providing a framework for thinking about the possible order of magnitude of the 
scarring effect; it should not be treated as a serious predictive model.  
In applying the model, we assume that every drug offence that involves arrest and interview at a 
police station leads to a criminal record, but we ignore cannabis warnings and PNDs. There are 
errors in both of these assumptions: some arrests do not result in a conviction or caution and 
many warnings and PNDs may be visible to some employers with negative consequences for the 
individual. These errors are offsetting to some degree and we expect any bias to be in the 
direction of understatement of the scarring effect, so that our estimates should be seen as 
conservative. 
Table 6.2.2 shows the elements of the calculation. The assumption that employment 
probabilities are halved in sector 1 translates into an estimated 19% reduction of average 
                                                 
46 Metcalf et al (2001, Table 4.6). 
47 Metcalf et al (2001, Table 4.7). 
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earnings for all people convicted on cannabis charges.  Of the twenty-eight thousand cannabis 
arrestees (with average annual earnings of roughly £21,500), 16.5% are first-time arrestees 
who are at risk of scarring. The total loss of earnings through this scarring effect is therefore 
estimated to be just over £100m. The component of this sum which is external to the cannabis 
user is the total tax/contribution yield of £23m. 
 
Table 6.2.2  Estimated scarring costs 
Parameter Estimate 
Proportional loss of earnings due to scarring 1  18.6% 
Number of cannabis possession and supply convictions in 2010 28,048 
Proportion of cannabis-arrestees who are first-time arrestees 16.5% 
Average  gross annual earnings 2 £21,520 
Aggregate  earnings lost through  criminal record scarring £101.9m 
External cost component of earnings £23.0m 
1 Weighted average over individuals who are not users of opiates or cocaine.  2 Weighted mean 
average for Arrestee Survey cannabis-only users arrested on suspicion of a drugs offence  
 
6.3 Long-term effects on human capital and earnings 
Experimental evidence demonstrates convincingly that THC has an impact on brain function 
which results in at least a temporary impairment of cognitive function and memory. Although 
there is considerable doubt about whether sustained use causes these impairments to persist in 
later life, even temporary impairments may cause significant difficulties in learning and in 
negotiating the educational system. If cannabis consumption does have an adverse causal effect 
on human capital accumulation, it follows that there is a stream of lost returns to human capital 
in later life, at least until experience and on-the-job training make good the initial losses. In 
addition to this, continued use of cannabis might further decrease an individual’s productivity 
while in work, in addition to its effect through educational achievement. To evaluate these 
losses, we need to combine evidence from three areas of the research literature: one dealing 
with the impact of cannabis use on educational attainment; the second dealing with the long-
term returns to that attainment; the third investigating the impact of current cannabis use on 
productivity when in work. The last two of these effects in principle involve both the expected 
level of earnings when in employment and the incidence of unemployment spells interrupting 
the earnings stream. Appendix A6.3 sets out a highly stylised method of generating a range of 
plausible long-term earnings impacts. To make this method operational, we need to use a range 
of alternative assumptions about the causal impact of early cannabis use on school attainment 
and of adult cannabis use on earnings. 
The research literature on cannabis and schooling contains a great diversity of findings, 
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complicated by different authors using different measures of cannabis use and schooling 
outcomes. In our view, none of the available studies is able to deal with the problem of 
unobservable confounding factors in a fully satisfactory way, and many of the results rely on 
quite weak strategies for identifying true causal effects. Some, like Engberg and Morral (2006), 
are based on selected samples which are unrepresentative of the general population that is our 
concern. Examples of studies which find quite large causal effects include Yamada et al (1996), 
Bray et al (2001), Register et al (2001), Engberg and Morral (2006) for the US and Van Ours and 
Williams (2009) for Australia. Studies which find smaller effects or which give reason to suspect 
that unobserved confounding factors are the dominant reason for the empirical association 
between cannabis use and school dropout include Chatterji (2006), Pacula (2003) and Roebuck 
et al (2004) for the US and Fergusson and Horwood (1997) for New Zealand. Observational 
studies of this kind rely on strategies for identifying true causal effects which are questionable 
to some extent and, in our view, it is extremely difficult to avoid a chronic tendency for over-
estimation of causal effects through a failure to account fully for unobservable confounding 
factors and reverse causation (see Appendix 6.3). This means that any attempt to estimate the 
social costs and benefits flowing from the human capital consequences of reform will be subject 
to a large range of uncertainty. 
The biggest policy concern is the possible link between early cannabis use and the failure to 
achieve any recognised qualifications from school. Table 6.3.1 gives some idea of the size of the 
empirical association between the two, using data on respondents aged under 35 from the 
2010/11 BCS. The probability of leaving school without any qualification is 22% lower (2.4 
percentage points) for early-onset cannabis users than for others.48 The unconditional earnings 
premium associated with any form of school qualification is large: almost £10,000, or 71% of 
unqualified career average earnings.49 This premium allows for differences in the incidence of 
interruptions to earnings through unemployment, but not for personal characteristics other 
than education or unobservable characteristics such as cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. 
The relatively small difference in basic qualification rates means that the difference in average 
annual earnings between early-onset cannabis users and others is much less than the earnings 
difference between groups classified by school qualification. 
To span a wide range of assumptions about the causal impact of early cannabis use, we assume 
for our central estimate that half of the empirical difference in qualification rates between early 
onset users and others is causal; for the low and high estimates we assume respectively that 
                                                 
48 The difference is statistically significant (P = 0.048) and comparable but slightly larger than the corresponding 
estimate from the 2003 OCJS. 
49 These earnings estimates are averages over all age groups in the 17-59 2010 population, weighted by age group 
size, and therefore abstract from cohort differences.  
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none  and all of the difference is causal.50 
 
      Table 6.3.1   The empirical association between early cannabis use, educational 
achievement and average career earnings: British Crime Survey and Labour 
Force Survey, 2010/11 
School qualifications 
BCS 2010/11 data (all aged 17-34) LFS 2010 Mean 
annual earnings, by 
qualification level 
Cannabis onset 
before age 16 
Later or no 
cannabis onset 
No qualifications 
10.82% 
(8.40, 13.24) 
8.46% 
(7.03, 9.90) 
£13,516 
At least GCSE or equivalent 
89.18% 
(86.76, 91.60) 
91.54% 
(90.10, 92.97) 
£23,159 
 
The relationship between adult drug use and earnings when in work has been studied 
extensively and there is a greater degree of consensus in the research literature. Research based 
on UK and US data from the 1980s and 1990s is near-unanimous in finding an insignificant 
(often positive) association between cannabis use and earnings, after allowing for the effects of 
individual differences in personal characteristics and education attainment. See Kaestner (1991, 
1994), Gill and Michaels (1992), Register and Williams (1992), Kandel et al (1995) and 
MacDonald and Pudney (2000, 2001) for leading examples of this literature. These findings are 
robust with respect to the type of data (cross-section or longitudinal) and the strategy for 
establishing causality. They are also in line with Conti’s (2010) finding, based on data from the 
1970 British Birth Cohort Study, that experimentation with cannabis is positively associated 
with measures of cognitive ability and that, when the wage analysis takes account of IQ test 
scores alongside other personal characteristics, the empirical (positive) association between 
cannabis use and wages disappears.  
However, the analysis by Van Ours (2007b) conflicts with this body of research. Using 
longitudinal data from Amsterdam, he found evidence of a large negative association, with 
recent cannabis use accounting for a roughly 10% reduction in the average wage of cannabis 
users. We find it hard to reconcile this study with the large body of work reaching quite 
different conclusions, but the differences may be linked to the fact that Van Ours’ data come 
from a specific location known as a centre of drug culture, and from a later period when the 
typical THC/CBD ratio of purchased cannabis was much higher. There are also identification 
issues and methodological differences that may account for some of the difference from earlier 
findings. We take account of the lack of complete unanimity by using Van Ours’ estimate in the 
                                                 
50 Note that the relationship between qualification rates and age of onset of cannabis use is not a simple one. For 
example, in BCS data, the qualification rate among people who first used cannabis at age 16-18 is higher than that 
among people who have never used cannabis. 
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construction of the upper limit of the range of uncertainty attached to our estimate (see 
Appendix A6.3).  
Few studies have much to say about the link between drug use and earnings through the course 
of a whole career. Kandel et al’s (1995) finding of a zero effect at age 35 is the combination of a 
positive association early on and subsequent slower wage growth, but their findings are based 
on a small US panel of individuals in continuous employment. In the absence of clear results on 
the time profile of impacts on wages, we assume that any earnings effects that exist act 
proportionately throughout the career. Recent work by Hyggen (2012) based on Norwegian 
survey data linked to administrative records finds a link between long-term cannabis use and an 
subjective index of work commitment, but we are sceptical about the causal significance of this 
link, given that work commitment and cannabis may both be consequences of the same 
underlying psychological process. 
Most of this literature confines attention to the impact of cannabis use on the earnings of people 
in employment, overlooking the possible effects on the risk of unemployment. MacDonald and 
Pudney (2001) looked at the latter and concluded that, in contrast to heroin and cocaine, there 
was no evidence of an impact for cannabis. For our central estimate, we assume again that there 
is no direct effect on unemployment risk, but only an indirect effect through the human capital 
route. For our worst-case assumption, we use a 10% impact by analogy with Van Ours’ (2007b) 
estimates for wages. 
The results we arrive at, following the method set out in Appendix 6.3, are shown in Table 6.3.2. 
None of these figures should be regarded as reliable estimates, since the uncertainties in the 
basic research literature are too great to allow us much confidence. While we think that the 
extreme estimate of a £3bn loss of aggregate earnings from cannabis-induced loss of human 
capital is highly unlikely to be accurate, because its neglect of the self-selected nature of the 
early-onset group, it is consistent with a pessimistic reading of the evidence. Our aim in 
presenting these figures is primarily to demonstrate the importance of these uncertainties, 
underlining the need for more robust evidence on the link between cannabis use and school 
achievement. 
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Table 6.3.2   Estimated impact of reform on aggregate total earnings 
 Low market 
response 
(THC = -10%) 
Mid market 
response 
(THC = +5%) 
High market 
response 
(THC = +25%) 
Total annual earnings loss 
+£24m                         
[-£2,900m, £0m] 
-£12m                          
[-£3,000m, £0m] 
-£60m                            
[-£3,100m, £0m] 
External component 
+£6m 
[-£720m, £0m] 
-£3m 
[-£740m, £0m] 
-£15m 
[-£760m, £0m] 
 
6.4 Behavioural gateways and their long-term costs 
The “gateway” hypothesis has attracted a great deal of attention in the debate on cannabis 
policy. The hypothesis asserts a causal link between cannabis use and an increase in the risk of 
subsequent hard drug use,51 and it is generally seen as a demand-side phenomenon, implying 
that any reform which increases consumption of cannabis would induce additional long-term 
social costs. There is some, highly contested, evidence in favour of a gateway effect for 
consumers of cannabis. Some animal experiments have found evidence of a “chemical gateway” 
in experiments involving self-administration of opiates by THC-exposed rats, but some other 
experimental work has found no effect of THC on the self-reinforcing character of opiates or 
cocaine (Ellgren et al 2007, Solinas et al 2004, Panlilio et al 2007). The vast difference between 
rats in an experimental laboratory setting and human beings in the social world makes this 
ambiguous evidence very difficult to interpret. 
Naive interpretations of survey data suggest a large gateway effect, since there are few hard 
drug users who did not use cannabis before taking hard drugs. However, more sophisticated 
analysis allowing for confounding factors tends to result in a much smaller, but still positive 
residual gateway effect. Building on past work (Pudney 2003, Hernandez and Pudney 2011), we 
now believe it is essentially impossible to generate robust evidence of a gateway effect free of 
the upward bias caused by unobserved confounding factors, through observational studies of 
this kind, and it is our view that any true causal gateway facing individual cannabis users is 
likely to be very small.52  
For our purposes, it is important to broaden the scope of the gateway hypothesis and consider it 
                                                 
51 Many different mechanisms could be responsible for such an effect, ranging from neurological processes in the 
brain to social pressure from suppliers but the empirical research literature has made little progress in distinguishing 
these causal paths. See MacCoun and Reuter (2001), Kandel (2002) and Pudney (2010) for discussion of the elusive 
gateway effect. The policy implications of the gateway effect would depend on the mechanism involved. For example, 
if it has neurobiological roots, harm will be related to the change in THC consumption; if it is generated by contact 
with suppliers, harm is related to the number of transactions made. 
52 Recent work using genetic instrumental variable methods (Mendelian randomisation) has looked at a possible 
causal gateway operating from alcohol consumption to cannabis use and other adverse outcomes (Irons et al 2007), 
using as an instrumental variable a genetic variant linked to ALDH2 enzyme deficiency, and finding no evidence of a 
gateway. As yet, no genetic variant linked unambiguously to the probability of cannabis use has been identified, so the 
same technique is not available for gateway effects of, rather than on, cannabis use.  
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as a possibility on the supply side of the cannabis market also. The processes by which people 
become involved in drug supply are varied and complex, and social networks involving family 
and friendship ties are particularly important. For example, in a qualitative study of young 
active cannabis users, Duffy et al (2008) found that well over 90% either bought cannabis from 
a seller they knew socially or were given it by friends or had it bought on their behalf by a 
friend. This view is confirmed by large-scale survey data on young people (National Centre for 
Social Research 2011).53 Thus, among social groups where cannabis use is prevalent, supply at 
the lowest market level seems to be more a by-product of social engagement than deliberate 
commercial activity. The predatory profit-motivated drug-pushers so often portrayed in the 
news and entertainment media appear hardly to exist at all at the lowest level of the cannabis 
market. Instead, there is a large group of young people, not otherwise involved in criminality, 
who are vulnerable to sliding into serious trouble as an unintended consequence of something 
they regard as a part of their social life rather than a considered income-generating activity. A 
supply-side gateway theory would predict that this low-level cannabis supply activity generates 
contact with ‘professional’ drug supply, creating pressure or temptation for informal supply 
activity to be extended to harder drugs, with consequent long term risks of incarceration, 
damage to employment prospects and hard drug dependence. This is at least as plausible as the 
demand-side gateway, but has quite different implications: it is the people supplying, rather 
than using, cannabis who are at risk; and the risk in question is one of involvement in hard drug 
supply rather than in hard drug use. By reducing the number of illicit cannabis suppliers, the 
reform we are considering would reduce, rather than increase, social cost. 
The 2003-6 Arrestee Survey (AS) is one of the few surveys containing usable information on 
supply behaviour. Apart from the usual difficulty of establishing a causal link, the AS has the 
further disadvantage that it only contains two questions about supply of each of a few specific 
drugs: whether the respondent has ever sold it and, if so, when he or she last sold it. This 
question design makes it impossible to observe the sequencing of initiation into cannabis and 
hard drug supply for those who have supplied both and, consequently, it is not possible to 
estimate a statistical model of the causal link between them. Instead, we do two things. First, we 
show evidence from the AS, in the form of crude statistical associations between hard drug and 
cannabis supply and between hard drug and cannabis consumption, to demonstrate that the 
scope for an individual-level causal gateway effect is at least as large on the supply side of the 
market as it is on the demand side. Second, we explore the implications of alternative 
assumptions about the relative strength of supplier and consumer gateways for the aggregate 
                                                 
53 The same pattern is common in other countries: for example in a large quantitative survey in New Zealand, Wilkins 
and Sweetsur (2006) found that a high proportion of cannabis users were provided with the drug by friends in a 
process of barter and gift exchange, and that most low- and middle-level dealers earned rather little cash income 
from their supply activity. 
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welfare outcomes of a move to a regulated market. 
The AS was an annual repeated cross-section survey of arrestees aged 17 and over, in police 
custody in England and Wales (see Boreham et al 2006 for further details). The sample itself 
was designed to be representative of the population of arrest events flowing through police 
custody suites above a minimum size thresholds (those with at least one interview room and 
processing at least 2,000 arrests a year). The design of the AS randomised the timing and 
location of interviewer shifts within custody suites, and interviewers were required to attempt 
interviews with all arrestees in custody during the shift. A stratified random sample of 72 police 
custody suites was used and interviews were conducted while respondents were in police 
custody, using computer-assisted self-interviewing (CASI) for the sensitive subjects of crime 
and drug use. Survey weights are used to adjust for three possible sources of non-
representativeness: (i) the oversampling of larger custody suites where cost per interview is 
low; (ii) non-response, caused by a number of process-related factors as well as refusals; (iii) 
the higher sample inclusion probability of prolific offenders. Weighting for frequency of arrest is 
particularly important, to avoid over-representation of prolific offenders with high frequency of 
arrest. The AS weights are based on predicted frequency of arrest estimated from reported 
actual frequency in the year preceding interview.  
The last two waves of the AS give some detail on drug dealing activity by drug type. In 2004/5, 
the questionnaire asked when the most recent episode of selling occurred for each of cannabis, 
heroin, crack and powder cocaine. In 2005/6, the list was extended to include ecstasy. Table 
6.4.1 is based entirely on the AS sample for 2005/6 and shows the most common combinations 
of co-supply of different drugs within the group of five drugs covered by the AS questionnaire. 
By far the most common is cannabis alone: using a one-month or one-year observation window 
to define dealing status, this accounts for 40-50% of those who are active in supply. There is a 
clear empirical distinction between two dealer “types”. One is a supplier of the more socially-
accepted recreational drugs, cannabis, ecstasy and powder cocaine. The various combinations of 
these three drugs account for around three-quarters of supplier prevalence in total. The second 
distinct type is the supplier of heroin and crack cocaine, accounting for almost 15% of dealers. 
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Table 6.4.1  Most common combinations of co-supply (Arrestee Survey, 2005/6) 
 
Combination of drugs supplied 
within observation window 
Observation window 
Last month Last year Ever 
Sample percentage of each supply combination within observation window 
Cannabis only 51.3 
(3.5) 
41.7 
(2.2) 
37.9 
(1.7) 
Ecstasy only 5.0 
(1.1) 
5.7 
(1.0) 
5.8 
(0.9) 
Cocaine only 5.7 
(1.4) 
5.1 
(1.0) 
2.1 
(0.4) 
Cannabis + ecstasy 5.3 
(1.6) 
9.6 
(1.8) 
14.2 
(1.3) 
Cannabis + cocaine 4.4 
(1.5) 
4.0 
(1.0) 
3.5 
(0.6) 
Ecstasy + cocaine 1.2 
(0.6) 
1.4 
(0.5) 
0.7 
(0.2) 
Cannabis+ ecstasy + cocaine 3.6 
(1.2) 
6.8 
(1.2) 
6.6 
(0.9) 
Heroin only 7.6 
(1.7) 
6.5 
(1.4) 
4.5 
(0.7) 
Crack only 1.3 
(0.4) 
2.3 
(0.6) 
1.3 
(0.4) 
Heroin + crack 5.3 
(1.2) 
5.2 
(1.2) 
1.8 
(0.4) 
Other combinations 9.4 
(1.5) 
11.6 
(1.0) 
21.6 
(1.4) 
Number reporting supplying drugs 
within observation window 
488 918 1,733 
Note: Proportions calculated within subsample of respondents reporting any drug dealing within the 
observation period. Weights are used to adjust for sample design, non-response and arrest frequency. 
Standard errors in parentheses, calculated allowing for stratified and clustered sample design. 
 
Table 6.4.2 shows the empirical associations between involvement with cannabis and 
involvement with hard drugs in terms of supplier and consumer behaviour and the associations 
after adjustment for personal characteristics.54 These associations are severely afflicted with 
bias arising from underlying confounding factors and should not be interpreted in a causal 
sense, but the comparison between the demand side and supply side is suggestive. In each case, 
the association between cannabis supply and dealing in hard drugs (especially cocaine) is 
particularly strong, and considerably stronger in proportionate terms than the analogous 
association for consumption. Note that the high rate of hard drug use among AS respondents is 
quite atypical of cannabis users in the general population, since users of hard drugs are greatly 
over-represented in the criminally-active part of the population. 
 
                                                 
54 Adjusted using a logit model with covariates: gender, age, age2, whether first arrested as a juvenile, whether left school 
prematurely, whether excluded from school. 
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Table 6.4.2    Crude gateway measures: Arrestee Survey 2004-6 
 
Sample proportions 
Supply Consumption 
Powder 
cocaine 
Cocaine, 
heroin or 
crack 
Powder 
cocaine 
Cocaine, 
heroin or 
crack 
Unadjusted for personal characteristics 
Proportion supplying/using hard 
drugs: if no supply/use of cannabis at 
any time 
1.0% 
(0.10) 
3.7% 
(0.25) 
6.5% 
(0.55) 
7.9% 
(0.61) 
Proportion supplying/using hard 
drugs: if some supply/use of cannabis 
at any time 
20.5% 
(0.85) 
36.9% 
(1.03) 
56.0 
(1.04) 
61.8 
(0.92) 
Ratio 
 20.91 
(2.37) 
 10.03 
(0.73) 
 8.57 
(0.74) 
7.82  
 (0.62) 
Adjusted for personal characteristics 
Proportion supplying/using hard 
drugs: if no supply/use of cannabis at 
any time 
1.3% 
(0.14) 
4.6% 
(0.28) 
10.4% 
(0.68) 
13.1% 
(0.70) 
Proportion supplying/using hard 
drugs: if some supply/use of cannabis 
at any time 
17.4% 
(0.95) 
33.9% 
(1.24) 
54.5% 
(1.08) 
60.7% 
(1.04) 
Ratio 
13.64 
(2.54) 
7.31 
(0.93) 
5.25 
(0.82) 
4.65 
(0.70) 
Note: Weighted estimates adjusting for over-sampling of prolific arrestees. Standard errors in 
parentheses, calculated allowing for stratified and clustered sample design. 
 
 
The potential for large supply-side gateway effects at the individual level is striking, but it is 
only one of the factors determining the outcome of gateway processes in aggregate welfare 
terms. Since the number of cannabis users is much larger than the number of cannabis 
suppliers, even a small demand-side gateway effect may be sufficient to outweigh a larger 
supply-side effect in terms of aggregate net social benefit. In fact, the aggregate gateway impacts 
depend on: (i) the numbers of cannabis suppliers and users, pre and post-reform; (ii) the 
magnitudes of the relative individual-level gateway effects; (iii) the proportions of people who 
supply or use hard drugs without supplying or using cannabis; and (iv) the long-term external 
social cost of a life involving supply or use of hard drugs compared to a life that does not. 
To see this, suppose that, prior to the projected policy change, there were    cannabis suppliers 
and    cannabis users. The new policy has the effect of increasing the prevalence of cannabis 
use to   
  and reducing the number of illicit cannabis suppliers to   
 . Suppose also that there is a 
probability    of someone who is not a cannabis supplier being a supplier of hard drugs, while 
   is the probability of someone who is not a cannabis user being a user of hard drugs. The 
corresponding probabilities for someone who has supplied or used cannabis are   
  and   
 , so 
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the proportional gateway effects for the supply side and demand side are       
         and 
      
        . The long-term average social cost of becoming a hard drug user is   , while 
the social cost of becoming a hard drug supplier is   . 
The net social benefit of the move to a regulated cannabis market is therefore: 
     
        
             
        
            (6.4.1) 
which we compute as: 
                                 (6.4.2) 
where   is the assumed proportion of current cannabis suppliers who would continue to engage 
in illegal supply post-reform and r is the assumed increase in cannabis (or THC) demand 
following  reform.  
Definition (6.4.2) is used to make three illustrative calculations, set out in Table 6.4.3 below, 
based on the following assumptions. 
(i) The number of cannabis suppliers and consumers pre-reform are based respectively on 
the combined-sample proportion of OCJS and AS respondents who self-report any current or 
past cannabis supply activity and on the estimate by Pudney et al (2006). Both supplier and 
consumer numbers are scaled down by 39%, to reflect the reduction in measured cannabis 
prevalence recorded in the BCS since 2003/4. This gives estimated numbers of suppliers and 
users as 0.139m and 3.374m respectively in 2009/10: a supplier-consumer ratio of 4.1%. For 
the purpose of these illustrative calculations, we assume that 12% of current illicit suppliers of 
cannabis would continue illicit supply activity post-reform: the same proportion as the 
estimated market share of smuggled cigarettes in the tobacco market. For the change in 
cannabis prevalence induced by reform, we use the three scenarios set out in Table A4.5.3. Since 
a neuroscience-based demand gateway would depend primarily on THC consumption, while a 
social influence-based demand gateway would depend primarily on the number of purchase 
transactions, we use an average of the THC and volume changes characterising each scenario, so 
the low, mid and high-response scenarios imply demand increases of 2.5%, 12.5% and 32.5% 
respectively. 
(ii) There are three alternative variants of the gateway. The ‘weak gateway’ case assumes 
that causal gateways are responsible only for a 10% increase in risk on both the demand and 
supply sides of the market. The ‘plausible gateway’ case reflects our view that there is at most a 
modest true demand-side gateway, but possibly a significant supply-side gateway. Thus we 
assume that cannabis is responsible for a 20% increase in risk on the demand side, but a 
doubling of risk on the supply side. The ‘strong gateway’ case – which we see as the least 
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plausible of the three – assumes that there is a causal gateway which doubles the risk of 
initiation into hard drugs for cannabis users and triples the risk of hard drug dealing for 
cannabis suppliers.  
(iii) The probabilities of hard drug supply or consumption without cannabis supply or 
consumption are estimated from a combination of AS and OCJS data as 0.17% and 0.34% 
respectively. 
(iv) The assumed long-term average social costs of an individual becoming involved in hard 
drug supply or consumption are very difficult to measure. Work by Cohen (1998) and Cohen 
and Piquero (2009) for the US leads to social costs as high as $1.7-2.3 million discounted over a 
whole career.55 These estimates are certainly too high for our purposes, for two main reasons. 
First, they relate to an individual who follows a “delinquent” trajectory, whereas not all 
individuals who slip into hard drug use or supply through a causal gateway will follow such a 
trajectory – for many, it will be a transient phase generating much less social cost. Second, these 
evaluation exercises assume implicitly a non-delinquent counterfactual, whereas it is likely that 
someone who slips into delinquency through a causal gateway would not have led a blameless 
life in the absence of that gateway. Estimation of unit social costs in a way that addresses these 
concerns is virtually impossible with currently available evidence. Instead, we make illustrative 
calculations based on an estimate by Gordon et al (2006) of £44,231 as the annual social cost of 
class A drug use per user. For the gateway into hard drug supply, we use this figure and assume 
that such costs are, on average, incurred over a 5-year period, giving a result of approximately 
£221,000 per person. For hard drug use rather than supply, a lower figure is appropriate, since 
the majority of people who use heroin crack or cocaine at some point do not become sustained 
problem drug users. Consequently, we assume the average cost is equivalent to that for a 2-year 
drug-use career: roughly £88,500. These are purely illustrative figures, not serious predictions. 
 
                                                 
55 However, discounting is not appropriate in our context because we are evaluating the current cost of a group of 
people at different stages of their lifecycles. In a stationary environment the 10 year of social cost generated by one 
new cannabis-induced hard drug dealer is representative of the first year’s cost arising from that person plus 9 
similar people who began their 10-year hard drug dealing careers 1-9 years earlier. To calculate aggregate current 
social cost, we sum them without discounting. 
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Table 6.4.3  Aggregate net social benefit resulting from demand- and supply-side gateways 
 
Aggregate net 
social benefit 
(£m) 
Low demand 
response 
(-10% THC, 
+15% volume) 
Mid demand 
response 
(+5% THC,  
+20% volume) 
High demand 
response 
(+25% THC,  
+40% 
volume) 
Weak  gateway effects 
(10% risk increase for cannabis 
users and suppliers) 
Demand side - £3m - £13m - £33m 
Supply side + £5m + £5m + £5m 
Total + £2m - £8m - £28m 
Plausible gateway effects 
(20% risk increase for cannabis 
users; 100% for suppliers) 
Demand side - £5m - £25m - £65m 
Supply side + £53m + £53m + £53m 
Total + £48m + £28m - £13m 
Strong gateway effects 
(Risk doubled for cannabis users 
and tripled for suppliers) 
Demand side - £25m - £126m - £326m 
Supply side + £105m + £105m + £105m 
Total + £80m - £20m - £221m 
 
The estimates in Table 6.4.3 are subject to very great conceptual and statistical uncertainty and 
should only be seen as illustrations of the way in which the costs and benefits of reform would 
arise. However, there are two important – and reasonably clear – conclusions to be drawn from 
these calculations.  
The  magnitude of the aggregate gateway effect is not huge. Although the social cost of a life 
“lost to drugs and crime” may be very high at the individual level, the number of individuals 
involved through any plausible gateway mechanism is small, so the aggregate gateway effect 
appears to be moderate, compared with current enforcement costs. 
The combined demand and supply gateway effect may favour regulation over prohibition.    Unless 
policy reform leads to a very large expansion in cannabis consumption, the beneficial effect of 
the supply side gateway tends to offset the costs induced by the demand-side gateway, and it is 
quite plausible to argue that gateway mechanisms – if they exist at all – act in favour of 
regulation and against prohibition, rather than the reverse as argued by many opponents of 
reform. Even if we change our cost assumptions considerably (for example by increasing the 
assumed unit social cost of hard drug use), it is difficult to generate an outcome in which 
negative gateway effects on the demand side of the market grossly outweigh the positive 
gateway effects on the supply side and become a dominant factor in the cost-benefit balance. 
Consequently, it is hard to justify the central position that “the gateway effect” has occupied in 
the policy debate. 
 
6.5 Other indirect effects 
There are many other possible indirect effects of policy-induced change in the cannabis market. 
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Given the state of available evidence, we do think it possible to construct any meaningful 
estimate of these effects, so we leave them as further unquantifiable source of uncertainty in the 
cost-benefit calculation.  
6.5.1 Consumption of other substances 
For people who use cannabis alongside other substances, changes in the price (and physical 
properties) of cannabis arising from policy reform are likely to cause some changes in the 
demands for those other substances. If the substance in question is a substitute for cannabis, its 
consumption will fall if cannabis demand rises in response to a policy-induced price fall. There 
is therefore a positive cross-price elasticity between the two. Conversely, if it is a complement to 
cannabis, the cross-elasticity is negative, and its demand will increase together with 
consumption of cannabis in response to the price change. Note that these effects are distinct 
from the “gateway” effects of the previous section, which relate to changes in preferences 
induced by consumption of cannabis. Instead, cross-price effects relate only to economic 
responses to changes in the relative prices of consumption goods. 
Appendix Tables A4.5.3-A4.5.5 survey the published literature on cross-elasticities of demand 
between cannabis and, respectively, tobacco, alcohol and other illicit drugs. A majority of these 
studies have concluded that cross-elasticities are negative, suggesting that tobacco, alcohol and 
other drugs are complements to cannabis, and that consumption will increase along with any 
policy-induced rise in cannabis consumption. Unfortunately, this body of evidence is of very 
little use to us. Most published research has investigated the effect on cannabis demand of 
changes in the prices of other goods, rather than the reverse, and the few studies that have 
looked at the impact of cannabis price changes on consumption of other goods have produced 
no clear conclusion. In general, the estimates cover a wide range of numerical values and there 
is a great deal of uncertainty associated with them. Moreover, none of them relates to the UK 
and none comes from a model of demand that accommodates the qualitative difference between 
high- and low-potency varieties of cannabis and the shift in their market shares that has been 
seen in recent years. Our view is that the direction of these cross-commodity effects is 
uncertain, but their magnitude is unlikely to be large. 
6.5.2 Failures of decision-making 
Our use of net external benefit as the evaluation criterion rests on the assumption that any 
individual who chooses to consume a good expects the personal consumption benefit he or she 
derives from it to outweigh the harm they expect to suffer. After the event, some may regret the 
outcome, but the assumption is that, beforehand, consumption appeared to be a risk worth 
taking. There is nothing special about cannabis in this respect: many forms of consumption or 
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personal activity entail some short- or long-term risk which people willingly accept.56 Cost-
benefit analysis usually allows individuals to be the best judges of their own welfare, and 
assume that observed choices reflect those welfare judgements. Under this assumption, the net 
external benefit criterion biases the analysis in favour of the status quo to some degree.  
There is only good reason to depart from the revealed preference assumption if there are 
grounds for believing that a significant number of consumers are making irrational decisions 
(i.e. decisions which would conflict with their own ‘true’ evaluation of their welfare). This could 
arise either because of flaws in the decision-making process through an inability to envisage 
and compare potential outcomes or through a lack of the information required for efficient 
decision-making. For such individuals, it is possible that the net external benefit criterion would 
be biased against the status quo rather than in favour of it.  
Two population groups are of most concern in this respect: young people whose decision-
making capacities are not yet fully developed, and people with capacities impaired by mental 
illness (a group known to have a relatively high prevalence of cannabis use). While it is possible 
to measure population size by age group and to estimate the prevalence of various kinds of 
mental illness, it is much more difficult to define the idea of impairment as it affects decisions in 
relation to cannabis and to estimate the prevalence of impairment and its consequences. A 
further source of uncertainty is the effect of market regulation on the choices made by these 
groups.  
One might expect that an expansion of the market would increase the number of ‘irrational’ 
consumption decisions, particularly if the legal status of licensed cannabis encourages more 
adults to continue consumption into the parenthood stage. However, it is not impossible that 
regulation of the retail trade, better control of product quality, and clearer health messages 
would be more effective as a curb on consumption by the very young than the current illicit but 
widespread market. 
Overall, our view is that this is likely to be a net source of social cost rather than benefit, but 
potentially large only if there is a very large market response to policy reform.  
6.5.3 Credibility of health information 
At present, official information about health risks from drug use are linked to the Misuse of 
Drugs Act and thus tied to the prohibitionist legal provisions of that Act. Distrust of government 
in general and drugs policy in particular is widespread among the groups most at risk of 
becoming involved in drug use, and it is plausible to suggest that the health information 
                                                 
56 David Nutt’s famous or infamous example of horse riding is only one of many that could be given – including 
smoking, drinking, driving, eating junk food, TV watching and other sedentary habits. 
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originating from government loses credibility by being linked to the law in this way. If this 
argument is correct, one possible benefit of regulating rather than prohibiting the cannabis 
market is that consumers would become better-informed and more likely to conform to the 
economist’s idea of a rational decision-maker. 
We know of no evidence bearing on this issue, and we take the view that there may be some 
positive net benefit from this source, but probably of modest size.   
6.5.4 Drug tourism 
If the UK were to introduce a licensed cannabis market, and do so alone, there is little doubt that 
it would generate “drug tourism” in the same way that liberalisation has in the Netherlands, 
although a ban on all smoking in public places such as bars and cafés would presumably reduce 
this considerably. Although the Dutch have found drug tourism to be a nuisance and have 
considered controls on tourists’ access to cannabis, there may be benefits (in terms of 
employment and income from overseas) as well as costs involved. 
Overall, we see increased drug tourism as a potential net social cost, but probably not on a large 
scale. 
 
7 Overall results: aggregate net benefits and their distribution 
We have made a distinction between those costs and benefits which are directly related to the 
current working of the cannabis market and costs/benefits which are more indirectly related, 
through uncertain long-term causal mechanisms such as disease processes and behavioural 
gateways. Although not completely clear-cut in practice, this is a useful distinction, because it 
separates (relatively) straightforward issues, where there is clear scope for further research to 
clarify the picture considerably, from difficult issues relating to long-term impacts which 
involve  questions of causality that are unlikely ever to be settled unambiguously. 
We summarise the net benefit estimates under three alternative assumptions about the increase 
in consumption generated by the switch to a licensed regulated cannabis market; these 
scenarios are set out in Table 4.5.3 above. Remember that the estimates are not predictions of 
what would happen in any future period. They are estimates of the net aggregate effect of a 
hypothetical reform implemented in 2009/10, abstracting from any transitional adjustments 
(and any accompanying transitional cost), assuming that the full potential savings are realised. 
For instance, this would mean that potential savings in police time are realised either through a 
corresponding reduction in police funding or by the reallocation of those resources to other 
socially beneficial uses. A positive figure represents a net saving to society from the reform, 
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negative figures represent net losses. All figures are expressed in 2009 prices. 
7.1 Direct costs and benefits 
The results for direct net benefits are given in Table 7.1.1. Drug-related crime plays a critical 
role here. The figures for crime are based on an individual-level study by Bryan et al (2011) 
which found no statistically significant evidence of crime caused by cannabis use and only 
modest amounts of crime caused by involvement in cannabis supply. If we were to assume that 
the former is exactly zero and the latter small but positive, the conclusion would be that 
licensing and regulation would have positive net benefits in terms of crime in all market 
response scenarios. However, there are wide confidence intervals around these estimated 
individual-level mean crime effects, which must be multiplied by very large numbers of 
suppliers and (especially) users of cannabis to generate aggregate estimates. The assumed 
mean unit social costs of (especially violent) crime are high and the result is an extremely wide 
range of possible values for the net benefit of reform through the impact on crime. 
If we were to exclude cannabis-related crime, our conclusion would be that reform would 
generate a modest direct net benefit, probably between £200m and £300m, irrespective of the 
scale of market response. When we include crime in the picture, the estimate of the total direct 
impact of reform varies much more across market response scenarios and the range of 
uncertainty becomes much larger. The fall in net benefit with the degree of market response is 
largely driven by the (statistically insignificant) estimate of violent crime caused by cannabis 
use because of the very large number of cannabis users.  
Allowing for the uncertainty introduced by estimation of drug-related crime, we can be 
confident of a positive total direct net benefit in the low- and mid-response scenarios. In the 
other projection which envisages a much greater demand response, the central estimate is large 
and negative, but largely swamped by statistical uncertainty. 
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Table 7.1.1  Summary of aggregate direct external net benefits from cannabis 
licensing in England and Wales (2009 prices) 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Policing + £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
+ £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
+ £105m 
[£65m, £147m] 
Court procedures + £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
+ £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
+ £97m 
[£58m, £143m] 
Custodial sentences + £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
+ £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
+ £84m 
[£50m, £125m] 
Community sentences + £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
+ £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
+ £5m 
[£3m, £8m] 
Tax on earnings lost 
during  incarceration 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
+ £10m 
[£8m, £12m] 
Market regulation / 
health promotion costs - £45m - £45m - £45m 
Cost of cannabis-related 
accidents 
+ £13m 
[£8m, £21m] 
- £6m 
[-£11m, -£4m] 
- £32m 
[-£53m, -£20m] 
Cannabis dependency 
treatment costs 
+ £5m 
[£2m, £7m] 
- £2m 
[-£3m, -£1m] 
- £11m 
[-£16m, -£6m] 
Cannabis-induced crime + £17m 
[£6m, £28m] 
- £15m 
[-£145m, £114m] 
- £569m 
[-£1.4bn, £256m] 
Total 
+ £290m 
[£224m, £366m] 
+ £231m 
[£86m, £381m] 
- £356m 
[-£1.2bn, £472m] 
Note: subjective ranges of uncertainty in brackets; figures may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
  
7.2 Indirect costs and benefits 
Effects of reform which are less directly related to outcomes in the cannabis market often 
involve long-term processes which are not easily analysed statistically. This means that the 
overall net benefit-cost balance becomes more uncertain still when indirect consequences are 
brought into consideration. Our attempts to evaluate the mental and physical health 
consequences, the costs of scarring in the labour market and gateway effects do not lead to any 
substantial change in the overall picture: an overall net external benefit from reform of around 
£280-460m for the low-response scenario and £100-400m for the moderate assumption about 
market response. Only for the high-response scenario do we find a risk of large net social costs, 
with the range of uncertainty running from a £1.3bn loss to a £400m net benefit. 
This neglects further potential impacts which we do not see as quantifiable with currently 
available evidence. However, in our view, the unquantifiable effects probably do not change the 
picture greatly, except to add further uncertainty and to increase the possible extent of net 
social loss in the high-response scenario. 
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Table 7.2.1  Summary of aggregate indirect net external benefits from cannabis 
licensing in England and Wales 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Quantified effects 
Mental illness treatment 
costs 
+ £16m 
[+£8m, +£43m] 
- £8m 
[-£21m, -£4m] 
-£41m 
[-£106m, -£20m] 
Physical illness treatment 
costs 
- £16m 
[-£31m, -£8m] 
- £21m 
[-£41m, -£11m] 
- £43m 
[-£82m, -£21m] 
Criminal record scarring 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
+ £23m 
[+£11m, +£57m] 
Gateway consequences 
+ £48 
[£0m, +£96m] 
+ £28 
[-£20m, +£80m] 
- £13m 
[-£220m, £0m] 
Unquantified effects 
Consumption of other 
substances ? ? ? 
Failures of decision-making  ? - -- 
Credibility of health 
information + + + 
Drug tourism - - - 
Total quantifiable indirect 
effects 
+ £71m 
[+£19m, +£136m] 
+ £22m 
[-£33m, +£82m] 
-£74m 
[-£295m, -£18m] 
Total quantifiable direct 
and indirect effects 
+ £361m 
[£277m, £461m] 
+ £253m 
[+£98m, +£415m] 
-£430m 
[-£1.3bn, +£400m] 
Note: subjective ranges of uncertainty in brackets; figures may not sum to totals because of rounding. ? = direction of 
effect uncertain; - = probable net cost of modest size; -- = probable net cost, possibly large; + = probable net benefit 
of modest size. 
 
7.3 Government budget implications 
The impact of a policy reform on the government’s budgetary position is not a measure of social 
cost, but it is important, since all policy changes need to be integrated in the government’s 
overall funding strategy. The budgetary impact is the sum of net savings in expenditure (on 
policing and criminal justice procedures, health care costs, etc.) and net increases in revenue 
from taxes and other receipts. We summarise these impacts in Table 7.3.2. 
Any net savings in government expenditure should be seen as potential savings until a strategy 
for realising them is in place. For example, our central estimate of a saving of £105m on policing 
costs represents the estimated value of police time freed by the removal of the requirement for 
policing of cannabis possession and domestic supply. Government could choose to realise it as a 
budgetary saving by reducing the police budget accordingly, or it could allow the corresponding 
resources of police time to be redeployed to meet other policing objectives. The estimates 
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presented in Table 7.3.2 assume that potential savings are realised in cash terms. 
The largest single element of the budgetary picture is the net indirect tax revenue from the 
taxation of licensed cannabis production. This is difficult to predict since, to do so, we need to 
know: (i) the baseline volume of demand pre-reform; (ii) the effect of reform on demand; and 
(iii) the share of market captured by licensed production. All three of these are uncertain, but 
(ii) and (iii) are fixed by our three market response scenarios set out in Table 4.5.3.  
Our starting point for (i) is the analysis of market size for England and Wales in 2003/4 by 
Pudney et al (2006), which resulted in an estimate of cannabis volume of approximately 360 
tonnes at a retail value of around £900m. Note that 2003/4 represents a low point in cannabis 
prices, with an average price of around £2.50 per gram according to Law Enforcement Agency 
sources (see Figure 2.3.1 above). Since that time, the available survey data suggests that there 
has been a fall in prevalence to around 60% of the 2003/4 level and that the fall has been 
approximately uniform across regular and occasional users, so that total consumption will have 
followed the same trend. However, we know that there has also been a pronounced shift in 
market share of the more expensive sinsemilla varieties. There is no completely reliable data on 
the sinsemilla market share, but we can use evidence from police seizures which suggests that 
the share had reached 80% by 2010, implying an average cannabis price of around £6.40 per 
gram. If we assume that there has been no change in the volume of cannabis per episode of use 
(in other words no change in titration), then the 2010 market value can be estimated as £900m 
 60%  6.40/2.50, giving a baseline market size of £1.38bn in 2010. 
Our reform scenarios assume a licensed product limited to 10% THC content, with a tax rate set 
in such a way that licensed supply is retailed at the price of £4.80, which is 90% of the 
competitive price predicted by the 2-component Gorman-Lancaster model for a product with 
10% THC.57 Using the range of estimated production costs set out in Table 4.3.2, the required 
taxation system is as shown in Table 7.3.1. The tax rate on licensed cannabis would be around 
70%, which is considerably lower than the 83% total tax rate on cigarettes and close to the 72% 
rate on high-alcohol beer. Since we envisage the existence of a substantial residual illicit market, 
the share of taxation in total market turnover would be significantly lower, in the range 30-63%. 
Note that the unlicensed market shares we envisage are considerably greater than the  shares of 
illicit supply in the alcohol and tobacco markets. 
If there is significant change in consumption of tobacco and alcohol as a consequence of 
cannabis market reform, this would have further implications for tax revenue. We do not 
believe it is possible to estimate these secondary tax effects with any degree of confidence. 
                                                 
57 Note that this calculation of the competitive price ignores the cost of risk associated with illicit purchases, so the 
licensed product would in fact undercut the illicit market by rather more than this margin. 
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Table 7.3.1  Projected indirect tax regime 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Tax rate on licensed cannabis 
70% 
[51%, 79%]  
70% 
[51%, 79%]  
70% 
[51%, 79%]  
Share of tax in total market  
value 
56% 
[41%, 63%] 
43% 
[32%, 49%] 
39% 
[29%, 44%] 
Total tax revenue 
£768m 
[£564m, £871m] 
£594m 
[£436m, £674m] 
£541m 
[£397m, 614m] 
 
 
The overall impact of the policy innovation on the government budget is summarised in Table 
7.3.2. We would expect the government to gain in budgetary terms by something approaching 
£1bn per year, roughly three-quarters of which would come from tax revenue rather than 
expenditure savings.  
 
Table 7.3.2  Summary of aggregate government budget implications of cannabis 
licensing in England and Wales 
 
Market response scenario 
 
Low-response Mid-response High-response 
Commodity taxes  
  
 
     Taxes on licensed cannabis 
+ £768m 
[£564m, £871m] 
+ £594m 
[£436m, £674m] 
+ £541m 
[£397m, £614m] 
     Other indirect taxes ? ? ? 
Taxes on earnings 
  
 
     Tax lost during incarceration 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
+ £10m 
[+£8m, +£12m] 
     Tax lost due to scarring 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
+ £23m 
[£11m, £57m] 
Public expenditure 
  
 
     Enforcement costs 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
+ £291m 
[£176m, £423m] 
     Health information and 
dependency treatment 
- £41m 
[-£43m, -£39m] 
- £47m 
[-£48, -£46m] 
- £58m 
[-£61m, -£51m] 
     Mental illness treatment 
+ £16m 
[-£0m-£53m] 
- £21m 
[£0m-£53m] 
- £43m 
[£0m-£107m] 
     Physical illness treatment 
- £16m 
[-£31m, -£8m] 
- £21m 
[-£41m, -£11m] 
- £43m 
[-£82m, -£21m] 
Total 
+ £1,051m 
[£816m, £1,225m] 
+ £841m 
[£645m, £1,000m] 
+ £724m 
[£525m, £882m] 
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8 Conclusions and recommendations 
Our main conclusions and recommendations are as follows. 
[1] The heated public debate on cannabis policy is much too limited in scope. We have 
identified seventeen distinct sources of social cost or benefit that might contribute to the 
outcome of a comprehensive market reform and attempted to quantify thirteen of them. The 
relative importance of these sources depends critically on the form of regulation and the nature 
of market responses to reform. Consequently, any considered view on the question of reform 
needs to take account of a large number of factors and be contingent on a specific view about 
the detailed nature of the reform. Few of the most vocal participants in the debate on drug 
policy reform take a sufficiently broad perspective. 
[2] At present, there is so much uncertainty about some of the important issues involved in 
the introduction of a licensed and regulated cannabis market that a clear conclusion is not 
possible. In particular we lack a good understanding of the demand behaviour which underlies 
the steady fall in cannabis prevalence over the last decade or so, and the degree to which the 
association between cannabis use and long-term adverse outcomes is truly causal. In our view, 
all unambiguous claims for or against radical policy options should be treated with caution. 
[3] Psychopharmacological research suggests that harm from cannabis use is related to the 
chemical composition of the drug, so tight product regulation similar to that in the tobacco 
market would have some advantages. Several alternative forms of regulation that could be used 
in a licensed market and policy designers need to bear in mind the different consequences each 
might have for the harmfulness of consumption. Relatively laisser faire reforms which 
encourage large numbers of small producers make it difficult to control product characteristics 
and may lead to higher levels of average potency and thus more harmful long-term outcomes. 
[4] Cost benefit evaluations should not assume that there are zero personal benefits from 
consumption: such an assumption would be unthinkable in any other application of cost benefit 
analysis. Our use of a net external benefit criterion is based on the view that the consumer 
necessarily perceives at least as great a personal benefit from consumption as there is personal 
cost and risk from consumption. It is a conservative approach, producing results biased in 
favour of the status quo under the assumption of competent well-informed decision-makers. 
However, we need a much better understanding of the vulnerable groups who may be making 
poor consumption decisions because of inadequate information or imperfectly developed 
decision-making capacity. 
[5] Given the lack of a convincing empirical model of market demand for high- and low-
potency forms of cannabis and the uncertainty about the form that product regulation would 
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take, there is a wide range of plausible market responses to reform. It is likely that consumption 
in overall volume terms will rise significantly as a consequence of the switch to legal status and 
the lower price that results. But it is possible that, for some forms of product regulation, average 
potency would fall, so that average consumption of the psychoactive ingredient THC would rise 
much less than consumption of the good itself, and might even fall. 
[6] Our results are set out in the Table below. The direct impacts of reform in terms of 
potential changes in aggregate policing, criminal justice and drug treatment costs appear to be 
modest and largely insensitive to the nature of regulation and the market response to it. We 
estimate an annual aggregate net benefit of roughly £200-300m from this source as a 
consequence of a move to a regulated market. 
[7] Another direct effect of reform will come through its impact on drug-related crime. One 
might expect crime related to cannabis consumption to increase if reform reduces price and 
increases demand, while crime related to cannabis supply would be reduced as illicit supply is 
driven out of the market. At the individual level, we have found no statistically significant 
evidence of a causal link between cannabis use and acquisitive or violent crime, but a modest 
significant link with supply activity – suggesting an overall net saving on crime costs from 
reform. However, the large size of the cannabis market, the potentially high personal costs for 
the victims of violent crime, and the substantial statistical uncertainty around the estimates 
imply that, at the aggregate level, projected net social benefit of reform is highly uncertain. We 
can be confident of a substantial additional net benefit from reform through a reduction in drug-
related crime if we assume that the demand response is low or moderate. However, if very large 
demand responses to market reform are envisaged, it is not possible to draw any definite 
conclusions about the cost-benefit balance for the impact on crime. 
[8] The indirect effects of policy reform include the social costs of long-term impacts on 
physical and mental health, the impact on labour market outcomes through the scarring effect of 
a criminal record, and the ‘gateway’ effect on the risk of involvement with harder drugs. For all 
of these, we estimate the external costs and benefits to the rest of society, excluding the internal 
costs and benefits borne by the cannabis user. These indirect impacts of reform are hard to 
estimate with any confidence because of the difficulty of isolating the effect of unobserved 
confounding factors that produce spurious correlation between cannabis use and observed 
outcomes. The public debate about cannabis policy has focused heavily on mental health costs, 
but we find these to be modest, because of the relatively small number of individuals involved 
and the modest effect size suggested by the research literature. In total, we expect net external 
costs of the impact on physical and mental health to range from zero for the low demand 
response scenario to around £85m in the case of a strong demand response to reform. Even in 
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the worst case, these costs are modest in relation to projected savings on policing and criminal 
justice costs. 
[9] We estimate modest external net benefits from reform through the avoidance of 
scarring effects of criminal records in the labour market of roughly the same magnitude as the 
external cost to society of the impact on metal health. 
[10] Another greatly exaggerated focus of the public debate on cannabis policy is the 
“gateway effect” – the possible increase in risk of involvement in hard drugs caused by exposure 
to cannabis. In our view, the evidence for a large gateway effect among cannabis consumers is 
weak, and there is an often-overlooked offsetting gateway on the supply side, drawing cannabis 
users into drug dealing. Licensing of supply might lead to a rise in demand and thus harm 
through the demand gateway, but it would also remove many people from illicit cannabis 
supply and thus reduce harm through the supply gateway. We estimate that reform could 
generate a net external benefit in the range £20-80m under the most plausible assumption of a 
moderate demand increase. Only a large demand response would be likely to generate a net 
social cost. 
[11] Overall, taking account of all thirteen reform effects that we were able to estimate 
quantitatively, the total effect of reform is a net external benefit of around £280-460m if we 
anticipate a low demand response; a net benefit of £100-415m for the most plausible moderate 
demand response; and a projected net external cost of £430 in the case of a large demand 
response. This last estimate is very uncertain, with an indicative range of uncertainty from -
£1.3bn to +£400m. 
[12] There are many other possible effects of reform which we believe are not possible to 
quantify with any degree of confidence. Four of these may be particularly important: indirect 
effects of relative price changes on the consumption of other harmful substances including 
tobacco, alcohol and other illicit drugs; failures of decision making by certain vulnerable groups 
whose evaluations of their personal costs and benefits may be unreliable as a basis for welfare 
evaluation; the possible improvement in the credibility of health information achievable by 
separating health messages from legal penalties; and the possibility of “drug tourism” as a 
response to a unilateral UK policy initiative. Although we cannot quantify these effects, it is 
likely that they will follow a similar pattern to the quantified effects: no substantial net social 
costs if demand response is low or moderate and a risk of large social costs only if the demand 
response is large. The degree of uncertainty, particularly in the last case, is again very high. 
[13] Tax revenues are a transfer of resources within society rather than a net benefit to 
society, but they are an important aspect of policy outcomes. We estimate that tax revenue from 
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licensed cannabis supply in England and Wales would fall somewhere in the range £0.4-0.9bn, 
which is far less than some of the assumptions that have appeared in the policy debate. We 
expect tax revenue to be lower in the case of strong demand response to reform, because of the 
large residual illicit market for high-potency cannabis that could exist in that case. Overall, the 
contribution of cannabis licensing in England and Wales to reduction of the government deficit 
is expected to lie in the range £0.5-1.25bn. 
[14]  Uncertainty about the magnitude of certain impacts and the response of demand to 
market reform make it impossible to give an unambiguous ex ante evaluation of the net social 
benefit of reform. However, it seems clear that the risk of large net social costs is only significant 
if there is a large demand response to reform. This suggests that a good way to proceed in 
practice might be to introduce the reform together with a monitoring system to give early 
warning of any large demand response, particularly among the very young or other vulnerable 
groups. One of the clear lessons to be learned from policy experience over the last decade or so 
is that it is possible to reverse policy quickly if monitoring were to suggest a large expansion of 
demand. Policy monitoring should distinguish between consumption of low- and high-potency 
forms of cannabis, since the largest social costs are linked to the latter rather than the former. 
[15] The Home Office relies heavily on the British Crime Survey (now known as the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales) as the primary source of data on drug use.  The BCS has 
significant shortcomings: it is a cross-sectional survey that does not allow analysis of the 
dynamics of drug use at the individual level; it gives data on drug use and crime victimisation 
but not respondents’ own criminal activity; and it under-represents prolific offenders and drug 
users. In this study, we have exploited research based on a combination of the Arrestee Survey 
(AS) and Offending Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS), to avoid the under-recording of cannabis 
consumption by the BCS and to estimate the volume of cannabis-related crime. The 
abandonment of both the AS and OCJS in 2006 makes it now virtually impossible to construct 
these estimates using current, nationally representative data. If drugs policy is to be evidence-
based, this gap in our data resources is a serious problem and should be reconsidered. A second 
obvious gap in our data resources is the lack of regular, representative data on drug prices and 
potency, which makes it virtually impossible to attempt an analysis of demand in the current 
cannabis market.  
[16] The uncertainty inherent in our estimates is greatest in the scenario which envisages a 
large demand response to market reform. We see this outcome as relatively implausible, given 
the limited evidence of response to less radical policy liberalisation in many countries and the 
lack of any detectable increase in demand in response to the reclassifications of cannabis in 
2004 and 2009, but the evidence on demand behaviour is weak. Published attempts to estimate 
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demand responses come from US and Australian data and do not give a good basis for projecting 
the effect of reform in the UK. Standard statistical models of cannabis use also fail to offer any 
clear explanation for the steady decline in cannabis demand over the last decade and they do 
not capture the important distinction between low- and high-potency forms of the drug or 
explain the structural shift in the cannabis market. There is a clear need for a better 
understanding of the demand for cannabis, which will only be achievable with better data on 
consumption, price and potency. 
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10 Appendices 
 
A4.2  External and internal costs and benefits 
We set out a simple static analysis of fully-informed decision-making purely to illustrate the 
reasoning behind the external cost/benefit evaluation principle. 
Suppose that a consumer of type i has preferences represented by a utility function 
              
    
       where: P is the penalty imposed on cannabis users (if detected) 
under prohibition;           is taxable earnings,    is taxable earnings in the absence of any 
penalty;      is the loss of earnings associated with penalty level P (e.g. because of 
incarceration);   is the direct tax rate;    and   
  are the  price and quantity of cannabis under 
prohibitive (t=0) and regulatory (t=1) systems; and D is a measure of severity of cannabis-
induced disease, if any. Both P and D are uncertain when the consumption decision is made, 
except when there is no cannabis use (  
  = 0), in which case both P and D are zero. Assume 
there is no black market under the regulated system, so that P is always zero in that case. 
Individuals are assumed to know the risks of criminal justice penalties and health harms, and 
they are capable of making decisions based on expected utility.  
There are three classes of individual58: type 1 are abstainers who would not use cannabis under 
prohibition or regulation. There is no welfare gain or loss arising from these people. Type 2 
individuals would be non-users of cannabis in the current illicit market, but would choose to 
become users in a regulated market. Thus: 
                 
  
   
                        
    
                                           
   
  
   
                 
    
                                                                  
where the expectation is with respect to the uncertain internal criminal justice and health costs, 
P and D. Type 3 people are users of cannabis under both prohibition and regulation: 
   
  
   
                        
    
                                                    
   
  
   
                 
    
                                                                  
There are three further costs external to the consumer: the costs of enforcement and medical 
treatment; and society’s share of the output that would have been produced by the individual 
had the penalty not been imposed. The latter is the loss of revenue from earnings taxation.  
                                                 
58 We make a monotone response assumption: there is no-one who would be a cannabis user under prohibition, but 
an abstainer under regulation. 
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Assume that the unit costs of enforcement and disease treatment are    and   ; that the social 
value (measured in money terms) of a unit of individual utility is v; and that the population 
numbers of type 1 and 2 people are    and   . Then the expected change in aggregate social 
welfare generated by the policy change is:       
             
  
   
                
    
                     
        
  
   
                 
    
           
  
   
                        
    
         
           
      +                        
            
         
                             (A4.2.5) 
The first term of this expression is the change in self-perceived expected welfare of people who 
are drawn into cannabis use by the policy reform. Revealed preference (equation A4.2.2) tells us 
that this term must be non-negative, since these people retain the option of not using cannabis 
after reform, but choose not to do so. Similarly, the second term is the perceived change in 
welfare of cannabis users. It is non-negative since the consumer retains the option of consuming 
at the previous level   
 , but the risk of a criminal penalty is removed, thus increasing welfare. 
These first two components of the change in aggregate welfare represent internal benefits 
accruing to drug users; the remaining two terms are external impacts of reform on society as a 
whole.  
The first external impact represents the treatment costs for drug-induced ill-health experienced 
by new users and is clearly negative. The remaining component is ambiguous in sign, consisting 
of a gain to society in the tax revenue from productive employment (          ), a saving to 
society in the cost of enforcing prohibition (          
  ) and a change in the cost of treatment 
for drug-induced illness (            
         
   ), which is negative if the reform has the 
effect of increasing intensity of use for existing users. 
Our approach to evaluation is to consider primarily the external costs and benefits of reform. 
Since the revealed preference principle tells us that the internal impacts are necessarily non-
negative, this means that our analysis will be conservative in that it has a built-in bias in favour 
of the status quo.  However, it should be borne in mind that there are several circumstances, 
discussed in section 4.2.1 above, which might tend to offset this conservatism.  
 
A4.4  Estimating production costs 
The first step is to estimate the yield of cannabis per unit area of greenhouse. Cannabis plants in 
greenhouses are likely to grow taller than in residential settings, and it is necessary to allow for 
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the higher yield of taller plants. The IDMU website59 gives yield figures from over 2000 court 
cases in which IDMU staff have acted as expert witnesses. We use their yield figure of 40 g per 
plant, corresponding to the approximate average yield of mature plants more than 1.2 m tall. It 
is somewhat higher than the 1.2 oz figure (=34 g) used by Caulkins (2010), based on home 
production yields. These yields assume that only the flowering tops of the plant (which contain 
by far the highest concentration of THC) are used, as is normal in ‘cottage-industry’ production. 
It may also be possible to extract THC content (as resin) from the lower leaves of the plant. 
However, such extraction techniques are currently under-developed: Caulkins (2010) gives  an 
example of a home processing method which yields only 3 kg of resin from 100 kg of leaves. The 
IDMU data indicate that only 30% of the weight of tall plants (more than 1.2 m in height) is leaf 
and stem matter (the other 70% being flowering tops). Extracting resin from the leaves with an 
efficiency of 3%, and making the generous assumption that resin has the same THC content as 
the flowering  tops, would increase the effective cannabis yield by only about 1%. It is likely that 
extraction techniques would become much more efficient under a legal regime, but given this 
very low baseline figure and the uncertainty around technical progress in this area, we base our 
estimates only on product from flowering tops. We assume a density of 15 plants per square 
metre (Toonen 2006), but subtract 20% to allow for greenhouse walkways, giving an effective 
density of 12 plants per square metre. This corresponds to a production rate of 480 g per square 
metre per harvest, or 2400 kg per harvest for the entire operation (5000m2 under glass).  
An important issue is the number of harvests per year. Cannabis requires long days (ideally 18-
24 hours of light per day) during its vegetative growth phase and much shorter days (10-12 
hours, which signal approaching winter) in order to flower. Achieving these daylight periods at 
UK latitudes would require artificial light, especially during the winter months. Following 
Caulkins (2010), we assume that plants would be exposed to light for 24 hours per day for the 
first month and then for 12 hours per day for the remaining two months. We consider two 
growing scenarios: first, two harvests per year, covering late spring to early autumn, and 
second, a year-round operation involving four harvests. The first scenario minimises the use of 
artificial light but leaves the greenhouses unused during winter, while the second scenario uses 
more artificial light (and heat) but spreads the fixed costs of the operation. Our purpose in 
considering these two scenarios is not to specify an optimal system of production, but to give an 
idea of the likely sensitivity of costs to plausible variations in the way production might be 
organised.  
The main inputs to be costed are consumables (such as growing medium and fertiliser), 
durables (hydroponic equipment, fans etc), lighting, rent and structural costs, and labour. The 
                                                 
59 http://www.idmu.co.uk/cannabis-plants-cultivation-yields.htm, retrieved 2 September 2001 
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total cost of consumables and amortised durables, taken from Caulkins (2010), is £142 per kg 
(with a low-high range of £71–£214). We also take greenhouse construction costs (amortised 
over 4 years) from Caulkins (2010), at £42 per square metre (with a range of £33–£49), which 
works out to £43 per kg with two harvests (42*5000m2/[2400kg*2]), and £22 per kg with 4  
harvests. The other costs may differ substantially between the US and UK and so we derive 
these estimates from separate sources.  
Lighting requirements depend on the length of the natural day, the required intensity of 
artificial lighting, and the cost of electricity. Using the day lengths given above, we estimate that 
cannabis plants would need 270 hours of artificial light for each of the two summer crops, 660 
hours for the November-January crop, and 480 hours for the February-April crop. Based on the 
light intensities cited by Caulkins, plants would need 430W of illumination per square metre, 
which implies a total energy per year of 1.2 MWh for two harvests and 3.6 MWh for four 
harvests. We cost these lighting requirements at £0.11 per kWh, a typical non-domestic tariff for 
small (less than 20MWh) consumers (DECC 2011). Using our assumed yields, lighting would 
cost £27 per kg in the two-harvest secenario and £42 per kg with four harvests.  
There would also be heating requirements, although it is likely that they would be negligible 
during the summer growing season. To obtain a very approximate estimate of possible heating 
costs, we take figures from Uva and Richards’ (2003) study of commercial greenhouses in New 
York state. They give a cost of about $1 of heating fuel per square foot. In 2011 prices, this 
equates to nearly £8 per square metre, and we allow for a high degree of uncertainty using a 
range of £3.60 to £10.90. With four harvests per year (9600 kg) covering 5000 m2, the heating 
cost per kg works out to just over £4 (£1.90-£5.70), which is only a tenth of the lighting costs. 
Data on farm rents in England (DEFRA 2011) indicate there is variation over type of tenancy 
and over region, which we reflect in a range of £100-£200 per hectare per year,  spanning a 
central estimate of £150. Rental costs are trivial, however, amounting to only £0.03 per kg (over  
two harvests). 
Labour costs are much more substantial. We base our estimates on the labour efficiencies 
reported in Uva and Richards’ (2003) study of commercial greenhouses in New York state. 
Labour efficiency is expressed as the greenhouse area covered per full-time equivalent (FTE) 
worker (including management labour), and we use a figure of 790 square metres per FTE 
worker, allowing for a range of 650–930  m2/FTE. Uva and Richards assume that a full-time job 
requires 55 hours  per week for 50 weeks per year, which is high by UK standards, so we adjust 
these figures downwards to 40 hours per week and 48 weeks per year. This yields an adjusted 
efficiency of 551 m2/FTE (454–648). From similar efficiency figures on management labour, we 
calculate the ratio of total FTE labour to FTE managers as 5.85 (allowing for a range of 5–7). 
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Based on overall labour efficiency and the total labour to management ratio, we can calculate 
that 5000 m2 of greenhouse area would require 1.5 FTE managers (=5000/551/5.85) and 7.5 
FTE operatives (=5000/551 – 1.5). Taking account of the range of labour efficiencies and 
amount of management needed, the overall range of labour inputs is 1.1–2.2 FTE managers and 
6.6–8.8 FTE operatives. These figures relate only to the growing operation. Labour would also 
be needed to harvest and process the flowering tops into saleable cannabis products. Current 
techniques are time consuming (Caulkins 2010) but we could expect rapid technical progress in 
a legal industry. Caulkins gives an estimated range of processing times post-legalisation of 4.8 to 
7.3 hours per kg, which we assume would be operative labour. 
We cost both the growing and processing labour inputs using information about the distribution 
of gross annual full-time pay in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industries from the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 2009 (indexed to 2011 using an average earnings index). 
We assume that a manager is paid at the 75th percentile of the distribution (£28,400 pa), while 
an operative is paid at the 10th percentile (£13,600 pa). Based on these figures and the 
estimated cannabis yields, we estimate total labour costs at £54 per kg, with a range of £47–£71. 
The results are given in Table  4.4.1 above. 
 
A4.5  The market price-potency frontier 
Suppose the market offers two products: standard herb/resin, which has unit THC content   , at 
price   ; and sinsemilla, with THC content    and price   . We consider two alternative versions 
of the Gorman-Lancaster characteristics model, describing the behaviour of a representative 
individual facing a budget constraint: 
                   (A4.5.1) 
where C is expenditure on all goods except cannabis and M is the total budget. Define 
        to be the total weight of cannabis consumed and             to be total THC 
intake.  
Model 1  Here we assume that the consumer is only interested in THC intake, so that 
preferences are representable by a utility function       . In this case, with two products and 
only a single desirable characteristic, the optimal consumption strategy is to consume only the 
variety of cannabis which offers the lowest price per unit of THC. If this is sinsemilla (as we 
observe in the current market), then                   and          is the implicit 
market price of THC. This model implies that standard herb/resin will disappear from the 
market. If this is the case, then a new licensed product with THC content    offered at price    
will be competitive only if           . Note also that total quantity consumed is proportional 
- 131 - 
 
to THC intake, so the elasticity of demand is the same in quantity and THC terms. 
Assume that the licensed product enters at a price    sufficiently far below the level         to 
dominate the market so that the illicit market essentially disappears. In that case, if the demand 
for THC has price elasticity  , the proportionate rise in consumption post-reform is: 
       
     
   
                                                                  
Assume that the tax rate is set sufficiently low that the new licensed supply dominates the 
market as the implicit THC price falls below its current market level of £46.67, with the 
magnitude of the demand increase determined by the elasticity of price Assuming perfectly 
elastic supply and alternative constant values of the demand elasticity ranging from -0.25 to -1, 
we have the predictions summarised in Figure A4.5.1. The greater is the margin by which 
licensed supply undercuts the current illicit market, the greater is the expansion of demand that 
will be observed after reform. A plausible assumption of a demand elasticity of -0.7 and a 10% 
cut in price implies a 7% rise in demand, if price is the only channel by which reform affects 
consumption. 
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Figure A4.5.1  Policy-induced increase in THC demand: 1-component model  
 
The tax raised under a proportional tax system is: 
    
         
   
                                                              
where   is the proportion of market price taken in tax and E is aggregate cannabis expenditure 
in the initial illicit market. If the licensed price    is set to reduce the market price of THC by 
10%, and if the producer/retailer costs and margins amount to £1.45 per gram of cannabis, the 
tax rate   is 42.5%, 56.8% and 65.5% for THC limits of 6%, 8% and 10% respectively. Then 
approximation (A4.5.3) suggests total tax receipts equal to 16%, 29% or 42% of pre-reform 
illicit market turnover, for THC limits of 6%, 8% and 10% respectively. 
Model 2  Now assume that the consumer is interested both in the amount of THC consumed and 
in the volume of cannabis. With two characteristics and two products in the market, the 
optimum will typically involve consumption of both varieties of cannabis in some proportion 
and our interpretation of the current market is that there continues to be a role for standard 
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herb/resin. With          , the identities defining T and X can be used to rewrite the budget 
constraint: 
 
     
     
    
         
     
                                                              
Therefore, in the original illicit market, the implicit prices of THC and cannabis volume are: 
                        (A4.5.5) 
                             (A4.5.6) 
Preferences can be represented by a utility function: 
                                                                                                
Maximisation subject to the budget constraint gives the marginal condition: 
  
  
 
     
     
                                                                                       
where a is the marginal rate of substitution                . This can be solved for a: 
  
     
         
                                                                                      
If a new product with THC content    is introduced, it will be competitive with sinsemilla and 
resin in the market if its price    satisfies: 
  
  
 
     
     
                                                                                    
where j = 1 or 2 is arbitrary. Conditions (A4.5.9) and (A4.5.10) imply: 
   
                   
     
                                                                     
This maximum price frontier is shown in Figure A4.5.2 together with that implied by the 1-
component (THC-only) model.60 Thus, if government wishes the licensed product to undercut 
the illicit market, and considers alternative THC limits of 6%, 8% and 10% as illustrated, it 
would need to set the excise tax rate at a level which will generate a market price significantly 
below £2.80, £3.73 or £4.67 respectively, according to the 1-component model, or £4, £4.67 or 
£5.33 per gram according to the 2-component model. Note that these valuation frontiers are 
independent of the form of the utility function        or          and depend only on the 
prices and technical characteristics of the three cannabis varieties. 
 
                                                 
60 This frontier takes no account of the role of CBD regulation. If CBD is perceived by consumers to be protective of 
mental health, then a licensed product meeting a minimum CBD threshold might be competitive beyond this frontier.  
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Figure A4.5.2  Gorman-Lancaster market valuation frontiers 
 
Under what circumstances will the new optimal demand not involve consumption of imported 
resin? The identity             implies that the market share of sinsemilla satisfies: 
 
   
 
            
 
 
                                                                 
Thus, sinsemilla will be purchased by the representative consumer only if    is set below his or 
her utility-maximising level of mean potency    . In practice there will be a mix of consumers 
with different preferences, operating at different optima, but if    is set sufficiently low, we 
would expect demand for traditional resin to fall so low that it will be uneconomic to supply. 
The policy-induced proportionate price changes caused by a switch to a new equilibrium 
involving consumption only of licensed product and illicit sinsemilla are: 
       
                    
                   
               
                
               
                          
Figures A4.5.3 and A4.5.4 show these implicit price effects for various combinations of THC limit 
and entry price. Note that these changes in implicit prices are very sensitive to the entry price 
  , so the choice of tax rate is critical to the success of the reform. 
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Figure 4.5.3  Policy-induced change in implicit price of THC: 2-component model  
 
 
Figure 4.5.4  Policy-induced change in implicit price of cannabis volume: 2-component model  
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Define    and    to be the pre-reform consumption of standard herb/resin and sinsemilla,   
   
and   
  the post-reform quantities of licensed product and sinsemilla, and T and X the pre-
reform quantities of THC and cannabis volume. Let         be the pre-reform quantity share 
of sinsemillla and                be the average pre-reform potency. Then we have the 
following identities: 
                                                                                   
                                                                                 
    
       
    
                                                                         
The post-reform shares of unlicensed cannabis in quantity and THC terms respectively are: 
  
 
  
 
                
             
                                                                  
    
 
     
 
                    
              
                                                         
Licensed supply is: 
  
  
                
     
                                                              
and thus tax revenue is: 
  
                     
                    
                                                      
 
What effect would the implicit price changes (A4.5.13) have on consumption? We are concerned 
with the consumption of THC for possible mental health and dependency costs, but with 
consumption of cannabis itself for physical health costs linked to smoking. We know very little 
about the underlying structure of implicit demands for the characteristics provided by cannabis 
use, so it is not possible to make a formal prediction of demand under a system of licensed 
supply. However, we would normally expect the consumer’s response to the increased implicit 
price of THC and reduced implicit price of cannabis volume to be to consume less THC but more 
cannabis volume by substituting the licensed product for illicit sinsemilla.  
Maximisation of utility (A4.5.7) subject to the budget constraint (A4.5.1) yields demand 
functions for the quantity of cannabis and THC:  
                                            (A4.5.21) 
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Assume that there is an approximately constant price markup m for high-quality sinsemilla over 
standard herb/resin so that             and both             vary in proportion to    over 
time. Then empirical estimates of the price elasticity of cannabis demand can be interpreted as 
the sum of the elasticities of quantity with respect to             : 
    
     
 
    
      
 
    
      
                                                                
Now suppose that a new licensed variety is introduced, undercutting standard herb/resin and 
thus generating a new market dominated by licensed cannabis and illicit sinsemilla. The 
proportionate effect on aggregate consumption of THC and cannabis quantity will be:  
                                                                               
                                                                               
where     and     are the elasticities of the demand for cannabis quantity and THC with respect 
to their own implicit prices     and     respectively,     and     are the corresponding cross-
elasticities. 
In a 2-component Gorman-Lancaster model, the demand elasticity can be viewed as the sum of 
the elasticities with respect to the shadow prices of THC and cannabis volume (A4.5.22). 
Elasticities can also be decomposed into the effects of price on participation in the market and 
intensity of use by those who do participate. Let C be some measure of consumption of cannabis 
and P be its actual or shadow price, with other influences on demand held constant. The 
expected value of consumption for a randomly-selected individual is: 
                                                                           (A4.5.25) 
The  elasticity  of quantity consumed with respect to price is: 
         
    
 
            
    
 
             
    
                                         
or: 
Total elasticity  =  Participation elasticity + Intensity elasticity                  (A4.5.27) 
The estimated elasticities which appear in the published research literature vary in terms of 
their focus on participation or intensity of consumption and, among the latter, in terms of the 
measure of consumption. Almost all of the available estimates come from the USA or Australia, 
which are the two countries with the best-developed retail price data. None of the estimates 
control for differences in THC content. Table A4.5.1 summarises the major studies of own-price 
elasticity.  See Pacula (2010 for a review of the (predominantly US) literature on price 
elasticities of demand and other non-price influences relevant to policy liberalisation. 
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Although the estimates cover a wide range, they suggest a total own-price elasticity of around  
-0.7 for cannabis. We showed (equation A4.5.22) that this elasticity can be interpreted as the 
sum of the underlying price elasticities for THC and cannabis quantity. In line with this, we 
assume an elasticity of -0.35 for each, but allow for alternative assumptions about the 
substitutability or complementarity of THC and cannabis volume in consumers’ preferences. In 
all cases except strong complementarity, the increased implicit price of THC produces a fall in 
the consumption of THC, but there is, in every case, a rise in the volume of cannabis consumed. 
If this view is correct, then the concern over cannabis-induced psychotic illness may lessen 
relative to the concern over smoking-related physical illness, following this type of reform. 
 
Table A4.5.1  Published estimates of cannabis demand elasticities 
Study Country Type of elasticity Estimate 
Pacula et al (2001) 
USA (high school 
seniors) 
Participation -0.06 to -0.47 
Pacula et al (2001) 
USA (high school 
seniors) 
30-day participation -0.002 to -0.69 
Grossman (2004) 
USA (high school 
seniors) 
Participation -0.46 
Cameron and Williams (2001) Australia  Participation -0.89 
Williams (2004) Australia Participation -0.18 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia Participation -0.21 
Williams et al (2004) 
USA (college 
students) 
Participation -0.20 
Williams et al (2004) 
USA(college 
students) 
30-day participation -0.24 
Desimone and Farrelly 
(2003) 
USA 
Participation: 
Age 12-17 yrs 
Age 18-39 yrs 
 
0.02 (NS) to -0.29 
0.00 to -0.29 
Williams (2004) Australia 
Frequency (among 
users) 
<0 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia 
Frequency (among 
users) 
<0 (NS) 
van Ours and Williams (2007) 
Australia 
(14-22 yr olds) 
Risk of initiation -0.47 to -0.55 
Clements and Daryal (2005) Australia Consumption volume -0.84 
Clements and Zhao (2005) Australia Consumption volume -0.69 
“wrt” = with respect to; “NS” = not statistically significant; participation is measured over 12 months unless otherwise 
stated. All Australian studies cover individuals aged 14 and over unless otherwise stated 
 
 
Table A4.5.2 gives some numerical examples to illustrate these effects, under two assumptions: 
that the licensed cannabis product enters the market 10% below the competitive price frontier 
and succeeds in eliminating the now uncompetitive illicit supply of standard herb/resin; and 
that the price of illicit sinsemilla remains at its current level.  
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Table A4.5.2  Projected price and demand responses under alternative assumptions 
Demand elasticities 
THC 
limit 
Licensed 
price a 
% change 
in 
implicit 
price of 
THC 
% change in 
implicit 
price of 
cannabis 
volume 
% change 
in THC 
consumed 
% change 
in 
cannabis 
quantity 
consumed 
Neutrality: 
             ; 
          
10% £4.80 +32% -80% -11.2% +28.0% 
8% £4.20 +20% -50% -7.0% +17.5% 
6% £3.60 +13% -33% -4.7% +11.7% 
Substitutes: 
             ; 
         .2 
10% £4.80 +32% -80% -27.2% +34.4% 
8% £4.20 +20% -50% -17.0% +21.5% 
6% £3.60 +13% -33% -11.3% +14.3% 
Complements: 
             ; 
          .2 
10% £4.80 +32% -80% +4.8% +21.6% 
8% £4.20 +20% -50% +3.0% +13.5% 
6% £3.60 +13% -33% +2.0% +9.0% 
a Set as 90% of the THC-specific competitive market price defined by sinsemilla (15% THC and £7 per gm) and 
standard herb/resin (6% THC and £4 per gm). 
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Table A4.5.3  Published estimates of cross-price elasticities of cannabis and tobacco demand 
Study Country Type of elasticity Estimate 
Chaloupka et al (1999) 
USA  
(adolescents) 
30-day cannabis 
participation wrt 
tobacco price 
-0.34 to -0.73 (both 
NS) 
Farrelly et al (2001) 
USA 
(12-20 yr olds) 
30-day cannabis 
participation wrt 
tobacco price (tax) 
-0.05 to -0.10 (both 
NS) 
Markowitz and Tauras (2006) 
USA 
(teenagers) 
30-day cannabis 
participation wrt 
tobacco price 
0.56 to 0.99 
Cameron and Williams (2001) Australia 
Cannabis 
participation  wrt 
tobacco price 
0.003 (NS) 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
tobacco price 
-1.1 
Chaloupka et al (1999) 
USA  
(adolescents) 
Cannabis frequency 
(among users) wrt 
tobacco price 
-0.36 to -0.84 
Farrelly et al (2001) 
USA 
(12-20 yr olds) 
Cannabis frequency 
(among users) wrt 
tobacco price (tax) 
-0.44 
Markowitz and Tauras (2006) 
USA 
(teenagers) 
Cannabis frequency 
wrt tobacco price 
0.58 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia 
Cannabis frequency 
(among users) wrt 
tobacco price 
<0 (NS) 
Cameron and Williams (2001) Australia 
Tobacco 
participation  wrt 
cannabis price 
-0.13 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia 
Tobacco 
participation wrt 
cannabis price 
0.06 (NS) 
Zhao and Harris (2004) Australia 
Tobacco frequency 
(among users) wrt 
cannabis price 
>0 (NS) 
“wrt” = with respect to; “NS” = not statistically significant; participation is measured over 12 months unless otherwise 
stated. All Australian studies cover individuals aged 14 and over. 
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Table A4.5.4  Published estimates of cross-price elasticities of cannabis and alcohol demand 
Study Country Type of elasticity Estimate 
Markowitz and Tauras (2006) 
USA 
(teenagers) 
30-day cannabis 
participation wrt 
beer price 
-0.71 
Saffer and Chaloupka 
(1999) 
USA  
(aged 12+) 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
alcohol price 
<0 (NS) 
Pacula (1998) 
USA  
(19-26 yr olds) 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
beer tax 
<0 
Markowitz and Tauras (2006) 
USA 
(teenagers) 
Cannabis frequency 
wrt beer price 
<>0 (NS) 
Pacula (1998) 
USA  
(19-26 yr olds) 
Cannabis frequency 
wrt beer tax 
<0 (NS) 
Clements and Daryal (2005) Australia 
Cannabis volume wrt: 
beer price 
wine price 
spirits price 
 
-0.33 
-0.07 
0.04 
Clements and Zhao (2005) Australia 
Cannabis volume wrt: 
beer price 
wine price 
spirits price 
 
-0.38 
-0.10 
-0.03 
Williams et al (2004) 
USA (college 
students) 
Alcohol participation 
wrt cannabis price 
<0 
Williams et al (2004) 
USA (college 
students) 
30-day alcohol 
participation wrt 
cannabis price 
<0 
Chaloupka and Laixuthai 
(1997) 
USA (high school 
seniors) 
(30-day) alcohol 
participation wrt 
cannabis price 
>0 
Clements and Daryal (2005) Australia 
Beer volume 
Wine volume 
Spirits volume 
wrt cannabis price 
-0.04 
-0.08 
-0.15 
Clements and Zhao (2005) Australia 
Beer volume 
Wine volume 
Spirits volume 
wrt cannabis price 
-0.07 
-0.15 
-0.30 
“wrt” = with respect to; “NS” = not statistically significant; participation is measured over 12 months unless otherwise 
stated. All Australian studies cover individuals aged 14 and over. 
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Table A4.5.5  Published estimates of cross-price elasticities of cannabis and illicit drugs demand 
Study Country Type of elasticity Estimate 
Desimone and Farrelly 
(2003) 
USA 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
cocaine price: 
Age 12-17 yrs 
Age 18-39 yrs 
 
 
0.05  to -0.20 (both 
NS) 
-0.19 to -0.24 
Saffer and Chaloupka 
(1999) 
USA  
(aged 12+) 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
cocaine price 
<0 
Saffer and Chaloupka 
(1999) 
USA  
(aged 12+) 
Cannabis 
participation wrt 
heroin price 
<0 
Desimone and Farrelly 
(2003) 
USA 
Cocaine participation 
wrt cannabis price: 
Age 12-17 yrs 
Age 18-39 yrs 
 
 
-0.10 (NS) to -0.53 
-0.04 (NS) to -0.21 
“wrt” = with respect to; “NS” = not statistically significant; participation is measured over 12 months unless otherwise 
stated. All Australian studies cover individuals aged 14 and over. 
 
 
 
A5.1  Calculation of hourly police costs 
Estimates of unit costs of policing need to address the possibility that more serious offences 
(such as cannabis supply) involve more senior staff and thus higher hourly costs than low-level 
offences such as cannabis possession. For this reason, we have produced a set of grade-specific 
hourly cost factors based on the following assumptions: 
 average rates of pay within grades are proportional to the mid-point of the pay scale for 
that grade in England and Wales in effect from September 2010 
 the total of other costs (apart from pay of police officers) are distributed as support costs in 
proportion to the wage bill within each officer grade. 
Let    be the number of police officers of rank r and    be the mid point of the salary scale for 
rank r. Data for the former are taken from Mills et al (2010) Table 16 and relate to March 31st 
2009. For the latter, we use official salary scales in effect from September 1st 2010, as set out in 
the police information website (www.police-information.co.uk/policepay.htm). Total police 
expenditure, T is taken from Mills et al (2010) Table 9 and relates to the 2008/9 financial year. 
If we make the assumption that all other costs are incurred as support costs in proportion to 
officer salary costs, the following relationship determines full cost per unit of police time (  ): 
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In implementing this formula, we combine the ranks of superintendent and above, assuming 
arbitrarily that numbers of superintendents and chief-superintendents are in the ratio 70:30% 
and that average salary above the rank of chief-superintendent is £100,000. 
Under these assumptions, the hourly costs are as set out in Table A5.1.1. The weighted average 
across all ranks is £68.46 per hour.  
 
Table A5.1.1  Gross hourly costs by police grade 
Constable Sergeant Inspector Chief Inspector Higher ranks 
£62.41 £78.51 £98.09 £107.35 148.7 
 
 
A6.1  The difficulty of causal analysis 
There are six main approaches that have been used in the research literature to address the 
confounding problem in the absence of long-term randomised controlled trials. 
Approach 1: Experimental neuroscience 
For the particular issue of mental health, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) can be 
used to monitor the change in blood flow within the brain and spinal cord as the subject 
undertakes cognitive tasks, following exposure to a treatment such as the administration of 
THC. The results of this kind of analysis can demonstrate convincingly the short-term causal 
effects of cannabis on brain activity, but the links between that activity and long-term 
behavioural and clinical outcomes are not fully understood. However, a tendency for cannabis 
exposure to generate brain activity patterns similar to those observed in people diagnosed with 
mental illness has been used as supporting evidence for a causal interpretation of the 
association between cannabis use and mental illness found in observational data. 
Approach 2: Animal models 
Patterns of drug dependence, including behavioural features like withdrawal symptoms and 
relapse, can be induced in laboratory animals under experimental control. With suitable 
randomised design of the experiments, causality can be demonstrated convincingly in this 
setting. The main drawbacks of animal experiments are that the quality of the animal-human 
comparison is uncertain and that it is often difficult to design experimental treatments which 
are close analogues of the policy variations of interest to us. 
Approach 3: Trend analysis 
Cannabis consumption followed a strongly rising trend from the 1960s until the early years of 
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the millennium. If there were a significant causal link from cannabis use to some particular 
outcome, we would expect to see a corresponding trend in the incidence of that outcome. This 
approach is not necessarily straightforward, since the outcome of interest (such as psychotic 
illness) is often very rare and population impacts consequently hard to detect in aggregate data. 
Outcomes may also only respond to the cannabis rise with a long lag, or may respond to 
cumulative cannabis use rather than point prevalence. There may also be trends in other 
contributory factors which have the effect of obscuring the relationship with cannabis.  
Approach 4: Mendelian randomisation 
If it can be shown that a specific genetic variant is both causally linked to the appetite for 
cannabis and randomly distributed through a relevant population, then division of a sample of 
individuals into genotype groups is analogous to experimental randomisation of exposure to 
cannabis itself. A comparison of outcomes between genotype groups then establishes causality 
in much the same way as randomised controlled trials. This approach has been applied in the 
case of alcohol (see Irons et al 2007), but its power to generate clear conclusions is often limited 
and its potential in the case of cannabis is not yet clear. 
Approach 5: Proxy covariates 
The most obvious solution to the confounding problem is to use surveys data to measure as 
many relevant characteristics of the individual as possible and include them jointly with 
measures of cannabis use as explanatory factors. Published studies have used a wide range of 
covariates, such as measures of personality traits, related behaviours including alcohol and 
tobacco consumption, early mental health and family background. These covariates fulfil a dual 
role: as influences on cannabis use in their own right and as proxies for other unobservable 
determinants of the outcome of interest. The presumption behind this practice is that inclusion 
of each additional proxy must necessarily reduce bias by reducing the degree of confounding, 
but this general presumption is not necessarily correct, as has been shown by Pearl (2000) (see 
also Shrier and Platt 2008). 
Using simulation of an artificial example, we can show that it is quite possible for the bias in 
estimates of the causal impact to worsen when additional controls for confounding are included 
in the analysis.61 Let U be an unobservable factor which tends to predispose people to cannabis 
use and schizophrenia; C is a measure of cannabis use; P is an indicator of psychotic illness, W 
and Y are covariates which are influenced by U; and X is another observed causal factor which 
may be correlated with U. Consider the following simple statistical model: 
                                                 
61 The use of proxies can be improved in some circumstances by using more sophisticated methods, including latent 
variable modelling and propensity score matching. 
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where X,   ,   ,   ,   ,    are independent N(0,1) random variables and      is the indicator 
function, equal to 1 if condition A is  true and 0 otherwise . In this case, there is, by construction, 
no true causal effect of cannabis use C on psychotic illness P.  Note that the parameter r 
determines the degree to which cannabis use C and the covariate W are correlated 
independently of the underlying factor U (r is most likely to be non-zero, reflecting intrinsic 
substitutability or complementarity, if W is another endogenous outcome, such as a measure of 
alcohol or other drug use). It is common practice to include such variables as additional 
“controls”. 
We use the method of Monte Carlo simulation, generating 1000 replications of a sample of 5,000 
individuals from the distribution implied by this model. We then average the results over the 
replications to give estimates of the bias in the results produced by each of the following three 
probit analyses: (i)  P  on C and X; (ii)  P  on C, W and X; (iii)  P  on C, W, Y and X.  In each case, we 
take the probit coefficient of C as the estimate of the causal impact of C on P. 
The estimated biases for two specific choices of parameter values are shown in Table A6.1. 
These results are arbitrary, but they illustrate some important methodological points which 
have been overlooked in much of the research literature. 
 The spurious causation bias can be large – in this case, the coefficient of C is highly 
significantly (P<0.01) different from the true value of zero in every replication 
 The inclusion of additional “controls” W and/or Y for  unobserved confounders never 
succeeds in reducing the bias very much  
 Results with additional controls may be more biased than the original naive estimate (see 
specification 2). 
Table A6.1   Monte Carlo simulations of bias 
Probit model Parameter specification 1a Parameter specification 2b 
P on C, X 0.3691 0.3691 
P on C, W, X 0.3597 0.5245 
P on C, W, Y, X 0.3575 0.5220 
a Parameters:                                                                          
                                           b Parameters identical except for       
- 146 - 
 
 
Approach 6: Fixed/random effects 
A second approach is to deal with unobservable confounding factors by using “fixed effects” or 
“random effects” methods which assume the confounding factors to remain constant as the 
individual is observed through time. This makes it possible to use observations on the 
individual’s own past to isolate the common unobserved factors and strip them out, leaving an 
estimate of the remaining causal impact of cannabis use on the outcome of interest. This widely 
used method has been criticised by Hernandez and Pudney (2011), who show that the 
assumption of constancy over time is critical and that even modest degrees of time-variation in 
confounding factors can lead to spurious causal estimates. 
 
A6.2  Criminal records and the labour market 
Evidence suggests the existence of two distinct sectors. Sector 1 covers occupations (such as 
education, finance and health) in which criminality is perceived to be a potential problem, so 
that employers are highly likely to carry out criminal record checks when filling vacant posts. 
Sector 2 covers less sensitive occupations (such as manual work) where criminality is not a 
major issue and the likelihood of checks is much lower. Consider the following two-sector 
search model of unemployment, based on Thomas (1998). 
The probability of locating a vacant post in sector s = 1, 2 within any short time interval [t, t+dt] 
is         , where    is the effort devoted to searching in sector j. The probability of a job 
application being successful is    and the distribution of offered wage rates is          
      . The individual will accept any job with a wage rate exceeding the reservation wage  
 .  If 
the marginal cost of search effort is c and the interest rate is r, then search in each sector will be 
undertaken up to the point where the marginal return to search is equal to its marginal cost. 
The hazard rate for movements from unemployment into sector s is the instantaneous 
probability of locating a vacancy, successfully applying and receiving an acceptable wage offer: 
                
                                                             (A6.2.1) 
and the overall hazard rate for any exit from unemployment is: 
                                                                                (A6.2.2) 
If out-of-work income, the vacancy discovery rate, the application success rate and the sectoral 
wage offer distributions are all constant through time, the resulting duration distribution is 
exponential and has mean: 
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                                                         (A6.2.3) 
If we also assume that all employment spells have the same expected duration   , then the 
proportion of a long career spent in unemployment will be: 
                         
  
     
                                                    (A6.2.4) 
The probability that the individual finds work in sector s is: 
                     
  
     
                                                    (A6.2.5) 
and the average wage while in employment is: 
            
  
     
         
    
  
     
         
                 (A6.2.6) 
Under normal assumptions, search theory implies that, if the probability of an offer in sector 1 
falls because of a criminal record (   ), search effort will be diverted to sector 2 (       ), the 
reservation wage will fall in response to the lower overall availability of jobs (   ), but the 
overall exit rate from unemployment will fall (       ). Therefore, the proportion of time 
spent unemployed will rise. Given the lower average wage in sector 2, the fall in the reservation 
wage and the diversion of search effort to sector 2, the average wage while in employment will 
also fall. 
Where is the social cost in all this? Assume the criminal record does not alter the individual’s 
potential productivity in any causal sense and that the reduced success rate is purely the result 
of stigma. Then the loss to the individual and society is the output lost during the additional 
periods of unemployment plus the difference between the output that would have been 
produced in a normal configuration of employment and that produced during a career of poorer 
job matches. If productivity is perfectly rewarded by earnings, the social cost can be evaluated 
as the change caused by the conviction to the career average level of annual earnings: 
                 
  
     
 
  
     
         
    
  
     
         
                  (A6.2.7) 
 
For any individual, we can calibrate this structure by adopting specific numerical values for two 
characteristics: the proportion of elapsed career time spent unemployed (C1); and the 
proportion of time in employment which is spent in sector 1 (C2). These quantities are defined 
by equations (A6.2.4) and (A6.2.5) respectively.  
Now make a further assumption that the effect of a criminal record for a cannabis offence is to 
halve the hazard rate    for transitions from unemployment to sector 1 employment, while    
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remains unchanged.62 We then replace    by       and re-compute (A6.2.7). As examples of this, 
consider two hypothetical individuals. Individual A has low qualifications and, without a 
criminal record would be expected to spend 8% of his career unemployed, to have mean 
unemployment spell durations of 6 months and, when employed, has jobs in the favoured sector 
1 only 20% of the time. Individual B would normally spend only 2% of his career unemployed, 
with a mean unemployment spell length of 3 months, and 80% of his employment is in sector 1. 
Both A and B have the same average pay when employed in sector 2; A’s pay in sector 1 is 20% 
higher than in sector 2 but, for individual B sector 2 pay is double the level in sector 1. 
For individual A, the social cost of a criminal record amounts to 2.6% of his expected career 
earnings, as a consequence of a 10% rise in the time he spends unemployed, and a near-halving 
of the proportion of employment spent in sector 1. In the absence of a criminal record, 
individual B has average career earnings 84% higher than individual A and, for him, the 
potential social cost is much greater, amounting to 8.6% of career earnings, which is a 
consequence of a 65% rise in time spent unemployed and a 20% fall in his proportion of 
employment in sector 1.  
We use this approach to estimate the aggregate social cost of drug-related criminal records in 
the following way. 
Step 1 Define x as a set of personal characteristics which are observable in the Arrestee Survey 
and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). They include gender and the age at which full-
time education was completed. Define sector 1 to cover all occupations in education, health, 
finance, the law and public service. Using BHPS observations for people aged 20-35 during the 
period since 2000, estimate cross-section statistical models of Pr(unemployed|x) and     
Pr(sector 1|employed, x). The predicted probabilities from these models provide values of C1 
and C2 for any individual with given characteristics x. 
Step 2 For each Arrestee Survey respondent who is: (i) a first-time arrestee; (ii) under arrest 
on suspicion of a drugs offence and (iii) reports being a current cannabis user who is not also 
using hard drugs, use the estimated BHPS models to predict the individual’s values for C1 and 
C2.63 Calculate the expression (A6.2.7) with no criminal record effect, then recalculate after 
halving h1, to give the proportionate reduction in career earnings, using average earnings levels 
for sectors 1 and 2, taken from the LFS. This is equivalent to changing the baseline estimate of 
                                                 
62 Note that this implies that, in equation (A6.2.2), the diversion of search activity away from sector 1 exactly offsets 
the increase in the hazard caused by the fall in the reservation wage; and that the increase in h2 caused by the 
reduced reservation wage and increased search effort in sector 2 is exactly offset by the negative impact of the 
criminal record on the success rate 2. There is no empirical evidence to confirm the validity of these assumptions, 
but they seem reasonable as a first approximation. 
63 Note that the BHPS model for C2 can also be estimated for the AS sample and used as a check or to re-calibrate the 
BHPS estimates to allow for selection effects. 
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 from C2 to 
  
    
  and the estimate of 
  
     
 from (1-C1) to   
   
          
. Calculate the 
weighted sample mean of this proportionate loss of career earnings,   . 
Step 3 Construct an estimate of the aggregate annual social cost (internal + external) for the 
inflow of new arrestees as: 
               (A6.2.12) 
where N is the number of convictions for cannabis possession and supply offences in England 
and Wales in 2010, f is the proportion of cases which are first-time arrests in the sample of AS 
respondents who are cannabis users64 and were arrested on suspicion of a drugs offence.    is 
the level of average earnings in 2010.  
Step 4 Assume the scarring effect decays to zero linearly over 10 years, so that the social cost 
for this cohort of cannabis convicts t years after first conviction is s/(1-t/10). Assume further 
that the flow of convictions is stable over time, so that the output loss caused by the scarring in 
the current period, aggregated over all relevant past cohorts of convicts, is:  
        
 
  
 
   
   
                                                              
 
 
A6.3 Direct and indirect effects on earnings potential 
We make a simple distinction between high school graduation and non-graduation. Define 
  
     and   
     to be the expected level of annual earnings at reference age a for a graduate 
and non-graduate respectively, under policy regime 0 (the status quo).   
     and   
     are the 
school graduation65 rates for people who respectively have and have not used cannabis by age 
16 (the “early” and “late” onset groups).  
Because cannabis use can have an impact on educational attainment at an early age and another 
impact on productivity at later ages, we distinguish four population groups, defined in terms of 
their outcomes at age a under current policy: 
(I) Lifetime abstainer: no cannabis use prior to age 16 and none at age a; 
(II) Late-onset user: no cannabis use prior to age 16 but some use at age a; 
(III) Early experimenter: cannabis onset prior to age 16 but no cannabis use at age a; 
(IV) Sustained user: cannabis onset prior to age 16 and cannabis use at age a. 
                                                 
64 But not also users of heroin, crack or cocaine 
65 Defined here as achievement of at least one GCSE pass of grade C or above (normally at age 16). 
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Before reform, the probabilities of these four outcomes are: 
  
   
              
                                                                  
  
    
           
                                                                           
  
     
          
                                                                           
  
    
       
                                                                                     
where Q is the probability of onset of cannabis use before age 17 and   
     and   
     are the 
probabilities of being a current cannabis user at age a conditional on late and early onset, 
respectively, all under the current policy environment. 
We assume that reform causes a uniform expansion, at a rate                 , according 
to the assumed market response scenario, in the prevalence of early onset and the probability of 
cannabis use in later life. Thus, post-reform, these probabilities   
   
      
    
    are 
(approximately) equal to (A6.3.1)-(A6.3.4), but with  ,   
     and   
     multiplied by a factor 
     .66 This implies that reform will unambiguously reduce   
   
    and increase   
     
    and 
  
    
   . For plausible values of Q,   
    
    will also increase. Thus    
   
     ,    
    
     , 
  
     
      and   
    
     . 
We assume that the impact of policy on school attainment is only the result of changes in the 
number of people with early onset of cannabis use. Consequently, the probabilities of school 
graduation conditional on early or late onset are    and   , which are unaffected by reform. 
Under policy regime r = 0 or 1, the expected level of annual earnings at age a for someone who 
remains a member of group I ... IV is: 
                                       
    
             
           
    
             
             
                                
There is an important selection issue relating to the earnings of people who would be in group I 
or II under existing policy, but in the early onset groups III and IV under the new policy. Such 
behavioural “movers” are likely to come from the lower part of the earnings distribution and 
thus would have below-average earnings within groups I and II under status quo policy. They 
are also likely to have higher-than-average earnings within the early onset group under the 
reform scenario. There are no estimates of the joint causal impact of early cannabis use on 
education and lifetime earnings, so we have no way of allowing for this selection effect. Its effect 
will be to bias upwards our estimates of the net social costs of reform.  
                                                 
66 Note that this approximation implies a change in prevalence rather greater than the assumed expansion rate  , so 
our analysis is again conservative. 
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Now assume that any reform-induced change in earnings is proportional so that, for anyone 
who is drawn into cannabis use by reform,          
  and         
 , where g is a 
constant revealed to us by past research on the impact of cannabis use in the labour market. By 
definition, these direct earnings effects only apply to groups II and IV, so the policy-induced 
change in overall average earnings for the cohort at age a is: 
        
                        
    
      
    
                                                  
                    
                          
    
      
    
                                 
where   means the change  from policy regime 0 to regime 1 and  
         
          
  
and   
         
          
  are expected earnings for the late and early onset groups. 
Consequently, the aggregate impact in the population as a whole is: 
             
 
                                                                       
where     is the size of the working population aged a.  
We implement expression (A6.4.3) in the following stages. 
Step 1 Set g to 0 for the central and low estimate, in line with the majority of the research 
literature. For the upper estimate, assume an impact on earnings of -10% (in line with Van Ours 
2007b). 
Step 2 Estimate separate non-parametric regressions67 of annual total earnings on age, for non-
disabled working-age adults with and without basic school qualifications, using 2010 LFS data. 
Use these models to predict   
     and   
     at each age. 
Step 3 Using data from the 2009/10 BCS, estimate Q as the proportion of respondents with 
onset of cannabis use at or before age 16. 
Step 4 Estimate    as the proportion of 2009/10 late onset BCS respondents with school 
qualifications. 
Step 5 For the lower limit of the high-low range, set    equal to   . For the upper limit, set    
equal to the proportion of 2009/10 early onset BCS respondents with school qualifications. For 
the central estimate, use the average of these two values for   . 
Step 6 Using data from the 2009/10 BCS, estimate   
     and   
     from separate 
nonparametric regressions of (last-year) cannabis prevalence on age for the group of 
respondents with early onset of cannabis use and the remainder of the adult sample. 
                                                 
67 We use the locally-linear weighted least-squares method, using a tricube weighting function and bandwidth of 0.5. 
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Step 7  Set               to reflect the market response scenarios of Table 4.5.3 and 
construct      as the age-specific ONS estimates of the resident population reduced by 10% to 
allow for non-employability through disability. Use (A6.3.7) to construct low, mid and high 
estimates of the total gross aggregate earnings loss from cannabis use.  
